America's Israel. Kenneth Kolander

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СКАЧАТЬ 21, Donald Rumsfeld, a Republican representative from Illinois and future Secretary of Defense for Gerald Ford and George W. Bush, cautioned the administration against putting pressure on Israel by threatening to withhold arms. He noted that the Soviets had already resupplied their client states and that France refused to sell more aircraft to Israel. Rumsfeld was worried “that the U.S. position might be based on a desire to exert pressure on the Israelis to withdraw,” which Rumsfeld called “most unwise.” He further argued that it was “imprudent” to put “pressure on Israel by denying her the needed capability to deter further aggression.”¹³⁴ Rep. Charles H. Wilson (D-CA) reminded his colleagues that Congress is “charged with the responsibility for overseeing our foreign policy,” and he blasted the administration for providing disproportionate arms sales to Arab states. He noted with disdain McCloskey’s June 5 statement that the United States was “neutral in thought, word, and deed.” Wilson wanted to “junk our policy of restricting arms sales to Israel” and to immediately approve the delivery of Skyhawks.¹³⁵ Congressman Joel Broyhill (R-VA), similar to Rumsfeld, worried “that the planes are being withheld to obtain bargaining leverage to force Israeli concessions.” In his speech to a Virginia Lodge of B’nai B’rith, Broyhill vowed to “urge, with every bit of persuasion at my command, that these planes be released.”¹³⁶ Representative Halpern called for the delivery of the Skyhawks and complained that “the Department of State is using the Congress as an excuse” for not honoring the sale of Skyhawks to Israel. (He pointed out that congressional concern had been about the financing of arms sales to Arabs and in no way meant “to obstruct the arming of Israel.”)¹³⁷

      Johnson wanted to release the Skyhawks to Israel, but he also wanted to resume arms shipments to moderate Arab states. On October 9, Walt Rostow informed Johnson that Israeli officials were “deeply suspicious—despite our contrary assurances—that our freezing past aid means we’re going to use it as leverage to force them to terms with Arabs. They well remember 1956–57 when we froze their assets here and then forced them back to the armistice lines.” Secretary of Defense McNamara wanted to continue the freeze, not to pressure Israel, but to avoid upsetting legislators on the issue of military credit sales.¹³⁸ However, as noted above, Representative Halpern obviously disagreed with the administration’s position on the matter. By October 12, the administration had determined to resume shipments to Israel and planned for the delivery of the Skyhawks to begin in December; McNamara sent a letter to Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban to that effect.¹³⁹ But the administration also indicated that arms shipments would resume to moderate Arab states. Walt Rostow told Evron “that it would be impossible for the U.S. to have an Israel policy without a Middle East policy.” Evron agreed and added, “If we are to work together, as we must, on issues like Middle East arms supply, we ought to try to work out a more lucid common strategy for the whole region.”¹⁴⁰ Here again, Evron pushed for a stronger strategic relationship between the two countries. But for domestic political reasons, Israeli officials could not formally approve of the U.S. decision to resume arms shipments to Arab states. Therefore, on October 18, McNamara decided with Israeli ambassador Harman that Israel would not respond to McNamara’s letter to Eban, and instead, the two sides informally agreed to the arrangement.¹⁴¹

