The Phenomenology of Pain. Saulius Geniusas

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СКАЧАТЬ the method of eidetic variation presupposes a more original exposure to the essences of phenomena,⁷ one nonetheless has to agree that with the help of this method, one obtains a much more solid grasp of the essences in question. Insofar as it results in the insight into what is invariable, the method of eidetic variation solidifies our grasp of essences by transforming our vague and merely preconceptual understanding of phenomena into genuine, reliable, and intersubjectively verifiable knowledge of their essential predicates.

      Despite its difficulties, the method of eidetic variation is vital for phenomenology, since in its absence, phenomenology would not be in the position to make any reliable and intersubjectively verifiable claims. What exactly would a phenomenologist be left with if, methodologically, he relied only on the epoché and the phenomenological reduction? Following the methodological guidance of these two methods, one would reach the stream of experience and pure phenomena. Yet what would a phenomenological description of such a stream and such phenomena amount to? One would be left with a pure description of factual experiences and phenomena, yet without any right to claim that the description offered is of any relevance for other experiences or other phenomena. Insofar as one relies upon only the methods of the epoché and the reduction, one can already grasp phenomena in their phenomenological purity, yet one remains restricted to their singularity. Phenomenology is in need of a method that would enable it to transcend what is singular and factual. The method of eidetic variation is designed to take us beyond the Heracleitean flux of experience. The possibility of phenomenology, as a philosophy, rests on the shoulders of insights into essences of phenomena. In phenomenology, the method of eidetic variation is indispensable.

      Let us briefly sum up the three methodological procedures that are necessary for phenomenologically oriented research on pain. First, by following the method of the epoché, the phenomenologist puts in brackets all the scientific discoveries about pain and even the fundamental assumption that underlies these discoveries, namely, the assumption that pain is a natural, that is, a neurophysiological phenomenon. Second, with the performance of the phenomenological reduction, the phenomenologist gains access to pain, conceived of as pure experience. Third, the method of eidetic variation enables phenomenology to engender intersubjectively verifiable claims about the essence of pain experience. For our purposes, this brief presentation of the fundamental methodological principles that must underlie the phenomenology of pain will have to suffice.

THREE ALLEGATIONS: PSYCHOLOGISM, INTROSPECTIONISM, AND SOLIPSISM

      The method of eidetic variation has often been subjected to criticism, which left one with the impression that a safer way to proceed is to dispose of this method altogether. I do not see how such a presumably safe route can enable a phenomenologist to beget intersubjectively verifiable claims. With the epoché, the phenomenologist has cut off the possibility of relying on the accomplishments of the objective sciences; with the reduction, he has returned to the stream of pure experiences. Yet what can assure us that this stream is not a Heracleitean flux, into which one cannot set one’s foot twice? To make clear the dangers that phenomenology faces when one overlooks the eidetic nature of its claims, let us ask three interrelated questions: (1) When phenomenology is employed in such fields as pain research, does it not degenerate into a form of psychologism? (2) Moreover, can it be anything other than introspectionism? (3) Last but not least, is it not a type of solipsism? Addressing these questions will enable us to bolster the view that the methods of the epoché, the reduction, and eidetic variation are indispensable for phenomenologically oriented pain research.

      1. We can answer the first question by opening a brief dialogue between the phenomenology of pain and the phenomenology of illness. In her recent study, Havi Carel bemoans philosophy’s indifference to illness. She speaks of the “philosophical tendency to resist thinking about illness” (Carel 2016, 5) and offers an original and highly valuable phenomenological response to this indifference. One should not, however, overlook just how common it is to begin phenomenologically oriented studies of illness with a confession concerning the author’s personal experience of pain and/or illness. What exactly is the role of confessions of such nature? To be sure, nobody is a stranger to pain and illness, be it personal or interpersonal. Moreover, any phenomenological account is always grounded in experience. Nonetheless, as far as phenomenologically oriented studies of pain and illness are concerned, one shoots oneself in the foot when one argues, whether openly or discreetly, that only those who suffer from severe forms of illness and/or pain have the right to address these themes philosophically. We face here a crude form of psychologism, conceived of as an illegitimate form of reductionism,⁸ which one could describe either as the incapacity to raise one’s own personal experience to the eidetic level, or as a matter of diminishing eidetic unities of meaning to the level of psychological experiences. In light of Husserl’s sweeping critique of psychologism in the Prolegomena to his Logical Investigations, anyone in phenomenology who reflects on what such a view implies will be led to discard it.⁹

      A phenomenologically oriented study cannot consist of a set of reflections on the idiosyncratic nature of one’s own personal experiences, no matter how fortunate or unfortunate they might be. It is not just a question of personal justification that might underlie a phenomenological investigation of such phenomena as pain. What is at stake here is the very nature of an investigation that would make it phenomenological. We face here a deep confusion that continues to haunt phenomenologically oriented pain research. This confusion derives from the misunderstanding of the nature of phenomenologically oriented research. In light of the analysis undertaken in the previous section, we can say that this confusion derives from neglecting the eidetic nature of phenomenological investigations. The stream of pure experiences is not just a Heracleitean flux, which means that the phenomenology of pain is not pain autobiography and it should not be misconceived of as a code word for personal accounts of experience. To be sure, a phenomenologist has a full right to begin the analysis by focusing on first-person experience. Yet only insofar as one’s analysis involves some kind of epoché and reduction, and only insofar as it leads to insights into essences, does one have the right to qualify one’s account as phenomenological. With this in mind, let us once again stress that a phenomenologically oriented investigation is concerned with the eidetic structures of pain experience.¹⁰

      2. Just as phenomenology is not psychologism, so also it is not introspectionism. This is another implication that follows from the analysis offered in the last section. Here we touch on a confusion that is widespread in the contemporary philosophy of pain, which is marked by a general willingness to enter into dialogue with phenomenology. Such openness to phenomenology relies upon the conjecture that phenomenology can fill a significant void in pain research. One presumes that pain is both physiological and experiential, and on this basis one further claims that the science of pain is in need of both a third-person experimental and a first-person experiential methodology. Within such a framework, one further conceives of phenomenology, along with Eastern meditative practices (see Price and Aydede 2005, 14), as a peculiar type of introspective method.¹¹ One thus presumes that phenomenology can fulfill an important yet partial task in the science of pain: it can clarify pain’s experiential dimensions (what Price and Aydede identify as the horizontal dimension), which then need to be further linked to their neurological underpinnings (what Price and Aydede refer to as the vertical dimension).

      While appreciating the general openness toward phenomenology, I would nonetheless claim that we face here a highly misleading appropriation of phenomenology.¹² The confusion in question derives from a misunderstanding of the privilege phenomenology accords to reflection and intuition. One reasons as follows: since phenomenology is a reflective discipline whose fundamental concepts are established intuitively, what else can it be if not introspectionism—a first-person examination of one’s conscious thoughts and feelings, which can be given only reflectively and intuitively? But if so, then the devastating critique of introspectionism, and especially in behaviorist psychology, must also apply to phenomenology. This critique has demonstrated that first-person reports appear to rest only on immediate self-givenness, while in truth they entail inferences drawn from overt behavior and from the judgments of others. The recent critiques in the philosophy of mind, which reproach phenomenology for being naively reliant СКАЧАТЬ