America's Israel. Kenneth Kolander

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СКАЧАТЬ him enough freedom to effectively fight the Soviet Union, a dynamic often called the Imperial Presidency.²¹ But beginning in early 1966, Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-AR), chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, started to publicly question American involvement in Vietnam. Fulbright’s efforts would eventually lead to a full congressional assault on presidential foreign policy during the Nixon and Ford years. According to Robert David Johnson, “By the middle of 1968, a majority of Senate Democrats and a growing number of GOP senators, while not willing to advocate withdrawal from Vietnam, were sufficiently radicalized by the war to reverse their previous support for a weak legislative role in international affairs.”²²

      The Johnson administration tried to limit congressional pressure. In August 1965, Komer and National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy met with eleven Jewish members of the House of Representatives to offer what the administration called “an insider’s view,” in order “to reassure our Hill friends by appearing to lift the veil on our Israeli affairs on a confidential basis.” The key was secrecy. Bundy and Komer informed the congressmembers that U.S. aid to Israel, primarily economic to that point, totaled more than $1 billion and noted that “we want to convince them that we are really going all out to support Israel, so long as we can do it quietly.” The message from Bundy and Komer was this: “the more quiet … the more we can do.”²³

      As with East Asia, Congress proved to be a thorn in Johnson’s side about foreign policy in the Middle East. Pressure mounted on Johnson to sell Skyhawk jets to Israel. On February 1, 1966, more than seventy-five representatives wrote Secretary of State Dean Rusk to communicate their displeasure for an impending deal with Jordan without a corresponding deal for Israel.²⁴ It was no secret to the administration that Israel possessed a great deal of influence over members of Congress through lobbyists, and Komer pressed Johnson to “cope with this problem by requiring the Israelis themselves quietly to warn off their Hill lobbyists.”25 Johnson finally agreed to sell Skyhawk bomber jets to Israel that February, and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara insisted that the Israelis agree to “sew up everyone in Congress to keep quiet.”²⁶

      Just like the deal on tanks, President Johnson and his administration made it clear to Israeli officials that the sale of the Skyhawks was an exceptional case and constituted no change in the U.S.-Israel relationship. American officials informed the Israelis “not to bother us on planes for the next several years.”²⁷ Secretary McNamara also wanted Congress to understand that the Skyhawks sale signaled no change in U.S. arms-sales policies, and in May 1966, when speaking to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he emphasized that the Skyhawk sale was “very restrictive.”²⁸

      A few members of Congress started to press Johnson to sell weapons to Israel in order to contain communism. In September 1966, Rep. Seymour Halpern (R-NY) explained to the House floor that the PLO was amassing weapons for a war against Israel, and they had been “earmarked” by “Chinese Communists” to be “an effective instrument for revolutionary activity in this region.” Halpern submitted to the Record a letter from Congressman Glenn Cunningham (R-NE), which referenced the representatives’ letter from February 1966 that recommended strengthening Israel’s defenses, and further argued that recent developments required a reexamination of the U.S.-Israel relationship.²⁹ Rep. Lester Wolff (D-NY) spoke about tension on the Israel-Syria border and called for Americans to reaffirm their support for Israel, due largely to cultural ties between the United States and Israel, and especially because Israel was the only democracy in the Middle East.³⁰

      The sale of the Skyhawks did not prevent the United States from voting to censure Israel in the U.N. Security Council in November 1966. The censure came in response to Israeli military attacks on Jordan due to an increase in terrorism along the Israel-Jordan border. On November 13, an Israeli raid leveled the Jordanian border settlement of Samu, which resulted in the deaths of fifteen Jordanian soldiers, ten Israeli soldiers, and an Israeli commander; three villagers also died, along with nearly one hundred wounded. Syria had been behind the terrorist attacks, and Israel knew it. But Israel feared to attack Syria since it had just signed a defense pact with Egypt. The move against Jordan alienated King Hussein, who had been secretly collaborating with Israel, and convinced Hussein to move closer to Nasser, which he wanted to avoid.³¹

      As U.S. forces were bogged down in East Asia, the Middle East appeared to be heading to another war. Terrorist border attacks on Israel, many by the Palestinian organization Fatah, with Syrian support, had significantly increased since 1965. The Israeli response was often disproportional, such as at Samu, and Israel proved to be equally responsible for the outbreak of war.³² U.S. officials believed Israel to have a decisive military advantage vis-à-vis its Arab neighbors. In April 1967, McNamara related to Johnson that, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Israel will be militarily unchallengeable by any combination of Arab states at least during the next five years.”³³ Under secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach reiterated this point to President Johnson in a May 1 memo, about five weeks before the outbreak of war.³⁴ Nevertheless, in May, the Johnson administration completed negotiations with Israel for one hundred armored personnel carriers (APCs), military spare parts, and other assistance that totaled $72 million.³⁵ The U.S. assessments were on point as Israel would soon demonstrate in a lightning-quick defeat of Arab militaries.

       The 1967 War and the Congressional Response

      The June 1967 Arab-Israeli War and political aftermath proved to be one of the most significant events in modern Middle East history. Nasser did not want war with Israel. In fact, prior to the 1967 war, Israel was not a central concern of the Arab world; instead, inter-Arab politics, Arab nationalism, anticolonialism, and revolutionary socialism dominated Arab politics.³⁶ Arab states pursued their own national goals, and there was no monolithic or coordinated Arab strategy vis-à-vis Israel. But the Egyptian president made provocative moves against Israel, short of outright aggression, that led to an Israeli first strike and the outbreak of war. In response to a false report from Moscow about Israeli troop movements on the Syrian border, Nasser asked U.N. Secretary General U Thant to remove the U.N. Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Sinai Peninsula that had been deployed there in the aftermath of the 1956–1957 Suez Crisis. To the surprise of many, U Thant quickly agreed to Nasser’s request, which removed the stabilizing force that had acted as a buffer between the two states. On May 22, Nasser also ordered a naval blockade against Israeli shipping through the Straits of Tiran, which violated the agreement reached in 1957.

      Perhaps most important for American legislators, some Arab leaders—and Nasser in particular—made inflammatory comments about destroying Israel. Ernest Gruening (D-AK), for example, referenced “repeated threats by Egypt, in which it was joined by some of the Arab countries, that its intention was the liquidation of the tiny nation of Israel.”³⁷ James Scheuer (D-NY) added that Nasser “encourages Arab refugees to believe that they will destroy Israel and he arms them.”³⁸ In all likelihood, Nasser’s rhetoric aimed to generate popular support for his leadership in the Arab world and did not accurately reflect Egyptian goals. Thomas Pelly (R-WA) made a perceptive remark on May 23 when he said, “I do not know if President Nasser is engaging in psychological semantics or if his war threats to Israel are serious, but there is no doubt that his words are like striking a match on a powder keg.”³⁹

      Sincere or not, Nasser’s declarations reminded many of the Holocaust and brought about legislative expressions of support for Israel. Sen. Joseph Montoya (D-NM) wondered, “Are there not some of us here who remember the death camps…. I ask any humane and fairminded man here—have the Jews not paid out enough in the blood and agony of their people?”⁴⁰ Rep. Claude Pepper (D-NY) called Nasser “Little Hitler,” and Halpern warned against a “Munich-type sellout of Israel.”⁴¹

      Many members of Congress spoke of the American commitment to ensure Israel’s survival dating back to Harry Truman’s administration. In separate speeches on May 23, Senators Walter Mondale (D-MN) and Edward “Ted” Kennedy (D-MA) reminded СКАЧАТЬ