      Before the administration formally announced its decision to lift the arms embargo, another violent event in the Middle East hastened congressional calls for more arms to Israel. On October 21, Egypt sank the Israeli destroyer Eilat. An Egyptian boat within the harbor at Port Said, armed with Soviet missiles, fired upon and ultimately sank the Eilat, which had been in international waters approximately ten miles from the harbor. The attack was in response to a July attack by the Eilat on Egyptian boats that happened within Egyptian waters. Several Republican representatives voiced their Cold War concerns about Soviet activity in the Middle East. Bob Wilson (R-CA) believed the Soviets were testing the United States, since they had rearmed their Arab allies “without the United States keeping its commitment to sell a limited number of military jets to Israel.”¹⁴² Like Wilson, Edward Gurney (R-FL) was disturbed by the use of sophisticated Soviet weaponry as the sinking of the Eilat was “the first time in history that this type of radar missile has been used to sink a ship of any flag.” Gurney found it “inconceivable” that the Johnson administration “is reneging on its commitment to Israel…. By withholding this sale of jets to Israel … we are encouraging further Communist Russia intervention into the Middle East.”¹⁴³ By October 25, the administration had announced the lifting of the arms embargo, which pleased Bingham, who added his satisfaction for the administration’s decision during his denunciation of the Eilat attack.¹⁴⁴ James Fulton (R-PA) went even further. In addition to delivery of Skyhawks, he called on the U.S. Congress to pass a resolution to give “Israel at once, a late series destroyer to replace the Israel destroyer.”¹⁴⁵ Representative Farbstein, a New York Democrat, echoed the call for a replacement of the Eilat.146 Surprisingly, perhaps, representatives and senators voiced more concern on the House and Senate floors with Egypt’s attack on the Israeli Eilat than with Israel’s attack on the USS Liberty.

      While Soviet weapons threatened Israel in the Middle East, reports surfaced that Moscow had taken measures to oppress Jews living in the Soviet Union by placing restrictions on emigration. Speaker of the House John McCormack (D-MA) reported that Soviet treatment of Jews worsened after the June war, and that in August “the Soviet government barred the emigration of some 6,000 Soviet Jews to Israel.” McCormack added that “Soviet authorities” were pressuring “Soviet satellite countries in Europe to do likewise.”¹⁴⁷ (In the years to follow, the Soviet Union would place greater restrictions on emigration, which prompted further congressional action—the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade Act.)

      Finally, in November, after months of negotiations, the U.N. Security Council agreed to Resolution 242, which called on Israel to withdraw from territories occupied in the conflict in return for peace agreements. The resolution formalized the land-for-peace framework as the basis for the Arab-Israeli peace process. However, the resolution failed to mention the Palestinians by name, and unfortunately their plight would often be overlooked in the peace process. At the time, no serious discussion was devoted to a two-state solution. Moreover, Israel fought hard to remove the word “the” from the phrase: “Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from [the] territories occupied in the recent conflict.” In doing so, the resolution failed to firmly articulate which territories should be evacuated by Israel’s forces. The Israeli interpretation held that Israel did not have to leave all of the territories, and that the ambiguity of 242 provided room for negotiations; the Arab interpretation held that Israel had to leave all of the territories, not just some of them, which made negotiations much less essential to the process. Thus Gunnar Jarring, the diplomat appointed by the United Nations to facilitate peace negotiations, faced the unenviable task of trying to build agreements on an intentionally vague resolution. All the while, the United States and the Soviet Union sent more weapons to the region for purposes of the Cold War.

       Phantom Feud

      Johnson’s foreign and domestic problems came to a head in 1968, and an increasingly assertive Congress pushed Johnson to move closer to Israel with another major weapons sale—Phantom jets. After the weapons embargo was lifted, Israel requested twenty-seven more Skyhawks and fifty Phantom jets.¹⁴⁸ With supersonic speed, radar-guided missiles, and the potential to deliver a nuclear weapon, the Phantoms were far more sophisticated than the Skyhawks. The State Department opposed the sale in the hopes of advancing armslimitation agreements and repairing the damage done to U.S.-Arab relations during the recent war. The Joint Chiefs opposed the sale because, according to analyses, Israel did not need the Phantoms. The Defense Department did not necessarily oppose the sale, as long as moderate Arab regimes also received arms.¹⁴⁹ Johnson again proved reluctant to sell weapons to Israel. He hoped to avoid a strategic alliance with Israel, and selling Phantoms would further alienate Arab states. Johnson also wanted to support the efforts of Jarring, and selling the Phantoms would undercut his peace efforts. As Bard notes, “No decision was reached during the remainder of the year [1967], despite a deluge of letters from congressmen urging the president to СКАЧАТЬ