The Phenomenology of Pain. Saulius Geniusas

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СКАЧАТЬ from the realization that pain sensations can function as presentative contents that can give rise to pain as an intentional object of experience.

      The proposed conception of pain as a stratified phenomenon relies upon two distinctions. On the one hand, there is the distinction between intentional and nonintentional feelings, which Husserl defends in the Fifth Logical Investigation. On the other hand, there is the not so visible distinction between simple and complex experiences. Pain is not an intentional experience, insofar as intentionality is conceived in line with the Brentanian model, which suggests that all intentional feelings are founded on presentations. In this regard, Husserl’s opposition to Brentano cannot raise any doubt.¹⁴ This does not mean, however, that pain should be characterized as an essentially nonintentional experience. To be sure, insofar as pain is conceived of as a simple experience, it is a pure feeling-sensation. Nonetheless, pain can also be conceived of as a complex experience—an intentional object, founded upon pain sensations.

      According to the view I defend here, we should not interpret the central distinction between intentional and nonintentional feelings in §15 of the Fifth Logical Investigation as a suggestion that alongside essentially intentional feelings, there is a group of essentially nonintentional feelings. Rather, these nonintentional feelings, understood as feeling-sensations, can be taken up in an objectifying interpretation and transformed into components of intentional consciousness. There are two essentially different types of feelings: essentially intentional feelings, which are founded upon presentations; as well as nonintentional feelings, which are not founded on other presentations, yet which can found complex feeling-presentations. Husserl’s conception of pain as primarily a feeling-sensation, which can also become a complex intentional feeling, is to be understood as a critique, which is simultaneously directed at Brentano’s and Stumpf’s views, a critique that provides a viable resolution to a seemingly irresolvable dispute.

      Consider Husserl’s observation in one of the appendixes that accompany his Logical Investigations: “The perceived object is not the pain as experienced, but the pain in a transcendent reference as connected with the tooth” (2000, 866). The distinction Husserl draws here between pain-as-experienced and pain-as-an-object-of-experience is a clear indication that pain can be conceived not only as a sensed content but also as an intentional object. Husserl introduces this distinction with the aim of qualifying the type of evidence that accompanies one’s pain experience. Husserl’s goal here is to replace Brentano’s distinction between internal and external perception with the distinction between adequate and inadequate evidence. While for Brentano, only acts of consciousness can be given through internal perception (and thus, given indubitably), for Husserl, not only conscious acts, but also nonintentional contents of experience can be said to be given adequately. According to Husserl, insofar as pain is conceived of as a lived-experience, it is given adequately (that is, given indubitably). By contrast, insofar as pain is conceived of as an object of experience, its evidence is inadequate (one can therefore easily mistake the tooth that hurts for the one that does not hurt).¹⁵

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