The Hour Between Dog and Wolf: Risk-taking, Gut Feelings and the Biology of Boom and Bust. John Coates

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СКАЧАТЬ and most controversially, Craig, along with other scientists such as Antonio Damasio and Antoine Bechara, has suggested that gut feelings and emotions, rationality and even self-consciousness itself, should be seen as more advanced tools that emerged over the course of evolution to help us regulate our body.

      As evolution progressed, body and brain entwined in an ever more intimate embrace. The brain sent out fibres to touch every tissue in the body, asserting control over heart, lungs, gut, arteries and glands, cooling us when hot, warming us when cold; and the body in turn pumped message after message back into the brain, telling of its wants and needs, and making suggestions as to how the brain should behave. In this manner, feedback between body and brain became more complex and extensive, not less so. We did not grow a larger brain just to fit it inside a withering body of the kind seen in sci-fi movies. The brain grew in order to control a more sophisticated body – a body that can handle a sword like Alexander, play the piano like Glenn Gould, control a tennis racket like John McEnroe, or perform open-brain surgery like Wilder Penfield.

      Through the research surveyed here, from anatomy, physiology and neuroscience, we have today come to see the body as an éminence grise, standing behind the brain, effectively applying pressure at just the right point, at just the right time, to help us prepare for movement. Scientists, by small steps, are thus patiently stitching closed an ancient wound opened up between mind and body. By doing so they have helped us understand how body and brain cooperate at crucial moments in our lives, like the taking of risks, including, most certainly, financial risks.

      

      

      A WAKE-UP CALL ON THE TREASURY DESK

      The trading floor we will be observing belongs to a large Wall Street investment bank, located a short walk from the Stock Exchange and the Federal Reserve. We begin our visit early on a crisp morning in March. It is just past 7 a.m., darkness still shrouds the city, street lamps burn, but already bankers trickle from subway stations at Broadway, Broad Street and Bowling Green, or step from taxis and limos in front of our bank. Women in Anne Taylor and trainers grip coffees; men in Brooks Brothers look freshly scrubbed and combed, their eyes fixed, like an athlete’s, on the day ahead.

      Up on the 31st floor the elevator doors open and bankers are drawn into a yawning trading room. Almost a thousand desks line its gridwork of aisles, each one cluttered with half a dozen computer screens that will soon monitor market prices, live news feeds and risk positions. Most screens are black now, but one by one they are switched on, and the floor begins to blink with neon green, orange and red. A rising hubbub absorbs individual voices. Out the front window, across the narrow street, looms another glass office tower, so close you can almost read the newspaper lying on a desk. Out the side window, lower down, climbs a listed 1920s building, its stepped-back rooftop an Art Deco masterpiece: pillars topped with hooded figures; friezes depicting sunbursts, winged creatures and mysterious symbols the meaning of which have long since been forgotten. During idle moments bankers gaze down on this lost civilisation and feel a momentary nostalgia for that more glamorous time, memories of the Jazz Age being just some of the ghosts haunting this storied street.

      Settling in for the day, traders begin to call London and ask what has happened overnight. Once they have picked up the thread of the market they one by one take control of the trading books, transferring the risk to New York, where it will be monitored and traded until Tokyo comes in that evening. These traders work in three separate departments – bonds (the department is often called fixed income), currencies, and commodities, while downstairs a similar-sized trading floor houses the equity department. Each department in turn is split between traders and salespeople, the salespeople of a bank being responsible for convincing their clients – pension funds, insurance companies, mutual funds, in short, the institutions managing the savings of the world – to invest their money or execute their trades with the bank’s traders. Should one of these clients decide to do so, the salesperson takes an order from them to buy or sell a security, say a Treasury bond or a block of currencies, say dollar–yen, and the order is executed by the trader in charge of making markets in this instrument.

      One of these clients, DuPont Pension Fund, livens up what is turning out to be an uneventful day by calling in the only big trade of the morning. DuPont has accumulated $750 million-worth of pension contributions from its employees, and needs to invest the funds. It chooses to do so in US Treasury bonds maturing in ten years, the interest payments from which will finance retiring employees’ pension benefits. It is still early in the day, only 9.30, and most markets are sleepy with inactivity, but the fund manager wants to execute this trade before the afternoon. That is when the Fed will announce its decision to raise or lower interest rates. Even though the financial community widely expects it to do nothing, the fund manager does not want to take unnecessary risks. Besides, for months now she has worried about what she considers an unsustainable bull market in stocks, and the very real possibility of a crash.

      The fund manager scans her telephone keyboard for the four or five banks she prefers to deal with for Treasury bonds. Morgan Stanley sent her an insightful piece of research yesterday – maybe she should give them a shot. Goldman can be aggressive on price. Deutsche Bank entertains well, and last summer the salespeople covering her out of Europe took her to Henley Regatta. After a moment’s indecision she passes on these banks, and decides instead to give her pal Esmee a shot. Hitting the direct line, she says, without the usual chitchat, ‘Esmee, offer $750 million ten-year Treasuries, on the hop.’

      Esmee, the salesperson, covers the speaker of her phone and yells to the trader on the Treasury desk, ‘Martin, offer 750 tens, DuPont!’

      The trader shoots back, ‘Is this in competition?’ meaning is DuPont getting prices from a number of other banks. The advantage of doing a trade in competition is that DuPont ensures it gets an aggressive price; the disadvantage is that several banks would know there is a big buyer, and this may cause prices to spike before the fund gets its bonds. However, the Treasury market is now so competitive that price transparency is no longer an issue, so on balance it is probably in DuPont’s interest to keep this trade quiet. Esmee relays to Martin that the trade is ‘out of comp’, but adds, ‘Print this trade, big boy. It’s DuPont.’

      Looking at his broker screens, Martin sees ten-year Treasuries quoted at 100.24–100.25, meaning that one bank, trying to buy them, is bidding a price of 100.24, while another, trying to sell, is offering them at 100.25. Traders post their prices on broker screens to avoid the tedious process of calling round all the other banks to find out which ones need to trade (in that regard a securities broker is no different from an estate agent), and also to maintain anonymity. The offer price posted right now on this broker screen is good for about $100 million only. If Martin offers $750 million to DuPont at the offered price of 100.25, he has no guarantee of buying the other $650 million at the price he sold them.

      To decide on the right price, Martin must rely on his feel for the market – how deep it is, in other words how much he can buy without moving prices, and whether the market is going up or down. If the market feels strong and the offers are thinning out, he may need to offer the bonds higher than indicated on the screen, at say 100.26 or 100.27. If on the other hand the market feels weak, he may offer right at the offer side price of 100.25 and wait for the market to go down. Whatever his decision, it will involve taking a substantial risk. Nonetheless, all morning Martin has been unconsciously mapping the trading patterns on the screens – the highs and lows, the size traded, the speed of movement – and comparing them to ones stored in his memory. He now mentally scrolls through possible scenarios and the options open to him. With each one comes a minute and rapid shift in his body, maybe a slight СКАЧАТЬ