The Principles of Moral and Christian Philosophy. George Turnbull

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СКАЧАТЬ history of this faculty, and of the phenomena belonging to it is much wanted—Mean time, it is obvious, that invention is the faculty of finding out truths quickly, by ranging or disposing ideas in proper juxta-positions for discovering their relations—Every new juxta-position of ideas discovers some unknown truth—New truths cannot be any other way discovered—It is therefore by exercise that invention is improved.

      In the last place, it becomes easier to make progress in knowledge, in proportion as we make advances in it: and by the help of that science, whose object is science and evidence, properly called the art of reasoning, much neglected since Plato’s time, tho’ clearly delineated and strongly recommended by the great Verulam.

      General conclusion concerning our furniture for knowledge; it is very large and noble.

CHAPTER II.

      A second class of laws, those relative to our embodied state, and our connexion with a material world by means of our bodies.

      Communication with the material world necessarily supposes dependence on its laws—And natural philosophers have proved these laws to be good.

      A material world without being perceived could be of no use.

      Without beings capable of enjoying a material world, nature would not be full nor coherent.

      And by our commerce with the material world, we receive a great many pleasures of the sensitive kind, which well deserve their place.

      Our senses are admirably adjusted to one another, and to our whole frame.

      But this is not all; our senses are instruments or means, by which we are capable of many noble sciences and arts,—of natural philosophy.

      And of many ingenious imitative arts.

      Nor is this all; they are the means, or afford the subjects and occasions of many virtuous exercises,—of many social virtues—And which is principal, they afford our reason and moral conscience subjects to govern and keep in due order—And thus we have a noble dominion to acquire.

      But this supposes a moral sense in our mind, which shall be considered in another chapter.

      Sensible pains, whence they arise—The law with regard to them is shewn to be good.

      Pains are proper and useful monitors.

      The only proper ones for us—Nay, we can have no other consistently with the laws relative to knowledge.

      But from the necessity there is that bodily appetites should be attended with uneasy sensations arises the necessity of all the other uneasy sensations accompanying our desires, which are called passions.

      The law of matter makes an infant state of body necessary—And the law of progressive knowledge and power or perfection, makes infant minds necessary—And such bodies and minds are proper mates.

      There is a great variety among mankind in respect of mental powers—And this very considerably depends on physical causes,—as is generally owned— It is well worth while to enquire more fully into this phenomenon than hath been yet done.

      Mean time, it is evident, that such a dependence is involved in the very idea of union between mind and body.

      And it hath very good effects.

      True morality, therefore, must consider man as a compound creature, neither merely sensitive nor purely moral,—but, as he really is, Nexus utriusque mundi.

      All the observations made by naturalists upon the animal oeconomy of the human body, and of other animals, might be inserted here—But the preceeding remarks will prepare every intelligent reader for making a proper use of such, as they occur to them in their reading and studies. The laws relative to our communion with a material world are therefore very fitly chosen.

CHAPTER III.

      Another class of laws. Those relative to the association of ideas and habits.

      Both these effects take their rise from one principle.—And they are inseparable, or must go together; if the one take place, the other must likewise take place. The formation of habits supposes association of ideas; and where association of ideas takes place, habits must be contracted.

      But whether these effects are reduced to one principle in our nature or not, they do really take place, i.e. ideas are associated, and habits are formed by us. And both proceed from a most useful principle in our nature.

      Which is really the law of improvement to perfection: for by means of it only do we, or can we arrive at perfection of any kind.

      But, in order to treat more fully of so useful and extensive a law of our nature, an associated idea is defined and exemplified, in order to distinguish it from a complex idea.

      From the very definition, it is plain, that almost all our ideas have something in them of the associated kind.

      This is the necessary effect of a world, governed by general laws, upon minds which have the associating quality, or are capable of forming habits.

      Accordingly, when we come to philosophize, natural philosophy consists, in a great measure, in separating ideas, which the order of nature hath associated in our mind.

      And it is one great business, if not the chief in moral philosophy, to break or separate associations.

      Many associations are made by ourselves. But many are inevitably formed in consequence of the order of nature, or the methods in which ideas are independently of us conveyed into our mind.

      What hath been said is no objection against the law of association. For, in general, it is the law of improvement to perfection.

      Several good effects arise from it—Without it we could never become acquainted with the course of nature; every thing would for ever be new to us.

      Unraveling or separating ideas of associations is a very agreeable, rational employment.

      It is in consequence of the law of association, that we are capable of strengthening or diminishing our desires, or of adding to our pleasures, and of alleviating our pains.

      Because desires are excited by ideas, and our power over our ideas lies chiefly in associating and separating.

      Another circumstance with respect to association merits attention—Like ideas are very easily associated. Wit consists in associating—Judgment in separating—Both suppose the law of association to take place—It is therefore in consequence of the law of association, in a great measure, that there are different genius’s among mankind—The same law gives rise to an equal diversity of moral characters.

      But so far as temper depends on association of ideas, it depends on ourselves.

      Wit and its instruments, metaphor and simile, are associations—Philosophy is separating work—Both may run into extravagances.

      Practical philosophy, or the government of our affections, consists in the assiduous examination of our ideas, fancies and opinions—The chief business of education is to establish early the habit of self-examination.

      Associations cannot be broken by mere refutation СКАЧАТЬ