Organon. Aristotle
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Название: Organon

Автор: Aristotle

Издательство: Bookwire

Жанр: Языкознание

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isbn: 4064066466176

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      That disputations are composed from the things mentioned before, and through these, and pertain to these, we have the first evidence through induction, since if any one considers each of the propositions and problems, it will appear to have originated either from definition, or from property, or from genus, or from accident. Another evidence however is by syllogism, for it is necessary that every thing which is predicated of a certain thing, should either reciprocate with that thing or not. And if indeed it reciprocates it will be definition or property, since if it signifies what a thing is, it is definition, but if it does not signify it, it is property, for this was property, viz. that which reciprocates indeed, but does not signify what a thing is. If however it does not reciprocate with the thing, it either is one of those which are predicated in the definition of the subject, or it is not, and if it is one of those predicated in the definition it would be genus or difference, since definition consists of genus and differences, but if it is not of those predicated in definition, it would be evidently accident, for that was said to be accident which is neither definition, nor genus, nor property, yet is present with a thing.

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      We must next define the genera of the Categories, in which the above-named four (differences) are inherent. Now these are tea in number; what a thing is, quantity, quality, relation, where, when, position, possession, action, passion, for accident, and genus, and property, and definition will always be in one of these categories, since all propositions through these signify either what a thing is, or quality, or quantity, or some other category. Moreover, it is evident from these that he who signifies what a thing is, at one time signifies substance, at another quality, and at another some other category. For when man being proposed, he says that the thing proposed is man or animal, he says what it is, and signifies substance; but when white colour being proposed, he says that the thing proposed is white or colour, he says what it is, and signifies quality. So also, if when the magnitude of one cubit is proposed, he says that what is proposed is a cubit in size, he will say what it is, and will signify quantity, and so of the rest, for each of these, both if it be itself predicated of itself, and if genus (be predicated) of it, signifies what a thing is. When however (it is spoken) of another thing, it does not signify what it is, but quantity or quality, or some other category, so that the things about which and from which arguments (subsist), are these and so many; but how we shall take them, and by what we shall be well provided with them, we must declare hereafter.

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      In the first place then, let us define what is a dialectic proposition, and what a dialectic problem, for we must not suppose every proposition nor every problem as dialectic, since no one in his senses would propose that which is assented to by no one, nor would he advance as a question what was palpable to all, or to most men, for the latter does not admit of a doubt, but the former no one would admit. Indeed a dialectic proposition is an interrogation, probable either to all, or to the most, or to the wise; and to these, either to all or most, or to the most celebrated, it is not paradoxical, as any one may admit what is assented to by the wise, if it be not contrary to the opinions of the multitude. Dialectic propositions however are both those which resemble the probable and which are contrary to those which appear probable, being proposed through contradiction, and whatever opinions are according to the discovered arts. For if it be probable that there is the same science of contraries, it would also appear probable that the sense of contraries is the same, and if the grammatical art be one in number, that there is one art also of playing on the pipe, but if there are many grammatical arts, there will also be many piping arts, for all these things seem to be similar and akin. So also those things which are contrary to probabilities, being proposed according to contradiction, will appear probable, for if it is probable that we ought to benefit friends, it is also probable that we ought not to injure them. Nevertheless, that we ought to injure friends is contrary, but that we ought not to injure them is contradictory; so also if we ought to benefit friends, we ought not to benefit enemies; but this also is according to the contradiction of contraries, since the contrary is that we ought to benefit enemies, and in like ​manner in the case of other things. Still the probable will appear in comparison to be the contrary about the contrary, as, if we ought to benefit friends, we ought also to injure enemies. To benefit friends however may appear contrary to injuring enemies, yet whether it is truly so or not, will be shown in what we say about contraries. Notwithstanding, it is apparent that whatever opinions also are according to the arts, are dialectic propositions; since any one would admit those things, which are assented to by persons conversant with such subjects, as in matters of medicine, that the physician (is to be assented to), the geometrician in geometrical concerns, and similarly of others.

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      The dialectic problem is a theorem tending either to choice and avoidance, or to truth and knowledge, either per se or as co-operative with something else of this kind, about which the multitude either hold an opinion in neither way, or in a way contrary to the wise, or the wise to the multitude, or each of these to themselves. Now some problems it is useful to know, for the purpose of choice or avoidance, as whether pleasure is eligible or not, but others for knowledge only, as whether the world is everlasting or not, some again by themselves, for neither of these purposes, yet do they co-operate to something or this kind, since there are many things which we do not desire to know for themselves, but for the sake of others, in order that through these we may know ​something else. Moreover, those are problems also, of which there are contrary syllogisms (for they admit a doubt, whether they are so and so, because of there being credible arguments in both respects). And those about which we have no argument from their being vast, conceiving it difficult to assign their cause, e. g. whether the world is everlasting or not, for any one may investigate such things as these.

      Let then problems and propositions be distinguished as we have said: a thesis, on the other hand, is a paradoxical judgment of some one celebrated in philosophy, as that contradiction is impossible, as Antisthenes said, or that all things are moved, according to Heraclitus, or that being is one, as Melissus asserted, for to notice any casual person setting forth contrarieties to (common) opinions is silly. Or (a thesis is an opinion) of things concerning which we have a reason contrary to opinions, as that not every thing which is, is either generated or perpetual, as the sophists declare, since (they say) that a musician is a grammarian, though he is neither generated nor eternal, for this, even if it be not admitted by any one, may appear to be from possessing a reason.

      A thesis then is also a problem, yet not every problem is a thesis, since some problems are of such a kind, as that we form an opinion about them in neither way; but that a thesis is also a problem ​is evident, as it is neoesary from what we have said, either that the multitude ahould be at variance with the wise about the thesis, or one or other of these with themselves, since a thesis is a certain paradoxical judgment. Now almost all dialectical problems arc called theses, let it, however, make no difference how they are called, as we have not thus divided them from a desire to fabricate names, but that we may not be ignorant what are their real differences.

      Still we need not consider every problem nor every thesis, but that which any one may be in doubt about, who is in want of argument and not of punishment or sense, for those who doubt whether we ought to worship the gods and to love our parents or not, require punishment, but those (who doubt) whether snow is white or not, СКАЧАТЬ