Organon. Aristotle

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СКАЧАТЬ Nor (need we discuss those things) of which the demonstration is at hand, nor those of which it is very remote, for the one do not admit of doubt, but the other, of greater (doubt) than accords to (dialectic) exercise.

Chapter 12

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      These things then being determined, we must distinguish how many species of dialectic arguments there are. Now one is induction, but the other syllogism, and what indeed syllogism is, has been declared before, but induction is a progression from singulars to umversals, as if the pilot skilled in his art is the best, so also is the charioteer, and generally the skilful is the most excellent about each thing. Nevertheless, induction is more calculated to persuade, is clearer, and according to sense more known, and common to many things; but syllogism is more cogent, and efficacious against opponents in disputation.

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Chapter 13

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      Let then the genera about which, and from which, arguments subsist be defined, as we have stated before, but the instruments by which we shall be well provided with syllogisms are four; one to assume propositions, the second to be able to distinguish in how many ways each thing is predicated, the third to discover differences, and the fourth the consideration of the similar. In a certain way indeed there are three propositions of these, since it is possible to make a proposition as to each of them, as that the beautiful, or the sweet, or the profitable is eligible, and that sense differs from science, in that he who loses the latter may regain it; but this is impossible with the other, and that the wholesome has the same relation to health as what produces good constitutional habit, to a good habit of constitution. Now the first proposition is derived from that which is predicated in many ways, but the second from differences, and the third from similars.

Chapter 14

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      Propositions then must be selected in as many ways as there has been definition about proposition, either choosing the opinions of all, or those of most, or those of the wise, and of these either of all, or of most, or of the most celebrated, or opinions contrary to the apparent, and whatever are according to arts. Yet it is necessary to propose according to contradiction those which are contrary to the apparently probable, as we observed before; but it is useful to produce them by selecting, not only those which are probable, but those also which are like these, as that there is the same sense of contraries, (for there is the same science,) and that we see by admitting, not by emitting, somewhat, as it is thus also with the other senses, since we ​both hear from admission and not from emission of something, and also taste, and similarly with the rest. Again, whatever are seen in all or in most things, we must lake as principle and apparent theses, since persons lay down these who do not see, at the same time, in what thing it does not happen so. We must also select from written arguments, but descriptions must he made supposing separately about each genus; as ahout good or about animal, and about every good, beginning from what it is; we must also note besides, the several opinions, as that Empedodes said there are four elements of bodies, for any one would admit what had been asserted by some celebrated man.

      But to speak comprehensively, there are three parts of propositions and of problems; for some propositions are ethical, others physical, but others logical. The ethical then are such, as whether it is right to obey parents rather than the laws, if the two are discordant; the logical, as whether there is the same science of contraries or not; and the physical, whether the world is perpetual or not; the like also occurs in problems. Still it is not easy to explain by definition, what the quality of each of the above-named is, but we must endeavour to know each of them from habit, which arises from induction, addressing our attention, according to the before-mentioned examples.

      With regard then to philosophy, we must discuss these according to truth; but as to opinion, dialectically; still we must assume all the propositions as universal as possible, and make many one, as that there is the same science of opposites, ​afterwards that there is of contraries, and also of relatives. In the same manner we must divide these again, as long as it is possible to divide them, as that (there is the same science) of good and of evil, and of white and black, of the cold and the hot, and likewise of other things.

Chapter 15

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      Concerning proposition then, what has been stated will suffice, but as to how many ways (a thing may be predicated), we must discuss not only such things as are predicated in a different manner, but also we must endeavour to give their reasons; as not only that justice and fortitude are called good in one way, but what conduces to a good habit of body and to health in another way, but also that some things (are called so) from being certain qualities, but others from being effective of something, and not from themselves being certain qualities, and indeed in a similar manner in other things.

      Whether however a thing is predicated multifariously, or in one way in species, we must investigate through these. First, we must consider in the contrary, if it is multifariously predicated, whether it differs in species or in name, for some things immediately differ even in names, as the grave is contrary in voice to the sharp, but in magnitude the obtuse. Therefore it is clear that the contrary to the sharp is predicated multifariously, but if this be so, the sharp also is, for according to each of these, the contrary will be different, since the same sharp will not be contrary to the obtuse and to the grave, but the sharp will be contrary to each. Again, to the heavy in voice, the sharp is contrary, but in weight, the light, so that the heavy is predicated ​multifariously since the contrary also is. Likewise to the beautiful in an animal, the ugly, but in a family, the depraved (is contrary), so that the beautiful is equivocal.

      In some, indeed, there is no dissonance in the names, but the difference in them is at once palpable in species, as in white and black, for voice is said to be clear and obscure in the same manner as colour. In these, then, there is no dissonance in names, but their difference is at once evident in species, for colour and voice are not similarly called clear, and this is also evident from sense, for of things which are the same in species, the sense is the same; but we do not judge the lightness which is in voice, and that which is in colour, by the same sense, but one by sight, and the other, by hearing. So also the sharp and the obtuse in fluids and magnitudes, the one indeed by touch, the other by taste, since neither are these dissonant in names, neither in themselves nor in the contraries, for what is obtuse is contrary to each.

      Again, we must consider if there is any thing contrary to the one, but nothing simply to the other; as, to the pleasure from drinking, the pain from thirst is contrary; but to that which arises from contemplating, that the diameter of a square is incommensurable with its side, there is nothing (contrary), wherefore pleasure is predicated multifariously. To hate, also, is contrary to the love which is mental, but nothing to that which subsists according to bodily energy, wherefore it is evident that to love, is equivocal. Besides, we must consider the media, if there is a certain medium of some, but not of others, or whether there is of both, yet not the same, as of white and black, in colour, the dark brown; but in voice, there is no medium, unless it be the hoarse, as ​some say that a hoarse voice is the medium; so that white is equivocal, and black in like manner; yet more, whether there are many media of some things, but one of others, as in the case of white and black; for in colours, СКАЧАТЬ