The Republic. Plato

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СКАЧАТЬ according to your argument it is just to injure those who do no wrong?

      Nay, Socrates; the doctrine is immoral.

      Then I suppose that we ought to do good to the just and harm to the unjust?

      I like that better.

      But see the consequence:—Many a man who is ignorant of human nature has friends who are bad friends, and in that case he ought to do harm to them; and he has good enemies whom he ought to benefit; but, if so, we shall be saying the very opposite of that which we affirmed to be the meaning of Simonides.

      Very true, he said: and I think that we had better correct an error into which we seem to have fallen in the use of the words 'friend' and 'enemy.'

      What was the error, Polemarchus? I asked.

      We assumed that he is a friend who seems to be or who is thought good.

      And how is the error to be corrected?

      We should rather say that he is a friend who is, as well as seems, good; and that he who seems only, and is not good, only seems to be and is not a friend; and of an enemy the same may be said.

      You would argue that the good are our friends and the bad our enemies?

      Yes.

      And instead of saying simply as we did at first, that it is just to do good to our friends and harm to our enemies, we should further say: It is just to do good to our friends when they are good and harm to our enemies when they are evil?

      Yes, that appears to me to be the truth.

      But ought the just to injure any one at all?

      Undoubtedly he ought to injure those who are both wicked and his enemies.

      When horses are injured, are they improved or deteriorated?

      The latter.

      Deteriorated, that is to say, in the good qualities of horses, not of dogs?

      Yes, of horses.

      And dogs are deteriorated in the good qualities of dogs, and not of horses?

      Of course.

      And will not men who are injured be deteriorated in that which is the proper virtue of man?

      Certainly.

      And that human virtue is justice?

      To be sure.

      Then men who are injured are of necessity made unjust?

      That is the result.

      But can the musician by his art make men unmusical?

      Certainly not.

      Or the horseman by his art make them bad horsemen?

      Impossible.

      And can the just by justice make men unjust, or speaking general can the good by virtue make them bad?

      Assuredly not.

      Any more than heat can produce cold?

      It cannot.

      Or drought moisture?

      Clearly not.

      Nor can the good harm any one?

      Impossible.

      And the just is the good?

      Certainly.

      Then to injure a friend or any one else is not the act of a just man, but of the opposite, who is the unjust?

      I think that what you say is quite true, Socrates.

      Then if a man says that justice consists in the repayment of debts, and that good is the debt which a man owes to his friends, and evil the debt which he owes to his enemies—to say this is not wise; for it is not true, if, as has been clearly shown, the injuring of another can be in no case just.

      I agree with you, said Polemarchus.

      Then you and I are prepared to take up arms against any one who attributes such a saying to Simonides or Bias or Pittacus, or any other wise man or seer?

      I am quite ready to do battle at your side, he said.

      Shall I tell you whose I believe the saying to be?

      Whose?

      I believe that Periander or Perdiccas or Xerxes or Ismenias the Theban, or some other rich and mighty man, who had a great opinion of his own power, was the first to say that justice is 'doing good to your friends and harm to your enemies.'

      Most true, he said.

      Yes, I said; but if this definition of justice also breaks down, what other can be offered?

      Several times in the course of the discussion Thrasymachus had made an attempt to get the argument into his own hands, and had been put down by the rest of the company, who wanted to hear the end. But when Polemarchus and I had done speaking and there was a pause, he could no longer hold his peace; and, gathering himself up, he came at us like a wild beast, seeking to devour us. We were quite panic-stricken at the sight of him.

      SOCRATES - POLEMARCHUS - THRASYMACHUS

      He roared out to the whole company: What folly. Socrates, has taken possession of you all? And why, sillybillies, do you knock under to one another? I say that if you want really to know what justice is, you should not only ask but answer, and you should not seek honour to yourself from the refutation of an opponent, but have your own answer; for there is many a one who can ask and cannot answer. And now I will not have you say that justice is duty or advantage or profit or gain or interest, for this sort of nonsense will not do for me; I must have clearness and accuracy.

      I was panic-stricken at his words, and could not look at him without trembling. Indeed I believe that if I had not fixed my eye upon him, I should have been struck dumb: but when I saw his fury rising, I looked at him first, and was therefore able to reply to him.

      Thrasymachus, I said, with a quiver, don't be hard upon us. Polemarchus and I may have been guilty of a little mistake in the argument, but I can assure you that the error was not intentional. If we were seeking for a piece of gold, you would not imagine that we were 'knocking under to one another,' and so losing our chance of finding it. And why, when we are seeking for justice, a thing more precious than many pieces of gold, do you say that we are weakly yielding to one another and not doing our utmost to get at the truth? Nay, my good friend, we are most willing and anxious to do so, but the fact is that we cannot. And if so, you people who know all things should pity us and not be angry with us.

      How characteristic of Socrates! he replied, with a bitter laugh;—that's your ironical style! Did I not foresee—have I not already told you, that whatever he was asked he would refuse СКАЧАТЬ