The Russia-China Axis. Douglas E. Schoen
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Название: The Russia-China Axis

Автор: Douglas E. Schoen

Издательство: Ingram

Жанр: Зарубежная публицистика

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isbn: 9781594037573

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СКАЧАТЬ before these events unfolded, President Obama was sending similar signals—not only as regards Ukraine but also in connection with the mounting challenges the United States faces on many fronts. In his State of the Union speech in January 2014, for instance, Obama made clear that the U.S. was practically withdrawing from the field. He put no emphasis on confronting our enemies and made no explicit mention about the need to compete with China and Russia. The administration’s much-heralded “pivot to Asia” got just one sentence, and the president’s comments about the Middle East were perfunctory—save for his reference to Iran, where Obama made it clear that he would do everything in his power to support an agreement that contains such egregious loopholes that the Iranians can continue to enrich uranium at low grades, keep tens of thousands of centrifuges, and restart their full-blown enrichment program on less than a day’s notice. The difficulty of enforcing even the best deals with such adversaries was illustrated a day after Obama’s speech, when reports surfaced that the Russians have tested a medium-range cruise missile, in violation of the landmark 1987 arms-control treaty.16 The 1987 treaty was thought to be sound; by contrast, few but the most devoted Obama defenders see the Iranian agreement as anything but reckless, a virtual giveaway to an outlaw regime that will endanger the United States and its allies.

      Unfortunately, our allies have become accustomed to such disappointments. Indeed, rather than strengthening relations with American allies, the Obama administration, through its clumsy handling of the NSA wiretapping scandal, has found itself having to apologize to governments from Brazil to France to Germany for unauthorized monitoring of leaders’ and citizens’ phone calls. Indeed, reports have suggested that the NSA has monitored as many as 35 nations. The United States continues to prove far more adept at taping our allies and alienating our strategic partners than at developing and articulating a coherent policy in concert with them. “Fuck the EU,” Victoria Nuland, assistant secretary of state for European affairs, was caught on tape saying, expressing her contempt for European efforts to quell the crisis in Ukraine.17 German chancellor Angela Merkel, already alienated by American wiretapping, called the comments “completely unacceptable.”18 Meanwhile, a German newspaper editor opined that Vladimir Putin “should certainly be laughing himself stupid” over the latest fracas.19

      As the Western alliance frays and the U.S. becomes less powerful, Russia and China become more aggressive in the advocacy of their interests. They grow stronger while we do nothing to stand in their way and arguably become weaker. The stakes are enormous. If we don’t build awareness of what Russia and China are up to, greatly improve our understanding of their actions and motives, and take steps to defend ourselves and protect our interests, we will see our economic and political well-being threatened. And we’ll watch as the international order tilts toward authoritarianism and away from democratic ideals and freedoms.

      That would be a tragedy for America and for the world.

       The New Terrain

       “In my opinion, the competition between China and the U.S. in the 21st century should be a race, that is, a contest to see whose development results are better, whose comprehensive national power can rise faster, and to finally decide who can become the champion country to lead world progress.”

      —GENERAL LIU YAZHOU, CHINA1

       “What preserved peace, even in Cold War conditions, was a balance of forces.”

      —VLADIMIR PUTIN2

       “After my election, I have more flexibility.”

      —PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA3

      Xi Jinping’s visit to Moscow in March 2013 was dramatic, but the event was a long time coming. It was foreshadowed, in fact, more than a decade earlier, in 2001—the historic year that saw the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington and the launch of America’s War on Terror. Those attacks fundamentally transformed American foreign policy and American relations with both countries and the rest of the world. But while America geared up to fight a shadowy, multinational enemy, Russia and China were playing a much older, more traditional game: the time-honored practice of two strong nations identifying common interests and formalizing an alliance.

      In June 2001, in Shanghai, the two countries created a kind of alternative NATO: the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Evolving out of a predecessor organization, the Shanghai Five, and originally something of a vague concord between Russia and China, the SCO has developed more recently into a comprehensive effort to strengthen economic, military, and cultural ties and to provide mutual security. Vladimir Putin has called the SCO “a reborn version of the Warsaw Pact.”4 Unlike the old Warsaw Pact, however, which excluded China, the SCO is a joint Russian-Chinese alliance that includes the four “stan” countries that have tilted against democracy: Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Putin has made clear in recent years that he now sees the SCO as an explicit response to Western attempts to expand NATO—an effort that he views as a betrayal after his cooperation with the West, especially after 9/11.

      Working together in the SCO, Russia and China have forged strong relationships with enemies of the U.S., such as Iran (which has observer status), and with those that have contentious relationships with the U.S., such as Pakistan (which has applied for full membership). The SCO has also allowed observer status to India, Afghanistan, and Mongolia; Turkey became a “dialogue partner” in 2013.5 For Iran, in particular, SCO membership would guarantee stability in its relationships with Russia and China and further its interests in Central Asia.6 Because of the SCO, the United States has a difficult time building consensus on nuclear nonproliferation, drug trafficking, trade rules, and a host of other issues.

      That difficulty would probably grow if the SCO’s membership became much larger—a likely possibility. Its member states already cover an area of more than 30 million square kilometers, with a combined population of 1.46 billion. If India were to join, the organization would contain the two most populous countries. “The leaders of the states sitting at this negotiation table are representatives of half of humanity,” said the host of the SCO’s 2005 SCO summit. That was a bit of an overstatement at the time, but the words may soon reflect reality.

      Only a month after the SCO’s founding, Russia and China signed the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, the most significant agreement between the two powers since the historic 1950 compact signed by Stalin and Mao. The 2001 pact was a 20-year strategic treaty in which both parties formalized their shared positions on sovereignty issues and their opposition to “uni-polarity,” code for American influence abroad. The treaty made sense to both powers for many reasons. First and foremost, it increased their leverage internationally in relation to United States power, which was at a historic high. Both countries saw American unilateralism as a threat to their interests and traditional spheres of influence.

      The treaty also served individual needs on both sides. The Russians’ greatest need was for capital investment, and the Chinese had capital to burn. The Russians, meanwhile, had massive energy reserves and a willing and needy buyer in the Chinese. The Chinese were also eager to buy Russian military technology. All in all, for the Russian economy, the treaty was vital. For the Chinese, modernizing their armed forces and securing stable energy supplies were two of the most pressing national issues. The treaty helped fulfill both needs.

      Few observers at the time, however, understood the significance of the alliance between the two longtime foes. “If China and Russia decide to get into bed with each other,” Ralph A. Cossa had written in the New York Times a few years earlier, “the appropriate response СКАЧАТЬ