America's Israel. Kenneth Kolander

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СКАЧАТЬ worried that an existing amendment to eliminate a proposed program that would have granted new authority to the president to finance arms sales might “militate against our desire to supply Israel properly with arms…. it would be tragic indeed if Israel could not forfend against her Arab neighbors who are bent upon plunging her into the sea.”¹¹⁵ Representatives Bingham, Ryan, and John Dow (D-NY) all assured Celler that Israel would not be affected. Bingham said, “There are plenty of ways for us to supply Israel with all necessary arms,” and Ryan added that he wanted to eliminate a “new blank check authority” that “may be used to arm Israel’s eternal enemies.” The House passed the amendment.¹¹⁶

      As Congress encouraged a one-sided U.S. policy in the Middle East, the prospect for peace seemed to take a negative turn. On September 1, the heads of thirteen Arab states released the Khartoum Declaration, which famously declared the three “No’s”—no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, and no negotiations with Israel. The declaration came about six weeks after Arab states refused to accept a joint U.S.-Soviet draft resolution that called for Israel to withdraw “without delay” in return for nonbelligerency. The Arab states, according to Spiegel, “flatly rejected it,” and Quandt explains that “radical Arab objections to provisions calling for an end of war with Israel” led to the rejection.¹¹⁷ Israel also opposed the U.S.-Soviet resolution because it did not call for direct negotiations, did not mention Israel by name, and included only vague arrangements for peace.¹¹⁸ Israel was determined not to withdraw to previous lines without guarantees of peace—precisely what had happened with the Suez Crisis only ten years before. U.S. policy had already evolved to a point that peace with Israel must happen before the return of Arab territories; therefore, the Khartoum Declaration, which denied both formal recognition and a peace treaty, portended even worse U.S.-Arab relations.

      Similar to Nasser’s saber-rattling before the war, the Khartoum Declaration should not be taken at face value. According to Avi Shlaim, the Arab heads of state were prepared to recognize Israel as a state, though short of legal de jure recognition; were willing to negotiate with Israel through a third party, though not directly; and were willing to move to a state of peace short of a formal peace treaty. According to King Hussein of Jordan, Nasser encouraged him to “speak of a comprehensive solution to the problem and a comprehensive peace and go and do anything you can short of signing a peace.” Shlaim notes that Khartoum was a victory for moderate Arabs who wanted a political rather than military solution, and that the meeting marked “a real turning point in Nasser’s attitude to Israel.”¹¹⁹ Israeli leaders intentionally misrepresented Khartoum in order to justify their own hard line.¹²⁰

      According to U.S. documents, U.S. and Israeli officials clearly recognized the apparent moderation of Khartoum but doubted the sincerity of an Arab change of heart. On September 25, Johnson sent a letter to King Faisal of Saudi Arabia that stated, “I agree that the recent Khartoum conference marked notable progress for the forces of Arab moderation.” But Johnson also added that the Arab position “states what the Arabs will not do but, except by indirection, is silent on what the Arabs may be willing to do.” He welcomed the decision to move from a military to a political solution but questioned the Arab insistence on belligerency if they really hoped for a peaceful resolution.¹²¹ The State Department reiterated Johnson’s position on Khartoum in a telegram to Jordan a few days later.¹²² Lucius Battle, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs, told Adan Pachachi, Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs, “that it was difficult indeed for us to encourage the Israelis or anyone else to believe the Arabs wanted a political settlement when statements continued to emanate from Arab countries indicating the war would go on.”¹²³ Battle told Israeli Ambassador Abraham Harman that “reports of growing moderateness after Khartoum have so far not been borne out by any concrete Arab steps.”¹²⁴

      As Arab states searched for some way to secure a political agreement, Israeli flexibility diminished. Arthur Goldberg, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, told President Johnson that there were “some signs of moderation in the Arab camp, and some signs of hardening in the Israeli camp.” Goldberg cited “serious internal problems” in Israel, likely meaning a euphoric public mood following the dramatic victory, which made it “difficult for any Israeli spokesman to be ‘sweetly reasonable.’”¹²⁵ Eugene Rostow noted that “accepted wisdom” held that “the Israeli position is ‘hardening.’”¹²⁶ Battle questioned Harman about the announced establishment of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and on the Syrian border. He advised the Israeli ambassador to “not provide ammunition for those at U.N. who would interpret” the Israeli “position as hardening in direction of territorial acquisition rather than negotiated settlement.”¹²⁷ Secretary of State Rusk, when talking about territorial withdrawal in the Middle East, told Johnson, “In my opinion we are going to have to wrestle with Israel.”¹²⁸

      The Johnson administration could not mesh a commitment to territorial integrity for all states in the Middle East with a policy of protecting Israeli occupation until Arab states made peace. In response to Arab ambassadors’ questions about territorial integrity, National Security Advisor Walt Rostow wrote Johnson, “Our best answer is that we stand by that pledge, but the only way to make good on it is to have a genuine peace.” But even with “an honest peace settlement,” Rostow recognized that pushing “Israel back to 4 June borders … could lead to a tangle with the Israelis.”¹²⁹ King Hussein sent President Johnson a letter in early October, which noted that Khartoum reflected Arab flexibility, and that even Israeli navigation through the Suez Canal was possible if Israel would redress wrongs done to Palestinians since 1948. Hussein expressed his “deep hurt” by what he regarded as a “basic pro-Israel position” of the United States. He lamented the “double standard” applied to Arabs and Israelis regarding territorial integrity.¹³⁰ The Jordanian ambassador, Abdul-Hamid Sharaf, also communicated to Johnson an Arab frustration with an American double standard regarding territorial integrity. According to Harold Saunders’s notes from the meeting, “The Arab governments feel they have a right to expect the Government of the United States to honor that pledge. They have been deeply hurt that we have not.” Johnson responded that “we continue to support strongly the principle of territorial integrity but that the problem of putting that support in practice was a difficult one which we had not yet solved.”¹³¹ Also in the spirit of compromise, Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad admitted to U.S. officials that Egypt’s calls for the destruction of Israel had been a “mistake” and that Egypt did not challenge “Israel’s right to exist.” Rather, the main problem was refugees.¹³²

      The administration’s perception of the U.S.-Israel relationship continued to evolve. According to Saunders’s notes of a conversation with Israeli diplomat Ephraim Evron, Israel wanted new weapons sales connected to a strategic alliance. Evron asked that the Johnson administration treat Israelis “as close friends … rather than treating them like bazaar hagglers.” Evron recommended that the administration not try to exact any conditions for the sale of additional aircraft but to instead tell Israel through an informal channel “that we were doing this at some political cost and would therefore expect something from them in return.” By implication, Evron suggested the United States and Israel develop a strategic alliance in addition to a special relationship. Saunders made an insightful remark: “This strikes once again at the heart of our relationship with Israel. The Israelis always tried to get close to us and to build the kind of relationship we have with the British. We have—at least at the professional level of our government—kept them at arms length, and they have been deeply hurt. Evron and I have discussed this aspect of our relationship before, and it’s no surprise that he sees here a chance for a new start.” Saunders added that before the June war, the argument against more arms deals with Israel had nothing to do with dollars or armored personnel carriers—“the real argument was over what kind of relationship we should have with Israel.” Saunders added, “I’m tempted to take the risk Evron suggests … the real leverage we have is not a specific number of aircraft but our total relationship.”¹³³

      As the administration considered the next step in U.S.-Israel relations, СКАЧАТЬ