The Principles of Moral and Christian Philosophy. George Turnbull

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      I proceed next to consider active habits, properly so called,—from our power of contracting habits, proceed memory,—habitual knowledge, taste of every kind,—and perfection of whatever faculty.

      Instruction and education presuppose the power of habit—How memory may be improved in consequence of this law—We are imitative creatures, but it is in consequence of the law of habits that imitation hath its effect, or example its influence.

      Habit renders that agreeable which was at first disagreeble.

      It ballances our natural desire after novelty.

      By the law of habit, passive impressions grow weaker in proportion as practical habits are strengthened—instances.

      It is in consequence of the law of habits that temper is formed—In consequence of it, we are able to establish in our mind the deliberative habit,—which is self-command, and true moral liberty.

      It is therefore this law which renders us capable of liberty, or of being free agents.

      The laws relating to association of ideas and habits, are therefore good general laws,—an useful corolary.

CHAPTER IV.

      Another class of laws relative to our guiding principle and our moral conduct—Our excellence consists in our having reason and a moral sense to guide our conduct.

      It is by our reason, that we rise above merely perceptive beings in the scale of life—It is all our force, or, at least, our chief one.

      Reason is our guiding principle, and ought to be exerted as such.

      There are two things to be considered with respect to our guiding principle and our rule of conduct—Our sense of right and wrong,—and our sense of happiness—That these two do not disagree, shall be shewn afterwards.

      But first let us consider our sense of right and wrong—whether we have such a sense or not is a question of fact—But that we have it is plain, for we are not only capable of electing, but of approving—These two are very different operations.

      If we have an approving and disapproving sense, we have a moral sense, or a sense of right and wrong.

      What are the qualities which excite approbation or disapprobation—Actions must be done with affection, freedom and reflexion, to excite approbation or condemnation.

      Of such actions, veracity, candor, benevolence, &c. excite our approbation, and their contraries our disapprobation.

      Several arguments to prove we have a moral sense—from analogy,—for we have a sense of beauty in material forms.

      —From languages, for they suppose it.

      —From the polite arts, oratory, poetry, painting, &c. for they suppose it.

      Without supposing it, to account for several phenomena, we must have recourse to very subtle reflexions of which the mind is not capable, and for which it hath not time.

      We can no more be bribed to approve an action, than to assent to a proposition.

      Further reflexions on a moral sense—It is not worth while to dispute about a name, if the thing be owned.

      And it must be owned by all who acknowledge moral differences of actions and characters.

      However, it is proper, nay, necessary to give this sense or faculty in our nature a distinguishing name—This is no less necessary than it is to give distinguishing names to our other senses and faculties.

      That we are determined by pleasure and pain in all our motions, is true in a certain sense—But this general proposition is of little use in philosophy, till our pleasures are distinguished and classed.

      And our moral sense renders us capable of a peculiar set of them, the highest we are susceptible of, or can conceive.

      The cautiousness of the ancient moralists in using the words good and evil very commendable.

      If we have no moral sense, then we are only capable of computing our external interest or advantage.

      But if we have a moral sense, we are capable of rising higher, and taking in what is worthy and laudable in itself into the account.

      If we would but try ourselves by proper questions, we should soon feel, that we have indeed a moral sense— And it is absurd to suppose a moral sense, not to be from nature. Art cannot create.

      A moral sense does not suppose innate ideas—But moral ideas are continually haunting our mind—Nature therefore hath not left us quite indifferent to virtue and vice—But our moral sense, like all our other faculties, must depend on our care to improve it.

      Hitherto then we have found our nature to be admirably well constituted with regard to virtue and vice—But, it remains to be enquired, how interest and virtue agree according to the constitution and laws of our nature.

CHAPTER V.

      Another class of laws. Those relative to interest, or private and publick good.

      First of all, the several enquiries about morals are classed.

      Next, it is to be observed, that beauty is inseparably connected with utility throughout all nature—It is so in all the imitative arts—Because it is so in nature the standard of truth.

      It is so in our mundan system—and with regard to the bodies of all animals.

      It is so, and must be so with respect to the fabric of the human mind, affections, actions, and characters, and their effects.

      The proof of this must be fetched from the anatomy or texture of the mind—Lord Shaftsbury’s reasoning to prove it, is taken notice of as an example how enquiries into the human mind ought to be carried on.

      Another train of reasoning to prove that virtue is private interest—and universally acknowledged to be so.

      Some observations on Cicero’s way of ascertaining human perfection and duty,—and then of proving that virtue is in all respects our truest interest.

      An observation upon other ancient arguments to prove that virtue is private good,—we are not made for sensual pleasures, but for those of the mind, or rational ones.

      Man is made for exercise, and to acquire dominion over his mind, and all its appetites—In this our natural greatness of mind consists, and virtue alone can content this natural desire of power, and inclination to extend our capacity. Several observations to illustrate this.

      Some other considerations taken from ancient authors to prove, that virtue is man’s supreme, nay, his only happiness,—and that virtue alone can be the reward of virtue.

      Virtue is therefore private interest or good.

      This chapter concludes with some reflexions on the debates among philosophers about the meaning of obligation.

      And then sums up all in a conclusion from the foregoing considerations concerning human nature and its maker, in Lord Shaftsbury’s СКАЧАТЬ