Building an Effective Security Program for Distributed Energy Resources and Systems. Mariana Hentea

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СКАЧАТЬ OT and IT integration. ERP, Enterprise Resources Planning; EAM, Enterprise Asset Management; GIS, Geographic Information Systems; CRM, Customer Relationship Management; CIS, Customer Information Systems; OMS, Outage Management System; DMS, Distribution Management Systems; DG, Distributed Generation; DER, Distributed Energy Resource; HAN, Home Area Network; AMI, Advanced Metering Infrastructure; DSCADA, Distribution Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (DSCADA)

      Smart meters and home area network technologies are also helping to blur the lines between the energy supply and energy distribution domains. For example, the OMS at many sites has migrated away from the enterprise and toward the operation domain.

      1.6.1 Trends

      The Smart Grid is redefining technology norms, and the modernization is characterized by the following trends:

       The continuous growth in OT deployment.

       The continuous implementation of IT by the utility to model, monitor, and manage its distribution system.

       An urgent requirement for utilities to integrate their IT and OT networks.

      However, the extensive digital technologies that enable significant improvements to new energy systems also increase the attack surface for cyber intrusion. For power system and supply security reasons, DER systems have to include ancillary services that are commonly seen on traditional power systems or bulk generation systems, so as to ensure compatibility with older and legacy devices and systems.

      1.6.2 Characteristics

The characteristics of the future grid are distinctly different from those of the current power system as shown in Table 1.4. As shown in this table, there are more challenges including security that have to be addressed by Smart Grid systems.

Table 1.4 Comparison of key attributes of current and future systems.

      Source: [DOE 2015b]. Public Domain.

Current system	Future paradigm
Monolitic	Modular and agile
Centralized generation	Centralized and distributed generation
Decisions driven by cost	Decisions driven by cost and sustainability
Vulnerable to catastrophic events	Contained events
Limited energy choices	Personalized energy options
Vulnerable to new threats	Inherently secure against threats

The extensive digital technologies that enable significant improvements to new energy systems also increase the attack surface for cyber intrusion. The increasingly significant role of information systems and growing dependence on managing the power flow (generation, transmission, and distribution), markets, customers, financial, and trade needs call for special efforts to foster confidence in computing systems and information systems for business and industrial applications. Since the emergence of Internet and World Wide Web technologies, the control systems were integrated with the business and IT systems and became more exposed to cyber threats. Although specific threats target control systems and intelligent devices, these systems are also exposed to the same cyberspace threats as any business system because they share the common vulnerabilities with the traditional IT systems.

1.7 Critical Smart Grid Systems

      The availability and reliability of computing and information systems for business and power grid applications are dependent on the secure operations of ICSs and other infrastructures. The following sections include a brief introduction of key systems and security concerns. Any attack on any of these systems can propagate on other systems too.

      1.7.1 Industrial Control Systems

      A control system is a device or set of devices to manage, command, direct, or regulate the behavior of other devices or systems. ICSs are typically used to operate the infrastructure in industries such as electrical, water, oil and gas, and chemical including experimental and research facilities such as nuclear fusion laboratories. SCADA systems, DCS, and other smaller control system configurations including skid‐mounted PLC are often found in the industrial sectors and critical infrastructures. These are also known under a general term, ICS. The reliable operation of modern infrastructures depends on computerized systems and SCADA systems.

      In the past, control systems were isolated from other IT systems. Connection to the Internet is new (early 1990s) and debatable among specialists. Many experts agree that exposing control systems to the public PSTN and Internet carries unacceptable risk. However, even without any connection to the Internet, these systems are still vulnerable to external or internal attackers that can exploit vulnerabilities in private communication network and protocol, software such as operating systems, custom and vendor software, data storage software, databases, and applications.

      Control systems are exposed to the same cyberspace threats like any business system because they share the common vulnerabilities with the traditional IT systems. In complex interactive systems like Smart Grid whose elements are tightly coupled, likelihood of targeted attack as well as failures from erroneous operations and natural disasters and accidents is quite high. Vulnerabilities and attacks could be at different levels – software controlling or controlled device, application, storage, data access, LAN, enterprise, private communication links, and public PSTN and Internet‐based communications.

      1.7.2 SCADA Systems

      SCADA system is a common process automation system that is used to gather data from sensors and instruments located at remote sites and to transmit data at a central site for either control or monitoring purposes. The collected data is usually viewed on one or more SCADA host computers located at the central or master site. Based on information received from remote stations, automated or operator‐driven supervisory commands can be pushed to remote station control devices, which are often referred to as field devices. Generally, a SCADA system includes the following components:

       Instruments that sense process variables.

       Operating equipment connected to instruments.

       Local processors that collect data and communicate with the site’s instruments and operating equipment called PLC, remote terminal unit (RTU), intelligent electronic device (IED), or programmable automation controller (PAC).

       Short‐range communications between local processors, instruments, and operating equipment.

       Host computers as central point of human monitoring and control of the processes, storing databases, and display of statistical control charts and reports. Host computers are also known as master terminal unit (MTU), the SCADA server, or a PC with human–machine interface (HMI).

       Long‐range communications between local processors СКАЧАТЬ