An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue. Francis Hutcheson
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Название: An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue
Автор: Francis Hutcheson
Издательство: Ingram
Жанр: Афоризмы и цитаты
Серия: Natural Law and Enlightenment Classics
isbn: 9781614871934
isbn:
Whatever Faults the Ingenious may find with ||37this Performance, the Author|| hopes no body will find any thing in it contrary to Religion or good Manners: and he shall be well pleased if he gives the learned World an occasion of examining more thorowly these Subjects, which are, he presumes, of very considerable Importance. The chief Ground of his Assurance that his Opinions in the main are just, is this, That as he took the first Hints of them from some of the greatest Writers of Antiquity,vii so the more he has convers’d with them, he finds his Illustrations the more conformable to their Sentiments.
||38In the former Edition of this Book there were some Mistakes in one or two of the Instances borrowed [xxiii] from other Sciences, to a perfect Knowledge of which the Author does not pretend; nor would he now undertake that this Edition is every way faultless. He hopes that those who are studious of the true measures of Life, may find his Ideas of Virtue and Happiness tolerably just; and that the profound Connoisseurs will pardon a few Faults, in the Illustrations borrow’d from their Arts, upon which his Arguments do not depend.|| [xxiv]
THE CONTENTSi
SECTION II. Of original or absolute Beauty.
SECTION III. Of the Beauty of Theorems.
SECTION IV. Of || 39 comparative or relative|| Beauty.
SECTION VI. Concerning the Universality of our Sense of Beauty.
SECTION VII. Concerning the Power of Custom, Education and Example, as to our internal Senses.
SECTION VIII. Of the Importance of the internal Senses in Life, and the final Causes of them. [xxv]
TREATISE II
INTRODUCTION.
SECTION I. Of the moral Sense by which we perceive Virtue and Vice, and approve, or disapprove them in others.
SECTION II. Concerning the immediate Motive to virtuous Actions.
SECTION III. The Sense of Virtue, and the various Opinions about it, reducible to one general Foundation. The manner of computing the Morality of Actions.
SECTION IV. All Mankind agree in this general Foundation of their Approbation of moral Actions. The Grounds of different Opinions about Morals.
SECTION V. A further Confirmation that we have practical Dispositions to Virtue implanted in our Nature; with a further Explication of our Instinct to Benevolence in its various Degrees; with the additional Motives of Interest, viz. Honour, Shame, Pity.
SECTION VI. Concerning the Importance of this moral Sense to the present Happiness of Mankind, and its Influence on human Affairs. [xxvi]
SECTION VII. A Deduction of some complex moral Ideas, viz. of Obligation, and Right, Perfect, Imperfect, and External; Alienable and Unalienable from this moral Sense.
viz.
An Inquiry Concerning Beauty, Order, &c.[1]||
An Inquiry ||2Concerning Beauty, Order, &c.||
Concerning some Powers of Perception, distinct from what is generally understood by Sensation.
To make the following Observations understood, it may be necessary to premise some Definitions, and Observations, either universally acknowledg’d, or sufficiently prov’d by many Writers both ancient and modern, concerning our Perceptions called Sensations, and the Actions of the Mind consequent upon them.
||5Sensation.||
Art. ||3I||. Those Ideas ||4which|| are rais’d in the Mind upon the presence of external Ob-[2]jects, and their acting upon our Bodys, are call’d Sensations. We find that the Mind in such Cases is passive, and has not Power directly to prevent the Perception or Idea, or to vary it at its Reception, as long as we continue our Bodys in a state fit to be acted upon by the external Object.
Different Senses.
II. When two Perceptions are entirely different from each other, or agree in nothing but the general Idea of Sensation, we call the Powers of receiving those different Perceptions, different Senses. Thus Seeing and Hearing denote the different Powers of receiving the Ideas of Colours and Sounds. And altho Colours have ||6vast|| Differences among themselves, as also have Sounds; yet there is a greater Agreement among the most opposite Colours, than between any Colour and a Sound: Hence we call all Colours Perceptions of the same Sense. All the several Senses seem to have their distinct Organs, except Feeling, which is in some degree diffus’d over the whole Body.
The Mind how active.
III. The Mind has a Power of compounding Ideas, ||7which|| were receiv’d separately; of comparing ||8their|| Objects by means of the Ideas, and of observing their Relations СКАЧАТЬ