The Phenomenology of Pain. Saulius Geniusas

Чтение книги онлайн.

СКАЧАТЬ field of apperceptive accomplishments.

      We thereby obtain the methodological basis for studying the formation of preconceptual understanding in terms of “lawful regularities that regulate the formation of apperceptions” (Husserl 2001, 624). Apperceptions are intentional lived-experiences that prescribe to the given phenomenon dimensions of sense that exceed their intuitive justification. The phenomenological concept of apperception is meant to capture the excess of meaning that trespasses the boundaries of the phenomenon’s intuitive self-givenness.³¹ As seen from the standpoint of genetic phenomenology, each and every consciousness is apperceptive: “We cannot even conceive of a consciousness that would not go beyond the strict present in its essential flux from presence to new presences” (Husserl 2001, 626). It is, however, not enough to characterize apperceptive consciousness as a consciousness of the surplus of meaning that exceeds the bounds of intuition and that accompanies each and every experience. Apperceptive consciousness is focused on what is given intuitively and it finds within the intuitively given a motivation for a consciousness of something that exceeds the boundaries of intuition. That is, apperceptive consciousness is not just conscious of something intuitively given and in addition still conscious of dimensions of sense that exceed the boundaries of intuition; rather, it is a consciousness that intentionally points toward the nonintuitive as that which is motivated intuitively (see Husserl 2001, 627). To a large degree, the goal of genetic phenomenology is to discover the fundamental principles in accordance with which apperceptions are formed and in accordance with which ever-new apperceptions necessarily arise from other apperceptions.³² They can be formed at different levels of experience, which Husserl (2001, 631) identifies as the level of pure activity, the intermediary level between passivity and activity, and the level of pure passivity.

      At this point we can come back to the twofold question raised at the beginning of this section: How does preconceptual understanding originate, and how does it develop? Having addressed the fundamental methodological principles that underlie genetic phenomenology, we are in the position to appreciate the remarkably rich answer genetic phenomenology offers to this question. This answer is fundamentally twofold. On the one hand, by focusing on the hidden accomplishments of transcendental subjectivity, genetic phenomenology demonstrates that preconceptual understanding originates and develops within the framework of subjective experience. Genetic phenomenology focuses on the field of transcendental experience from a diachronic standpoint and inquires into the fundamental laws and principles in accordance with which transcendental experience develops. On the other hand, genetic phenomenology also strives to show that preconceptual understanding originates and develops in the life-world. In this regard, the questions that prove central to phenomenology concern the life-world’s fundamental structures, the way in which objects in the life-world obtain their meaning, and the way in which our basic rootedness in the life-world prefigures our theoretical activities.

      We are finally in the position to ask: Of what significance is the genetic method for phenomenologically oriented analyses of pain? What we just said about preconceptual understanding in general, we can also say about such bodily experiences as pain. We can ask: How does the experience of pain originate and how does it develop? The second and third paths to the reduction, coupled with the method of intentional implications, provide us with the methodological basis for addressing these questions phenomenologically. Following the guidelines of genetic methodology, we can investigate how the experience of pain originates both in the field of experience in general and in the life-world. In this regard, in what follows it will be important to show that pain originates as a rupture in the field of experience that unsettles one’s otherwise natural absorption in the world of things. In the natural course of life, we are, for the most part, delivered from internal life. Everything for us is outside, in the world, on the road, in the town, in the midst of the crowd (see Sartre 1970, 5). The emergence of pain puts a stop to our natural excentricity: the door through which we used to naturally fly out into the world is now, as it were, blocked with a mirror, in which we see reflected the incapacity of the inborn movement to get off the ground. Pain belongs to a group of feelings that compel us to discover our own immanence. Yet pain does not only occur, it also lingers, which means that one cannot grasp its nature without understanding its temporality. Following the genetic method, we can investigate the temporal nature of pain experience not only in terms of its formal structures, but also in light of its development, paying close attention to the significance of retention and protention, as well as memory and anticipation. Moreover, following the genetic method, we can also investigate how the experience of pain is incorporated into various apperceptions—both conceptual and affective—and how these apperceptions codetermine the nature of pain experience. The analysis of these themes will require that we understand pain not only as a depersonalizing, but also as a repersonalizing experience: not only as an experience that robs us of our selfhood, but also as an experience that invites us to reconstitute ourselves anew. Last but not least, the genetic method also invites us to examine the significance of the person’s immersion in the life-world. In this regard, a genetically oriented phenomenology of pain can demonstrate to what extent the processes of somatization and psychologization codetermine the nature of pain experience.

      As my references to such processes as depersonalization and repersonalization, as well as somatization and psychologization, suggest, genetically oriented phenomenology of pain must be pursued in dialogue with other disciplines—such as cultural anthropology, cultural psychopathology, and psychoanalysis—which study the same processes on the basis of other methodological principles. In this regard, genetic phenomenology, much like the method of factual variation, liberates phenomenology from insularity by opening exchanges with other fields of research.

      * * *

      Let us sum up these methodological considerations. I presented the methods of the epoché, the phenomenological reduction, and eidetic variation as the three fundamental methodological principles that make up the basic core of phenomenologically oriented investigations. I further argued that these three principles are necessary, although not sufficient. In virtue of inherent limitations, they need to be supplemented with further methodological considerations. As we saw, even though the method of eidetic variation is meant to provide the researcher with access to the essence of the phenomenon, it cannot guarantee that the investigator will not confuse this essence with a generalized factual description. Such being the case, the method of eidetic variation needs to be supplemented with the possibilities opened up by factual variation. Such a supplementation significantly enriches the phenomenological field of analysis, even though, admittedly, it does not close off the open possibility that the phenomenological insights might still fail to reach the essence of the phenomenon. Such a methodological supplementation, which reconceptualizes factual variation as a necessary ingredient of eidetic variation, imparts upon phenomenology a much-needed dialogical orientation. Phenomenology need not be disadvantaged by its own purity. Insofar as it is willing to supplement imaginative variations with factual variations, it can build on the basis of accomplishments derived from other sciences by transforming these accomplishments into pure possibilities. Insofar as phenomenology is willing to take on such a methodological orientation, it loses its insularity and becomes dialogical.

      Such a dialogical approach is especially called for in pain research. As Gallagher has it, “Phenomena that pertain to biological and specifically human behavior and experience are so complex, that we cannot always grasp the imaginative possibilities in a unified intentional act” (2012, 55). Pain is such a phenomenon. Thus, even though I will begin my analysis in chapter 2 by building phenomenological descriptions in line with the first three fundamental phenomenological methods, it will soon become apparent that a dialogue between phenomenology and a number of other disciplines—such as cognitive science, cultural anthropology, and psychoanalysis—is of great importance for phenomenologically oriented pain research. In addition to supplementing eidetic descriptions with resources obtained from other disciplines, it will also prove necessary to supplement static analyses with genetic investigations. In phenomenology, it does not suffice to clarify the nature of pain experience in terms of its fundamental structures. This is a great task in itself, and it can be achieved by following the methodological СКАЧАТЬ