The Republic. Plato

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СКАЧАТЬ - CLEITOPHON - POLEMARCHUS - THRASYMACHUS

      Yes, said Cleitophon, interposing, if you are allowed to be his witness.

      But there is no need of any witness, said Polemarchus, for Thrasymachus himself acknowledges that rulers may sometimes command what is not for their own interest, and that for subjects to obey them is justice.

      Yes, Polemarchus—Thrasymachus said that for subjects to do what was commanded by their rulers is just.

      Yes, Cleitophon, but he also said that justice is the interest of the stronger, and, while admitting both these propositions, he further acknowledged that the stronger may command the weaker who are his subjects to do what is not for his own interest; whence follows that justice is the injury quite as much as the interest of the stronger.

      But, said Cleitophon, he meant by the interest of the stronger what the stronger thought to be his interest—this was what the weaker had to do; and this was affirmed by him to be justice.

      Those were not his words, rejoined Polemarchus.

      SOCRATES - THRASYMACHUS

      Never mind, I replied, if he now says that they are, let us accept his statement. Tell me, Thrasymachus, I said, did you mean by justice what the stronger thought to be his interest, whether really so or not?

      Certainly not, he said. Do you suppose that I call him who is mistaken the stronger at the time when he is mistaken?

      Yes, I said, my impression was that you did so, when you admitted that the ruler was not infallible but might be sometimes mistaken.

      You argue like an informer, Socrates. Do you mean, for example, that he who is mistaken about the sick is a physician in that he is mistaken? or that he who errs in arithmetic or grammar is an arithmetician or grammarian at the me when he is making the mistake, in respect of the mistake? True, we say that the physician or arithmetician or grammarian has made a mistake, but this is only a way of speaking; for the fact is that neither the grammarian nor any other person of skill ever makes a mistake in so far as he is what his name implies; they none of them err unless their skill fails them, and then they cease to be skilled artists. No artist or sage or ruler errs at the time when he is what his name implies; though he is commonly said to err, and I adopted the common mode of speaking. But to be perfectly accurate, since you are such a lover of accuracy, we should say that the ruler, in so far as he is the ruler, is unerring, and, being unerring, always commands that which is for his own interest; and the subject is required to execute his commands; and therefore, as I said at first and now repeat, justice is the interest of the stronger.

      Indeed, Thrasymachus, and do I really appear to you to argue like an informer?

      Certainly, he replied.

      And you suppose that I ask these questions with any design of injuring you in the argument?

      Nay, he replied, 'suppose' is not the word—I know it; but you will be found out, and by sheer force of argument you will never prevail.

      I shall not make the attempt, my dear man; but to avoid any misunderstanding occurring between us in future, let me ask, in what sense do you speak of a ruler or stronger whose interest, as you were saying, he being the superior, it is just that the inferior should execute—is he a ruler in the popular or in the strict sense of the term?

      In the strictest of all senses, he said. And now cheat and play the informer if you can; I ask no quarter at your hands. But you never will be able, never.

      And do you imagine, I said, that I am such a madman as to try and cheat, Thrasymachus? I might as well shave a lion.

      Why, he said, you made the attempt a minute ago, and you failed.

      Enough, I said, of these civilities. It will be better that I should ask you a question: Is the physician, taken in that strict sense of which you are speaking, a healer of the sick or a maker of money? And remember that I am now speaking of the true physician.

      A healer of the sick, he replied.

      And the pilot—that is to say, the true pilot—is he a captain of sailors or a mere sailor?

      A captain of sailors.

      The circumstance that he sails in the ship is not to be taken into account; neither is he to be called a sailor; the name pilot by which he is distinguished has nothing to do with sailing, but is significant of his skill and of his authority over the sailors.

      Very true, he said.

      Now, I said, every art has an interest?

      Certainly.

      For which the art has to consider and provide?

      Yes, that is the aim of art.

      And the interest of any art is the perfection of it—this and nothing else?

      What do you mean?

      I mean what I may illustrate negatively by the example of the body. Suppose you were to ask me whether the body is self-sufficing or has wants, I should reply: Certainly the body has wants; for the body may be ill and require to be cured, and has therefore interests to which the art of medicine ministers; and this is the origin and intention of medicine, as you will acknowledge. Am I not right?

      Quite right, he replied.

      But is the art of medicine or any other art faulty or deficient in any quality in the same way that the eye may be deficient in sight or the ear fail of hearing, and therefore requires another art to provide for the interests of seeing and hearing—has art in itself, I say, any similar liability to fault or defect, and does every art require another supplementary art to provide for its interests, and that another and another without end? Or have the arts to look only after their own interests? Or have they no need either of themselves or of another?—having no faults or defects, they have no need to correct them, either by the exercise of their own art or of any other; they have only to consider the interest of their subject-matter. For every art remains pure and faultless while remaining true—that is to say, while perfect and unimpaired. Take the words in your precise sense, and tell me whether I am not right."

      Yes, clearly.

      Then medicine does not consider the interest of medicine, but the interest of the body?

      True, he said.

      Nor does the art of horsemanship consider the interests of the art of horsemanship, but the interests of the horse; neither do any other arts care for themselves, for they have no needs; they care only for that which is the subject of their art?

      True, he said.

      But surely, Thrasymachus, the arts are the superiors and rulers of their own subjects?

      To this he assented with a good deal of reluctance.

      Then, I said, no science or art considers or enjoins the interest of the stronger or superior, but only the interest of the subject and weaker?

      He made an attempt to contest this proposition also, but finally acquiesced.

      Then, СКАЧАТЬ