Plato: The Complete Works (31 Books). Plato

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СКАЧАТЬ in body.’ When I have done with the trainer, there arrives the money-maker, and he, as I expect, will utterly despise them all. ‘Consider Socrates,’ he will say, ‘whether Gorgias or any one else can produce any greater good than wealth.’ Well, you and I say to him, and are you a creator of wealth? ‘Yes,’ he replies. And who are you? ‘A money-maker.’ And do you consider wealth to be the greatest good of man? ‘Of course,’ will be his reply. And we shall rejoin: Yes; but our friend Gorgias contends that his art produces a greater good than yours. And then he will be sure to go on and ask, ‘What good? Let Gorgias answer.’ Now I want you, Gorgias, to imagine that this question is asked of you by them and by me; What is that which, as you say, is the greatest good of man, and of which you are the creator? Answer us.

      GORGIAS: That good, Socrates, which is truly the greatest, being that which gives to men freedom in their own persons, and to individuals the power of ruling over others in their several states.

      SOCRATES: And what would you consider this to be?

      GORGIAS: What is there greater than the word which persuades the judges in the courts, or the senators in the council, or the citizens in the assembly, or at any other political meeting?—if you have the power of uttering this word, you will have the physician your slave, and the trainer your slave, and the money-maker of whom you talk will be found to gather treasures, not for himself, but for you who are able to speak and to persuade the multitude.

      SOCRATES: Now I think, Gorgias, that you have very accurately explained what you conceive to be the art of rhetoric; and you mean to say, if I am not mistaken, that rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion, having this and no other business, and that this is her crown and end. Do you know any other effect of rhetoric over and above that of producing persuasion?

      GORGIAS: No: the definition seems to me very fair, Socrates; for persuasion is the chief end of rhetoric.

      SOCRATES: Then hear me, Gorgias, for I am quite sure that if there ever was a man who entered on the discussion of a matter from a pure love of knowing the truth, I am such a one, and I should say the same of you.

      GORGIAS: What is coming, Socrates?

      SOCRATES: I will tell you: I am very well aware that I do not know what, according to you, is the exact nature, or what are the topics of that persuasion of which you speak, and which is given by rhetoric; although I have a suspicion about both the one and the other. And I am going to ask— what is this power of persuasion which is given by rhetoric, and about what? But why, if I have a suspicion, do I ask instead of telling you? Not for your sake, but in order that the argument may proceed in such a manner as is most likely to set forth the truth. And I would have you observe, that I am right in asking this further question: If I asked, ‘What sort of a painter is Zeuxis?’ and you said, ‘The painter of figures,’ should I not be right in asking, ‘What kind of figures, and where do you find them?’

      GORGIAS: Certainly.

      SOCRATES: And the reason for asking this second question would be, that there are other painters besides, who paint many other figures?

      GORGIAS: True.

      SOCRATES: But if there had been no one but Zeuxis who painted them, then you would have answered very well?

      GORGIAS: Quite so.

      SOCRATES: Now I want to know about rhetoric in the same way;—is rhetoric the only art which brings persuasion, or do other arts have the same effect? I mean to say—Does he who teaches anything persuade men of that which he teaches or not?

      GORGIAS: He persuades, Socrates,—there can be no mistake about that.

      SOCRATES: Again, if we take the arts of which we were just now speaking:— do not arithmetic and the arithmeticians teach us the properties of number?

      GORGIAS: Certainly.

      SOCRATES: And therefore persuade us of them?

      GORGIAS: Yes.

      SOCRATES: Then arithmetic as well as rhetoric is an artificer of persuasion?

      GORGIAS: Clearly.

      SOCRATES: And if any one asks us what sort of persuasion, and about what, —we shall answer, persuasion which teaches the quantity of odd and even; and we shall be able to show that all the other arts of which we were just now speaking are artificers of persuasion, and of what sort, and about what.

      GORGIAS: Very true.

      SOCRATES: Then rhetoric is not the only artificer of persuasion?

      GORGIAS: True.

      SOCRATES: Seeing, then, that not only rhetoric works by persuasion, but that other arts do the same, as in the case of the painter, a question has arisen which is a very fair one: Of what persuasion is rhetoric the artificer, and about what?—is not that a fair way of putting the question?

      GORGIAS: I think so.

      SOCRATES: Then, if you approve the question, Gorgias, what is the answer?

      GORGIAS: I answer, Socrates, that rhetoric is the art of persuasion in courts of law and other assemblies, as I was just now saying, and about the just and unjust.

      SOCRATES: And that, Gorgias, was what I was suspecting to be your notion; yet I would not have you wonder if by-and-by I am found repeating a seemingly plain question; for I ask not in order to confute you, but as I was saying that the argument may proceed consecutively, and that we may not get the habit of anticipating and suspecting the meaning of one another’s words; I would have you develope your own views in your own way, whatever may be your hypothesis.

      GORGIAS: I think that you are quite right, Socrates.

      SOCRATES: Then let me raise another question; there is such a thing as ‘having learned’?

      GORGIAS: Yes.

      SOCRATES: And there is also ‘having believed’?

      GORGIAS: Yes.

      SOCRATES: And is the ‘having learned’ the same as ‘having believed,’ and are learning and belief the same things?

      GORGIAS: In my judgment, Socrates, they are not the same.

      SOCRATES: And your judgment is right, as you may ascertain in this way:— If a person were to say to you, ‘Is there, Gorgias, a false belief as well as a true?’—you would reply, if I am not mistaken, that there is.

      GORGIAS: Yes.

      SOCRATES: Well, but is there a false knowledge as well as a true?

      GORGIAS: No.

      SOCRATES: No, indeed; and this again proves that knowledge and belief differ.

      GORGIAS: Very true.

      SOCRATES: And yet those who have learned as well as those who have believed are persuaded?

      GORGIAS: Just so.

      SOCRATES: Shall we then assume two sorts of persuasion,—one which is the source of belief without knowledge, as the other is of knowledge?

      GORGIAS: By all means.

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