An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue. Francis Hutcheson
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СКАЧАТЬ Taste: In Musick we seem universally to acknowledge something like a distinct Sense from the External one of Hearing, and call it a good Ear; and the like distinction we ||38should|| probably acknowledge in other ||39Objects||, had we also got distinct Names to denote these Powers of Perception by.

      

      Different from External.

      XI. 40There will appear another Reason perhaps ||41afterwards||, for calling this Power of perceiving the Ideas of Beauty, an Internal Sense, from this, that in some other Affairs, where our External Senses are not much concern’d, we discern a sort of Beauty, very like, in many respects, to that observ’d in sensible Objects, and accompany’d with like Pleasure: Such is that Beauty perceiv’d in Theorems, or universal Truths, in general Causes, and in some extensive Principles of Action.

      XII. Let ||42aevery one here consider, how different we must suppose the Perception to be, with which a Poet is transported upon the Prospect of any of those Objects [10] of natural Beauty, which ravish us even in his Description; from that cold lifeless Conception which we ||43bimagine inb|| a dull Critick, or one of the Virtuosi, without what we call a fine Taste. This latter Class of Men may have greater Perfection in that Knowledge, which is deriv’d from external Sensation; they can tell all the specifick Differences of Trees, Herbs, Minerals, Metals; they know the Form of every Leaf, Stalk, Root, Flower, and Seed of all the Species, about which the Poet is often very ignorant: And yet the Poet shall have a ||44cvastlyc|| more delightful Perception of the Whole; and not only the Poet but any man of a fine Taste. Our External ||45dSensesd|| may by measuring teach us all the Proportions of Architecture to the Tenth of an Inch, and the Situation of every Muscle in the human Body; and a good Memory may retain these: and yet there is still something further necessary, not only to make ||46ea mane|| a compleat Master in Architecture, Painting or Statuary, but even a tolerable Judge in these Works; or ||47fcapable of receivingf|| the highest Pleasure in contemplating them.a|| Since then there are such different Powers of Perception, where what are commonly called the External Senses are the same; since the most accurate Knowledge of what the External Senses discover, ||48often does|| not give the Pleasure of Beauty or Harmony, which yet one of a good Taste will en-[11]joy at once without much Knowledge; we may justly use another Name for these higher, and more delightful Perceptions of Beauty and Harmony, and call the Power of receiving such Impressions, an Internal Sense. The Difference of the Perceptions seems sufficient to vindicate the Use of a different Name, ||49especially when we are told in what meaning the Word is applied.||

      

      Its Pleasures necessary and immediate.

      XIII.50 This superior Power of Perception is justly called a Sense, because of its Affinity to the other Senses in this, that the Pleasure ||51does not arise|| from any Knowledge of Principles, Proportions, Causes, or of the Usefulness of the Object; ||52but strikes us at first with the Idea of|| Beauty: nor does the most accurate Knowledge increase this Pleasure of Beauty, however it53 may super-add a distinct rational Pleasure from prospects of Advantage, or ||54from|| the Increase of Knowledge.*

      XIV.55 And further, the Ideas of Beauty and Harmony, like other sensible Ideas, are necessarily pleasant to us, as well as immediately so; neither can any Resolution of our own, nor any Prospect of Advantage or Disadvantage, vary the Beauty or Deformity of an Object: For as in the external Sensations, no View of Interest will [12] make an Object grateful, nor ||56View of|| Detriment, distinct from immediate Pain in the Perception, make it disagreeable to the Sense; so propose the whole World as a Reward, or threaten the greatest Evil, to make us approve a deform’d Object, or disapprove a beautiful one; Dissimulation may be procur’d by Rewards or Threatnings, or we may in external Conduct abstain from any pursuit of the Beautiful, and pursue the Deform’d; but our Sentiments of the Forms, and our Perceptions, would continue invariably the same.

      This Sense antecedent to and distinct from prospects of interest.

      XV.57 Hence it plainly appears, “that some Objects are immediately the Occasions of this Pleasure of Beauty, and that we have Senses fitted for perceiving it; and that it is distinct from that Joy which arises ||58from Self-love|| upon Prospect of Advantage.” Nay, do not we often see Convenience and Use neglected to obtain Beauty, without any other prospect of Advantage in the Beautiful Form, than the suggesting the pleasant Ideas of Beauty? Now this shews us, that however we may pursue beautiful Objects from Self-love, with a view to obtain the Pleasures of Beauty, as in Architecture, Gardening, and many other Affairs; yet there must be a Sense of Beauty, antecedent to Prospects ||59even of|| this Advantage, without which Sense, these Objects would not be thus [13] Advantageous, nor excite in us this Pleasure which constitutes them advantageous. Our Sense of Beauty from Objects, by which they are constituted good to us, is very distinct from our Desire of them when they are thus constituted: Our Desire of Beauty may be counter-ballanc’d by Rewards or Threatnings, but never our Sense of it; even as Fear of Death, ||60or Love of Life,|| may make us ||61chuse and|| desire a bitter Potion, or neglect those Meats which the Sense of Taste would recommend as pleasant; ||62and yet no prospect of Advantage, or Fear of Evil, can|| make that Potion agreeable to the Sense, or ||63Meat|| disagreeable to it, ||64which was|| not so antecedently to this Prospect. ||65Just in the same manner as to|| the Sense of Beauty and Harmony; that the Pursuit of such Objects is frequently neglected, from prospects of Advantage, Aversion to Labour, or any other Motive of ||66Self-love||, does not prove that we have no Sense of Beauty, but only that our Desire of it may be counter-ballanc’d by a stronger Desire||67: So Gold out-weighing Silver, is never adduc’d as a proof that the latter is void of Gravity||.

      XVI.68 Had we no such Sense of Beauty and Harmony; Houses, Gardens, Dress, Equipage, might have been recommended to us as convenient, fruitful, warm, easy; but never as beautiful: ||69aAnd in Faces I see no-[14]thing ||70bwhichb|| could please us, but Liveliness of Colour, and Smoothness of Surface:a|| And yet nothing is more certain, than that all these Objects are recommended under quite different Views on many Occasions: ||71And no Custom, Education, or Example could ever|| give us Perceptions distinct from those of the Senses which we had the use of before, or recommend Objects under another Conception than grateful to* them. But of the Influence of Custom, Education, Example, upon the Sense of Beauty, we shall treat below.†

      Beauty, Original or Comparative.

      ||73XVII.|| ||74Beauty|| is either Original or Comparative; or, if any like the Terms better, Absolute, or Relative: Only let it be ||75observ’d||, that by Absolute or Original Beauty, is not understood any Quality suppos’d to be in the Object, ||76which|| should of itself be beautiful, without relation to any Mind which perceives it: For Beauty, like other Names of sensible Ideas, properly denotes the Perception of some Mind; so Cold, ||77Hot||, Sweet, Bitter, denote the Sensations in our Minds, to which perhaps there is no resemblance in the Objects, ||78which|| excite these Ideas in us, however we generally imagine ||79that there is something in the Object just like our Perception||. The Ideas of Beauty and [15] Harmony being excited upon our Perception of some primary Quality, and having relation to Figure and Time, may indeed have a nearer resemblance to Objects, than these Sensations, ||80which|| seem not so much any Pictures of Objects, as Modifications of the perceiving Mind; and yet were there no Mind with a Sense of Beauty to contemplate Objects, I see not how they could be call’d beautiful. We therefore by* Absolute Beauty understand only that Beauty, which we perceive in Objects without comparison to any thing external, of which the Object is suppos’d an Imitation, or Picture; such as that Beauty perceiv’d from the Works of Nature, artificial СКАЧАТЬ