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СКАЧАТЬ but again it seems likely that they made use of the services of local brokers.²¹ Representatives of towns usually entered financial markets with a mandate to sell annuities at a certain interest rate, which was probably based on earlier communications with brokers. When they did not manage to sell sufficient annuities at this interest rate they simply could improve their offer. When the government of Leiden found out, in 1472, that demand for life annuities at interest rates of 10 % (one life) and 8,5 % (two lives) was low, it reacted by offering inhabitants of Leiden resp. 11,1 % and 9,1 %.²² In other instances we also encounter price making: some elderly people looking to buy life annuities from Leiden managed to negotiate higher interest rates –presumably to compensate for their low life expectancy–.²³ A claim by the large village of Noordwijk also hints at the adjustment of interest rates to sell annuities: the village claimed to have offered interest rates as high as 16,7 %, 20 % and even 25 %, but did not manage to find buyers, presumably because of a lack of creditworthiness.²⁴ Further evidence of price making is presented in figure 2, which will be discussed in more detail later in the text. Towns and villages sold redeemable annuities at interest rates ranging from 4,8 % to 12,5 %, although by far the most were sold in the range of 5,6 % to 6,7 %.²⁵ This range of interest rates also confirms that sovereigns did not yet impose maximum interest rates at levels that interfered with market prices: there was ample room to negotiate interest rates acceptable to creditors and debtors.

The interest rates presented here are nominal interest rates. They are likely to reflect the risk of inflation and currency manipulation. Apart from this interest rates consist of a) compensation for the time the creditor cannot use the money, b) a premium that reflects the expected increase of overall expected income, and c) a default risk premium.²⁶ Considering that Holland was in a monetary union with the regions of Flanders, Brabant and Zeeland in this period, the risk of inflation was more or less the same everywhere in large parts of the Low Countries. In theory the default risk premium may have varied from one public body to another: as explained earlier, towns that had earlier defaulted on annuity payments and therefore lacked creditworthiness, had to offer higher interest rates to investors. Their «credit rating» is thus likely to have affected pricing, although it must be added that towns that had reneged usually did not succeed in selling any more annuities, or stopped borrowing altogether.²⁷

Another element that determined default risk was the institutional framework of financial markets. How much expenses could a creditors expect to make when trying to enforce interest payments from reneging towns? Towns usually secured annuities relying on a community responsibility system that allowed creditors to hold all inhabitants liable for defaults.²⁸ In theory this may have meant that lending to large towns was less risky than to small towns and villages: the community responsibility system depended on the number of liable subjects frequenting the creditor’s residence. For the latter, the chances of encountering an inhabitant liable for public debt was greater in the event they had invested in the public debt of a large town with a substantial group of itinerant merchants. In practice creditors will therefore have selected debtors based on the probability that they would be able to hold someone liable –hence the relatively limited geographical scope of village debt and the much larger scope of urban debt, an issue that will be discussed further on–.

      III

      Our first exercise concerns the spatial distribution of investors in urban public debt. Our sample is based on three towns for which an elaborate administration of public debt has been preserved –including the residences of creditors–. The latter information is scarce: towns generally kept a good administration of their public debt, but many usually sufficed with listing the names of their creditors, and the interest they were due. Town accounts of Leiden, Groningen and Nijmegen do provide such information though (map 1).

Leiden was one of the main towns of the county of Holland. It was well known for its textile production, and had a population of c. 10.000-15.000.²⁹ Leiden stands out as one of the few towns that allows us to investigate the spatial distribution of public debt over a longer period of time. Although the town’s accounts go back to 1390, the first to offer an overview of the residences of creditors is from 1434. By that time the town government had apparently realized that a more thorough recording of public debt was necessary to prevent any errors in annuity payments, which were easily made considering the number of annuities Leiden owed.³⁰ Apart from the account of 1434, we have sampled accounts from 1449, 1500 and 1548.³¹

      Figure 1 gives the spatial distribution of the town’s public debt. The figure shows that Leiden initially paid out the greatest part of annuities to its inhabitants: in 1434 these were worth no less than 8.541 guilders out of a total of 10.059 guilders (85 %). However, this figure dropped over time, to 54 % in 1449, and 31 % in 1500, when Leiden had come to rely more on funding coming from out of town. By 1548 the proportion of creditors from Leiden had increased again to almost 50 %.

      FIGURE 1

      Geographic dispersion of creditors of Leiden (15^th-16^th centuries)

      Source: J. Zuijderduijn: Medieval capital markets, p. 178.

      Several things are worth discussing in depth. Initially the majority of foreign funding came from the Duchy of Brabant, to the Southeast of Holland. In 1434 the value of annuities Leiden was due in Brabant was 1207 guilders (12 %), and this share more or less stayed the same over time, peaking at 18 % in 1500. Foreign funding coming from Brabant is in line with the the prominence of financial markets in the Southern Low Countries. A wealthy area, in Brabant supply of savings was probably much higher than in Holland, and it seems that Leiden had little trouble selling annuities over there. The almost complete absence of creditors from equally wealthy Flanders is a bit puzzling though.

A second thing that stands out is the increasing importance of financial markets outside Leiden, but within the county of Holland. The value of annuities Leiden was due elsewhere in Holland rose from an almost negligable 33 guilders in 1434 to 2528 guilders in 1449. The town entering financial markets elsewhere in Holland went hand in hand with a gradual diversification: in 1449 creditors from Holland lived in main towns Dordrecht, Haarlem, Delft, Amsterdam and Gouda, in The Hague, and also in Noordwijk, a rather large village to the Northwest of Leiden. In 1500 creditors were also to be found in Rotterdam and a number of small towns and villages (map 2). Finally in 1548 the spatial dispersion had again declined, probably due to the fact that Leiden sold fewer annuities in the sixteenth century, due to severe financial problems that resulted in a low credit rating,³² and also because of the emergence of provincial debt after 1515, causing the representative council (Staten van Holland) to start selling annuities on behalf of the towns of Holland.³³

      MAP 1

      Map of the late-medieval Low Countries

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