International Responses to Mass Atrocities in Africa. Kurt Mills

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СКАЧАТЬ by regional organizations or individual states.⁹⁸ This language frequently includes admonitions for peacekeepers “to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence” and to provide a “safe and secure environment.”⁹⁹ The mandate frequently also includes the caveat “without prejudice to the responsibility of the host state.”¹⁰⁰ This indicates the relationship of PoC to the core of UN peacekeeping and in particular that peacekeeping relies on the consent of the host state to operate. When the state does not facilitate the creation of a secure environment for its citizens by protecting them, or when it carries out violence itself against its citizens, PoC can be severely undermined. This highlights a key difference between R2P and PoC. While R2P is about protecting civilians, the tools available to decision makers under the heading of R2P are potentially more robust than with PoC. Under R2P, the UN can authorize the use of force against the wishes of a state, as was done in Libya. PoC relies on the consent and cooperation of the host state. There is frequently confusion about the status of PoC in the peacekeeping mandate. Even when robust Chapter VII language is included that allows the use of force—“all necessary means”—the intent of Security Council is not always clear, and frequently commanders in the field see the Chapter VII language as an add-on that fits uncomfortably with a Chapter VI core. The fact that peacekeepers have to maintain relationships with multiple partners, including the state, makes using robust force problematic. This has been a particular issue in Darfur, where the government has placed severe restrictions on peacekeepers that interfere with the PoC mandate. This is not surprising, given that it is the government that is either carrying out or supporting a large part of the violence, but it highlights the problematic nature of PoC in the context of peacekeeping. Further, peacekeepers are frequently not given the tools they need to carry out such robust action. Nor is it frequently clear to those commanders on the ground exactly how they are supposed to carry out their PoC mandate, since there is no operational guidance from the Security Council for what PoC actually means.¹⁰¹

      Yet, as noted, there is a consensus within the UN regarding PoC. Because of this consensus, and the fact that it has a somewhat independent lineage from, and different connotations than, R2P, it is easier to talk about in the Security Council and other diplomatic exchanges. UN humanitarian agencies, such as UNHCR and OCHA, use the terminology of PoC rather than R2P because it describes better what they do and also seems to take politics out of the equation. Likewise, humanitarian NGOs will frequently also engage more with the PoC terminology, even when talking about R2P situations, because it makes conversation with states easier and less threatening. Humanitarian organizations may also not see the value added of R2P over PoC or the relevance of R2P to their activities. As many humanitarians will point out, PoC has been around for a while, and the protection activities they engage in do not fall under R2P. They perceive PoC as nonpolitical,¹⁰² or at least argue that PoC can be deployed nonpolitically, whereas R2P cuts to the core of issues related to sovereignty—issues they do not want to point to, even if their work raises significant issues of sovereignty. R2P is seen as not useful, and there is significant wariness about the equation of PoC and R2P, even as many PoC activities are being repackaged as R2P.¹⁰³ R2P is perceived as a Security Council concern, or something that happens in New York, whereas the more Geneva-centric humanitarian community sees PoC as much more relevant.¹⁰⁴ Some humanitarians can also be cynical and note that many concepts and developments do not actually result in much, and so they try to stay out of the entire debate.¹⁰⁵

      Even though PoC may be portrayed as apolitical, it is still political since it deals with highly charged political situations, but it appears to depoliticize situations. In some situations, this may be positive since it allows states to talk about concrete measures to protect people without getting caught in the high politics of sovereignty. On the other hand, these situations are political and require political response at the highest levels, and thus PoC might undermine the debates that need to happen within the R2P framework. Further, to the extent PoC is seen as something that happens in the context of peacekeeping, it can be an impediment to genuine protection in the sense of physically protecting people under imminent threat of harm. If a peacekeeping commander needs to get the permission of the host state to fly helicopters—assuming he or she has been given helicopters and other requisite tools in the first place—his or her ability to deploy troops when and where needed to respond to that imminent threat is severely compromised. While R2P is less accepted as a political, legal, and operational concept, it does bring an element of robustness that is lacking in most peacekeeping PoC mandates and, more important, practice.

       Complementary or Conflicting Responsibilities?

      I have outlined above the main human rights and humanitarian tools and concepts the international community has to respond to mass atrocities and associated humanitarian crises. In one sense, they all derive from the conceptual and practical developments in the human rights and international humanitarian law regimes over perhaps the last 150 years, but in particular the last seventy years. They all have the same goal—to protect lives. One might assume, then, that they are mutually supporting. That is, the implementation of one would support the implementation of another. As we will see, however, this is not necessarily the case. Indeed, applying one or more of these responses may, in fact, get in the way of, or undermine, other responses. Further, having recourse to one may provide an excuse to diplomats and policymakers not to implement another response that may be more effective. In this section, I will briefly outline some of the conundrums faced by practitioners (see Table 1.1).

      Humanitarianism, even in its most basic palliative form, can save lives. Yet, it cannot end the conflicts that lead to atrocities. This requires political action. Nor can humanitarianism save lives in all circumstances—particularly when parties to a conflict have as their goal, or significant tactic, to kill civilians or drive them out of their territory. Yet, as we shall see, the presence of humanitarians on the ground can give the illusion of adequate response when, in fact, the response is far from adequate. More robust action may be required, but the mere presence of humanitarians may reduce pressure on states to act. Thus, palliation reduces the prospects for protection. However, with rights-based humanitarianism, humanitarian actors themselves may be highlighting human rights abuses and calling for further action. This can put pressure on states to take further action, but it can also make their positions as humanitarian actors more precarious. They may either be targeted by parties to the conflict or kicked out of the country by the government, thus reducing or eliminating their ability to provide food and other resources to victims of conflict. As a result, people may die from malnutrition or lack of medical care. So the question becomes whether the greater good of a possible (if unlikely) humanitarian intervention to stop a conflict or more robustly protect civilians from attack is outweighed by the almost certain death of more people because of a lack of humanitarian assistance. This is a rather difficult decision to make. Most NGOs, because of their innate humanitarian ethos and mission, will choose to stay, although on occasion they have decided that they are doing more harm than good, thus violating the “do no harm” principle. There may thus be a negative symbiotic relationship between palliation and protection (notwithstanding humanitarian claims to protection). Palliation saves lives, but it is also significantly limited in what it can actually achieve in protecting people from violence.¹⁰⁶ It can also, at times, contribute to the continuation of a conflict, and it also provides a smokescreen for states who do not want to intervene. Calling for intervention might bring further long-term protection, although that is far from certain; it is more likely to reduce the humanitarian assistance available to victims of conflict.

      Prosecution can punish people for their crimes. However, inserting prosecution into the middle of a conflict can have unforeseen consequences and require difficult trade-offs. The most obvious is that potential prosecution can have an impact on peace negotiations, with the very unhumanitarian impact of prolonging the conflict. Combatants with arrest warrants against them may be less likely to come to an accommodation, knowing what possible fate might await them. Such international action might also interfere with domestic efforts to institute amnesty laws that might contribute to peace processes and postconflict reconciliation. States that have become a СКАЧАТЬ