The Republic. Plato

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СКАЧАТЬ that you class injustice with wisdom and virtue, and justice with the opposite.

      Certainly I do so class them.

      Now, I said, you are on more substantial and almost unanswerable ground; for if the injustice which you were maintaining to be profitable had been admitted by you as by others to be vice and deformity, an answer might have been given to you on received principles; but now I perceive that you will call injustice honourable and strong, and to the unjust you will attribute all the qualities which were attributed by us before to the just, seeing that you do not hesitate to rank injustice with wisdom and virtue.

      You have guessed most infallibly, he replied.

      Then I certainly ought not to shrink from going through with the argument so long as I have reason to think that you, Thrasymachus, are speaking your real mind; for I do believe that you are now in earnest and are not amusing yourself at our expense.

      I may be in earnest or not, but what is that to you?—to refute the argument is your business.

      Very true, I said; that is what I have to do: But will you be so good as answer yet one more question? Does the just man try to gain any advantage over the just?

      Far otherwise; if he did would not be the simple, amusing creature which he is.

      And would he try to go beyond just action?

      He would not.

      And how would he regard the attempt to gain an advantage over the unjust; would that be considered by him as just or unjust?

      He would think it just, and would try to gain the advantage; but he would not be able.

      Whether he would or would not be able, I said, is not to the point. My question is only whether the just man, while refusing to have more than another just man, would wish and claim to have more than the unjust?

      Yes, he would.

      And what of the unjust—does he claim to have more than the just man and to do more than is just.

      Of course, he said, for he claims to have more than all men.

      And the unjust man will strive and struggle to obtain more than the unjust man or action, in order that he may have more than all?

      True.

      We may put the matter thus, I said—the just does not desire more than his like but more than his unlike, whereas the unjust desires more than both his like and his unlike?

      Nothing, he said, can be better than that statement.

      And the unjust is good and wise, and the just is neither?

      Good again, he said.

      And is not the unjust like the wise and good and the just unlike them?

      Of course, he said, he who is of a certain nature, is like those who are of a certain nature; he who is not, not.

      Each of them, I said, is such as his like is?

      Certainly, he replied.

      Very good, Thrasymachus, I said; and now to take the case of the arts: you would admit that one man is a musician and another not a musician?

      Yes.

      And which is wise and which is foolish?

      Clearly the musician is wise, and he who is not a musician is foolish.

      And he is good in as far as he is wise, and bad in as far as he is foolish?

      Yes.

      And you would say the same sort of thing of the physician?

      Yes.

      And do you think, my excellent friend, that a musician when he adjusts the lyre would desire or claim to exceed or go beyond a musician in the tightening and loosening the strings?

      I do not think that he would.

      But he would claim to exceed the non-musician?

      Of course.

      And what would you say of the physician? In prescribing meats and drinks would he wish to go beyond another physician or beyond the practice of medicine?

      He would not.

      But he would wish to go beyond the non-physician?

      Yes.

      And about knowledge and ignorance in general; see whether you think that any man who has knowledge ever would wish to have the choice of saying or doing more than another man who has knowledge. Would he not rather say or do the same as his like in the same case?

      That, I suppose, can hardly be denied.

      And what of the ignorant? would he not desire to have more than either the knowing or the ignorant?

      I dare say.

      And the knowing is wise?

      Yes.

      And the wise is good?

      True.

      Then the wise and good will not desire to gain more than his like, but more than his unlike and opposite?

      I suppose so.

      Whereas the bad and ignorant will desire to gain more than both?

      Yes.

      But did we not say, Thrasymachus, that the unjust goes beyond both his like and unlike? Were not these your words? They were.

      They were.

      And you also said that the lust will not go beyond his like but his unlike?

      Yes.

      Then the just is like the wise and good, and the unjust like the evil and ignorant?

      That is the inference.

      And each of them is such as his like is?

      That was admitted.

      Then the just has turned out to be wise and good and the unjust evil and ignorant.

      Thrasymachus made all these admissions, not fluently, as I repeat them, but with extreme reluctance; it was a hot summer's day, and the perspiration poured from him in torrents; and then I saw what I had never seen before, Thrasymachus blushing. As we were now agreed that justice was virtue and wisdom, and injustice vice and ignorance, I proceeded to another point:

      Well, I said, Thrasymachus, that matter is now settled; but were we not also saying that injustice had strength; do you remember?

      Yes, I remember, he said, but do not suppose that I approve of what you are saying or have no answer; if however СКАЧАТЬ