International Responses to Mass Atrocities in Africa. Kurt Mills

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СКАЧАТЬ only if the génocidaires were brought to justice, a somewhat naïve position given the reality on the ground in the camps, the lack of international support for separating out the génocidaires so they could be arrested, and the sheer number of those to be brought to justice. Another CARE UK official, however, disagreed, focusing solely on feeding people.¹⁰² This also led to a much wider debate about whether or not the humanitarian imperative could be absolute, and whether humanitarians need to focus more on the “do no harm” principle. While the debate at the time varied widely within and among NGOs, Fiona Terry identifies five main justifications used by NGOs to continue their work:

      (1) humanitarian imperative;

      (2) attempts to affect the way the camps were administered from within and minimize the aid diverted to militants through “résistance humanitaire”;

      (3) focus on technical issues of relief provision, ignoring ethical issues;

      (4) the “institutional logic” of NGOs, which prioritized the media coverage and funding that having a presence in the camps would generate;

      (5) sympathy with the Hutu militants, in particular on the part of Catholic organizations.¹⁰³

      The obvious first step was to separate out the génocidaires and militant leaders from the rest of the population. Various plans to accomplish this were floated as early as mid-August 1994, when the Zairian prime minister requested that 20,000 ex-FAR be relocated away from the border. When family members were included, the total number of people to be relocated climbed to 80–90,000. Identifying all the ex-FAR would have been problematic. This plan would have been very costly, estimated at $90 to $125 million (whereas it was estimated that the solution ultimately adopted cost only about 2 percent of what a full-fledged peacekeeping operation would have).¹⁰⁴ Furthermore, such an undertaking would have entailed deploying a significant number of troops. The international community showed almost no support for this, and by January 1995 the Secretary-General admitted defeat in his attempt to put such a force together. Further, he put the responsibility for addressing the security issue on UNHCR, thus abdicating the responsibility of the UN to maintain international peace and security to its humanitarian arm.¹⁰⁵ The palliators were asked to act as protectors, which of course they could not do.

      A lesser option was then pursued—deploying a security force in the camps. Its mandate would not include separating extremists. Rather, its focus would be to maintain security in the camps for the refugees and make sure relief supplies could be distributed unhindered. However, it was hoped that the security force would undermine the hold the extremists had in the camps, making it possible for the refugees to make the decision to go home. This was the main reason UNHCR Goma requested this deployment. UNHCR negotiated with Zaire to create the Zairian Camp Security Contingent (ZCSC). Deployed in February 1995, it was comprised of 1,500 elite Zairian troops and paid for by UNHCR. The Zairian minister of defense referred to them as “‘Ogata’s troops.’” Yet, they were not, and could not be, under the command of UNHCR. While it could try to exercise influence in how the troops carried out their mandate, the orders came from the government. Obviously, however, the government wanted to be able to place the blame on UNHCR in case anything went wrong.¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, Ogata, as head of a humanitarian agency, did not have a mandate for controlling military forces of any kind. This abdication of its security role by the Security Council highlights the fact that UNHCR, and humanitarian actors more generally, are being called upon to carry out functions that they are not equipped to do and which are the purview of international security actors, like the Security Council. The international community had proven itself incapable of providing the support necessary for humanitarian agencies to carry out their work or, indeed, to obviate the need for humanitarian action in the first place. Furthermore, some felt that the ZCSC was a bad idea, precisely because it was not under UNHCR control, and when the war broke out, some of the troops fought, rather than providing protection to the refugees.¹⁰⁷ Although the ZCSC did arrest a few “small fry” leaders, most leaders, although known to the ZCSC, remained untouched by the force.¹⁰⁸ Further, the Zairian government provided resources to the militants, and rather than undermining their position, worked to strengthen it.¹⁰⁹ Given the lack of support from all quarters to separate the extremists, there seemed little prospect for a quick return of the refugees.¹¹⁰ A massacre of 2,000 people at the Kibeho internally displaced camp in Rwanda on 22 April 2005 (during which UNAMIR was ordered not to intervene, even though it had a mandate to protect displaced persons) further supported the militant’s arguments that it was unsafe to go back.¹¹¹

      The first forced repatriation from Zaire occurred in August 1995. A Human Rights Watch report¹¹² in May 1995 stated that arms were reaching the militants, and Zaire felt implicated. Further, Security Council Resolution 1011 of August 16, lifting the arms embargo against Rwanda, directly contravened Zaire’s position in favor of continuing the arms embargo. Consequently, approximately 12,000–15,000 refugees were expelled from the Kivu region to Cyangugu and Gisenyi in Rwanda over several days, beginning 19 August.¹¹³ It is unclear why the repatriations stopped. One senior UNHCR official claims it was the result of international pressure.¹¹⁴ The head of the UNHCR office in Goma at the time maintains that the repatriation was not seriously supported by the central government and that while it might have instigated the repatriation, the local officials were on their own. Under these conditions, there was no way that the repatriation could be sustained, and on 20 August the forcible returns ended.¹¹⁵

      Although the forced repatriation was condemned as a violation of human rights, and UNHCR could not support it because it contravened its mandate and other international law, some palliators saw it as a possibly positive development.¹¹⁶ There was relatively little violence, and the refugees, for the most part, seemed to move of their own free will. Yet, the hoped for momentum for further voluntary returns did not materialize, and some officials, particularly in Kigali, were coming to the conclusion that forced repatriation was the only way to get the refugees back. In other words, UNHCR should just allow this to happen, and then help the refugees when they were back in Rwanda. Some coercion, probably by Zairian forces, was necessary to break the stranglehold of the extremists to allow the refugees to make their own decision (although it was assumed most of them would decide to return).¹¹⁷

      Soon thereafter, Zaire announced a deadline of 31 December 1995 for all the refugees to leave Zaire. UNHCR did not oppose the deadline, and was roundly criticized.¹¹⁸ Yet some felt that the only way to deal with the situation and allow the refugees to exercise what was assumed to be their preferred option to return to Rwanda was to, in fact, force them to exercise that option.¹¹⁹ This was, at least on the surface, a significant breach of international norms, and it was shocking that UNHCR would not vigorously oppose such an eventuality. Yet it also highlighted the difficulties and conundrums faced by humanitarian actors in a situation where the international community is not willing to act. The deadline came and went without the hoped for returns. On 26 November, after a meeting with former President Carter, President Mobutu Sese Seko announced the deadline was being suspended. The voluntary return of refugees, which had increased significantly during the previous month, declined precipitously.¹²⁰

      The Return of the Refugees

      Throughout the first part of 1996, other strategies were pursued. The Zairian government restricted travel on the part of refugees. Further, much economic activity was quashed by Zairian troops, including the closing of shops. This was very short-lived, however.¹²¹ The problem of repatriation appeared intractable. While attempting to implement voluntary repatriation, UNHCR Goma also followed another tactic. Recognizing that there was no prospect of the refugees returning to Rwanda soon, it decided to investigate another durable solution—moving those refugees who did not wish to go back to settlements farther from the border. UNHCR recognized that this would not be looked on favorably by Zaire. Further, it would undermine efforts to encourage voluntary repatriation. It would help the leaders gain greater control over the refugees and a firmer position within Zaire from СКАЧАТЬ