The Russia-China Axis. Douglas E. Schoen

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СКАЧАТЬ adversaries back in the game, more powerful than they have been for decades, and with America more confused and tentative than it has been since the Carter years.

      Those in the Russia-China Axis now operate against American and Western interests in nearly every conceivable area. Their efforts include the following:

       • Overseeing massive military buildups of conventional and nuclear forces, on which they often collaborate and supply each other, as well as of missile defense—on which they have signed an agreement of partnership

       • Conducting aggressive and often underhanded trade and economic policies—in everything from major gas and oil deals to collaboration with newly developed nations on creating alternative international financial institutions

       • Taking aggressive action to consolidate and expand territorial claims in their spheres of influence, often in violation of UN norms: Russia in Central Asia and its “near abroad”; China, with its belligerence toward various disputed islands in the East and South China Seas and also toward its Asian neighbors

       • Facilitating rogue regimes, both economically and militarily, especially in regard to nuclear weaponry. China has kept the deranged North Korean regime afloat for years with economic aid and enabled Pyongyang’s nuclear pursuits by its refusal to enforce UN sanctions. Russia has bankrolled Iran’s nuclear program and also acted as Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad’s strongest ally, showering his regime with weapons systems, bases, and funding—even as Putin has played a key role in spearheading the diplomatic agreement calling for Assad to turn over his chemical weapons.

       • Using energy resources and other raw materials as weapons in trade wars

       • Acting as the two leading perpetrators of cyber warfare worldwide—activity almost entirely directed against U.S. or Western targets

       • Waging a war of intelligence theft and espionage against the West—an effort that has gone on for years but was epitomized in 2013, when China temporarily sheltered, and then Russia accepted for asylum, American NSA contractor and intelligence leaker Edward Snowden

       • Facilitating, albeit indirectly, terrorist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah

       • Standing together at the UN, as when the Russians vetoed—and the Chinese abstained from voting on—a Security Council resolution declaring the Crimea referendum invalid⁹

      Indeed, Russia and China exacerbate virtually every threat or problem facing the United States today—from terrorism to the war in Afghanistan to instability in the Western hemisphere and the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran.

      We understand why, to some ears, this argument might sound extreme or unfounded. The recent warmth between the two regimes masks a long history of division and hostility, most recently during the Cold War, when the Sino–Soviet split divided the Communist world. The relations of the two countries reached a nadir in 1969, when tensions between them nearly led to all-out war. But since Mikhail Gorbachev’s visit to China in May 1989, and especially since the fall of the Soviet Union a few years later, growing strategic affinity has prompted stronger bilateral ties. To be sure, the two nations remain rivals as well as partners in the Far East. The Russians, in particular, worry about Chinese expansionism and the penetration of Chinese refugees into their sphere of influence. The Chinese worry about Russian desires to merge the former Soviet republics into some kind of alternative European Union, thus threatening Chinese economic opportunities in Central Asia.¹⁰ It’s certainly possible that their shared interests could erode under the pressure of competition and divergent goals.

      We understand, too, that Russia and China have compelling economic and political reasons for maintaining strong ties with the United States: All three nations share key mutual interests, such as steadying global financial markets and combating Islamic terrorism. Russia and China have even voted America’s way recently in the UN—on North Korean nuclear proliferation, for example. But these factors only obscure a much longer track record of oppositional and even aggressive action that shows every sign of becoming a formalized, dangerous alliance. Russia and China have mastered the art of a kind of geopolitical two-step: doing the bare minimum necessary to create the impression of cooperation (voting for sanctions on North Korea, for instance) while doing nothing substantive to truly cooperate (not lifting a finger to enforce those same sanctions). Often, the two partners adopt intermittently conciliatory positions to provide themselves with deniability on major international crises—not just in North Korea, but also in Iran and Syria. Indeed, Assad’s use of chemical weapons against his own people in August 2013 was a case in point. American blundering and lack of resolve left an opening for Russia to play conciliator-in-chief by proposing a diplomatic solution to the crisis, although President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry had initially pushed for a military strike. But when Kerry inadvertently stated that Assad could avoid the attack by turning over his chemical weapons to inspectors, the Russians saw their chance and stepped in, announcing their support for that plan and offering their assistance in brokering it. (Unsurprisingly, China supported Putin’s plan.) The agreement did hold off the American attack—but also almost certainly bought Assad time to hide and move his chemical-weapons supplies before inspectors could come in. Indeed, Assad missed his first deadline—December 31, 2013—to turn over the first tranche of Syria’s chemical weapons, forcing Norwegian and Danish ships sent to collect the weapons to turn back.¹¹ The UN blamed security concerns and bureaucracy for the delay, and, in typical fashion, the State Department sought to play down the issue. “As long as we see forward progress that’s what’s most important here, and we have,” Marie Harf, the State Department’s deputy spokesperson, said.¹² But how the process will unfold remains to be seen, and Assad continues to consolidate his power as the June 2014 presidential elections approach.

      The Syria crisis showed the Axis powers (especially Russia) in a new light: They protected a mutual ally and in the process presented themselves as peacemakers trying to walk the Americans back from yet another military intervention in the Middle East. And, in fact, two years into the crisis, Putin’s staunch backing of Assad has now accomplished a nearly complete reversal of fortune for the regime: Whereas the expectation two years ago was that Assad would go—it was just a matter of time—he’s now an essential partner in the process, whatever happens.

      No wonder that Forbes, in its 2013 annual survey of the world’s most powerful people, selected Putin as Number One, elevating him above President Obama. “Who’s more powerful: The omnipotent head of a corroding but still feisty power or the handcuffed head of the most dominant country in the world?” the magazine asked. “This year’s snapshot of power puts the Russian president on top. Putin has solidified his control over Russia (‘dictator’ is no longer an outlandish word to ponder) and the global stage. Anyone watching the chess match over Syria has a clear idea of the shift in the power towards Putin.”¹³

      Nevertheless, in Washington, there seems to be little urgency and even less understanding about the burgeoning Russian-Chinese alliance. Our leaders appear unwilling or unable to grasp the magnitude of the situation and the inadequacy of their approach. American policy has been weak, bordering on negligent—the approach of a nation that seems to be conceding power and the ability to shape events.

      As this book went to press, the United States stood passively by as Russia, following its annexation of Crimea, continued to interfere overtly and covertly in Ukraine, sponsoring pro-Russian militias in the country’s east and south. Faced with Ukraine’s pleas for military assistance, President Obama responded with a meager offer to provide military rations—and even those were slow in coming.¹⁴ Unable to generate consensus among its NATO allies and unwilling to act decisively on its own, America seems to have all but conceded Ukraine to the Russian political orbit. Washington Post columnist Anne Applebaum quoted an exasperated Canadian diplomat who said, “It’s like watching a hockey game with only one team on СКАЧАТЬ