International Responses to Mass Atrocities in Africa. Kurt Mills

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СКАЧАТЬ the genocide, there were denials from U.S. and other officials that they knew what was going on at the time—a denial repeated by President Clinton four years later during his apology to Rwanda³⁵—although it was revealed in 2004 that the Clinton administration was aware of a “‘final solution to eliminate all Tutsis’” significantly before the genocide began.³⁶ Alan Kuperman argues that the earliest President Clinton could have known that genocide was occurring was 20 April.³⁷ While this may or may not be true, what is true, first, is that diplomats and policymakers in a number of important countries and the UN knew there was widespread killing happening that beyond “mere” political killings—crimes against humanity. Second, President Clinton—and other leaders—did not ask the questions necessary to determine exactly what was going on. President Clinton never convened senior advisers to discuss the situation.³⁸ Third, there was a concerted effort to avoid the term genocide.³⁹ When asked whether genocide was happening in Rwanda, a U.S. State Department spokesperson indicated (weeks later, on 10 June) that “acts of genocide” had occurred,⁴⁰ even though the U.S. National Intelligence Daily for 23 April, a classified document that would have been distributed to several hundred government officials—and thus contained information which Clinton would have had access to—noted an “‘effort to stop the genocide, which relief workers say is spreading south.’”⁴¹ Oxfam used the word genocide on 28 April in a public statement,⁴² and by the end of April, Dallaire was using the term.⁴³ The ICRC issued a statement indicating that “‘whole families are exterminated … the cruelty knows no limits,’”⁴⁴ claiming that 100,000, and as many as 300,000, people had been killed.⁴⁵ Amazingly, Rwanda was allowed to keep its seat on the Security Council and participate in discussions. On 29 April, Ambassador Keating, along with ambassadors from Argentina, Spain, and the Czech Republic, tried to get the Security Council to release a statement indicating that genocide was occurring.⁴⁶ On 17 May the Security Council passed Resolution 918, which used the language of the Genocide Convention but did not use the term genocide itself.

      This is a clear indication of the force of the word. If one uses awkward verbal constructions such as “acts of genocide” or refuses to use the “G word” altogether, one is obviously trying to avoid the implications of using the word. To use the word would be to acknowledge responsibility—which would bring one under pressure to act. Indeed, as a paper prepared by the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense stated on 1 May: “Be careful. Legal at State was worried about this [using the term genocide] yesterday—Genocide finding could commit [the U.S. government] to actually ‘do something’.”⁴⁷ Although a State Department spokesperson indicated that the Genocide Convention did not have an “‘absolute requirement’” to intervene, there was worry that this was the expectation. Here we see the clear working of the “never again” norm, the precursor to R2P. U.S. policy-makers felt there would be an expectation on the part of the public that the U.S. would live up to this perceived requirement. This was the last thing they wanted to do. So they manipulated and twisted words. The norm put pressure on policy-makers to act, but the action they took was perverse. The situation was denied, obfuscatory language was used, responsibilities were avoided. The “never again” norm was so powerful that when this norm collided with perceived state interests, policy-makers denied reality. There was recognition that people were being killed in Rwanda, but it was put down to civil war, tribalism, political killings, deep-seated ethnic hatred—in other words, the usual story from Africa.⁴⁸ But instead of making the case to stop the killing, the Genocide Convention was used to prevent such action. As long as the situation was not called genocide, there was no political downside to not reacting. Such is the status of genocide as the über crime that all other crimes can be made to pale in comparison. The Genocide Convention provides a shield against having to take action against “lesser” crimes. On June 10, the same day as the infamous “acts of genocide” briefing by a State Department spokesperson, Secretary of State Warren Christopher finally said that “If there is any particular magic in calling it genocide, I have no hesitancy in saying that.”⁴⁹ Indeed, there is magic in the term, and it can be stripped of its power by the simple act of avoiding the term.

      The media did little to put pressure on the Security Council to act. It was portrayed as tribalism—age-old ethnic hatreds which flared up periodically and which the international community could do little about.⁵⁰ Even when the New York Times identified it as genocide on 23 April, it concluded that little could be done.⁵¹ The Guardian agreed.⁵² Other newspapers had little interest in covering the story as a result of “compassion fatigue.”⁵³ As Edward Girardet argues, “it took the concept of genocide”—again that magical incantation—“the deliberate destruction of human life based on ethnic, racial, or religious discrimination—to convince most editors finally to cover the story.”⁵⁴ Even this less than helpful coverage was short-lived. The momentous elections in South Africa, which signaled the end of apartheid, took place and the world’s press corps moved en masse to South Africa to cover the elections and the inauguration of Nelson Mandela.⁵⁵

      At the same time, the Pentagon discussed the possibility of blocking the the broadcasts of Radio Mille Collines, which had been advocating and facilitating the genocide. This would not have stopped the genocide, but it might have slowed it down. But even this was too much; instead, one senior Pentagon official advocated for contributing to food relief.⁵⁶ On 4 May UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali called Rwanda a genocide, calling for intervention.⁵⁷ On 11 May the ICRC delegate in Rwanda, Philippe Gaillard, told the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights that 250,000 people had been killed.⁵⁸ On 13 May, Gen. Dallaire submitted a report to the Security Council asking for an additional 5,500 troops.⁵⁹ This was authorized four days later, with a mandate to protect civilians.⁶⁰ This was just authorization; deployment depended upon a further report by the Secretary-General. Ambassador Keating called the resolution a “sham.”⁶¹ Indeed, UNAMIR II would not be deployed until after the genocide had ended and the RPF had taken control.⁶²

      On 24 May, the French minister for human rights, Lucette Michaux-Chevry, used the term genocide.⁶³ On the same day Warren Christopher finally authorized use of the term genocide—if in an incoherent, muddled way.⁶⁴ A report by the Secretary-General to the Security Council finally recognized Rwanda as genocide.⁶⁵ This, however, did not lead to any swifter response. Dallaire wanted to create safe areas in Rwanda to protect civilians. The United States wanted to engage in “outside-in” protection—creating safe areas on the borders with Rwanda, thus obviating the need for military intervention in an ongoing genocide.⁶⁶ The U.S. offered fifty armored personnel carriers (APCs) stored in Turkey. However, they arrived after the genocide ended without guns, radios, manuals, and spare parts. The UK offered old trucks in return for a significant amount of money (the demand for money was eventually rescinded).⁶⁷

      The one even somewhat robust military response came, eventually, from the French. Through its Opération Turquoise it deployed in excess of 2,500 highly trained troops from the French Foreign Legion. This was completely separate from UNAMIR—indeed, there was little consultation with Gen. Dallaire.⁶⁸ France got the go-ahead from the Security Council on 22 June—after the vast majority of people had been killed. The week before, Foreign Minister Alain Juppé said, “We have a real duty to intervene in Rwanda…. France is ready, with its main European and African partners, to prepare an intervention on the ground to put an end to the massacres and protect the populations threatened with extermination…. France will live up to its responsibilities.”⁶⁹

      The question was which responsibilities he was talking about—those found in the Genocide Convention and the “never again” norm, or France’s ties to its Hutu clients? This was not made any clearer by Prime Minister Édouard Balladur when he stated, just days before the RPF took power, that “France has sent its soldiers out of a moral duty to act without delay in order to stop the genocide and provide immediate assistance to the threatened populations.”⁷⁰ It went in with lots of firepower—firepower Dallaire could have used earlier to protect people. СКАЧАТЬ