Making Arguments: Reason in Context. Edmond H. Weiss

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СКАЧАТЬ must perform innovation, and affirmative debaters ask why not, instead of why.

      It’s fascinating to think of these last two judges sitting, watching, and evaluating the same debate. The differing lenses through which they see the same argument reveal how judging philosophies affect how debaters should make their arguments. For the first policy-making judge, the bar for argumentative for success is set very high, nearly at the prosecutorial stance of “beyond a reasonable doubt.” The second policy-maker, though, has a bias toward change; the presumption in the case has moved. It is the status quo, or the defense, that has the real argumentative work to do in such a situation. Presumption, in this latter case, is not grant nearly the protection it does with the more traditional policy-maker judge.

      Often it is difficult to anticipate the judge’s paradigm; some judges use different models for the public evaluations from those they use in their private and personal lives. A person who eagerly embraces change and novelty in private may, as a debate judge, place a heavy, skeptical demand on the Affirmative case. Because both of these stances interact, “reading” a judge is more complex than the simple process described in basic writing and speech texts.

      Arguing, then, often entails adapting, simultaneously and on the fly, to the duality of the judge: independent public and private models of evaluation. The judge of an argument cannot be characterized as clear, unambiguous metric against which your arguments will be evaluated. Rather, the judge is an amalgam of public and private responses to the advocate’s presentation. And not only must advocates analyze the nature of the judges before the fact, they must also continue to adjust and modify in “real time,” while the judge is judging. In other words, communicating one’s argument to the judge, despite all the planning and preparation, is dynamic, interactive and immediate—more like jazz improvisation and less like playing from a published musical score.

      It is clear why there is such a wide variation of responses to our arguments. Just because one cannot predict the outcome of a particular case, and just because, no matter how we frame the argument, the outcome is uncertain, however, this does mean that the behavior of judges is irrational and random. Nor does it mean that arguing is a mad game in which one is forever trying to meeting the capricious expectations of judges. On the contrary, arguing well is a virtuous undertaking, and involves considerable, complex skills of interpretation—skills that enhance our effectiveness in scores of settings and contexts.

      Field-Dependent and Judge-Dependent Modalities of Decision-Making

      An advocate’s anticipation of, and adaptation to, judgment, both in the preparations stage and during the actual argument, is the single most important factor in the framing of arguments. But that consideration does not tell the whole story about how to make our arguments. We must clearly differentiate the arena of judgment from the particularities or peculiarities of the judge.

      What we have called philosophies or paradigms of judgment represent the broad arenas in which an argument is assessed. Argumentation theorists call these "argument fields." Their distinctness (or divergence) derives from the different ways that arguments can be judged. Moreover, for each way of judging an argument, an autonomous field can emerge, enabling disciplinary boundaries between argumentative judges and communities. Thus, scientists can judge arguments differently from politicians, for example. We know, for example, that critical and scientific arguments are not only different, but they are settled differently. We expect the standards for judgment for a given field to distinguish it from another. In fact, the disciplinary boundaries that we recognize in intellectual settings like universities are a map of these different judging paradigms.

      Many philosophers, especially those who study intellectual history and the philosophy of science, recognize such boundaries. Rather than view them as arbitrary, or as the mere products of inter-subjective agreement, these thinkers suggest that the grounds for what is accepted in a field arise less out of social epistemology, and more out of rational, logical, and argumentative structures. Similarly, scientists accept certain standards of argument not just because scientists agree with them per se, but rather because there is no recognizable science without them. (Note: Scientists can develop opinions and claims any way they like; to prove their conclusions, though, they need formal scientific arguments.)

      In later chapters we will examine not only at how different fields argue, but also the standards within those fields that help to “fence them off” from other fields.

      Projects and Thought Experiments

      1.Compose your judging philosophy. What informs it?

      2.Have you ever served on a jury, judged a debate, or been an evaluator of arguments? If so, what was your process?

      3.Is it really possible for a judge to view a dispute without prejudice or predisposition to vote a particular way?

      4.What is the difference between anticipating a judge’s expectations and manipulating the judge’s vulnerabilities?

      5.Supreme Court Justices are often nominated by virtue of their politics. Are their politics the same as their judging philosophy?

      6.What do you understand by “judicial activism”? Are some judges more “activist” than others? Can you think of recent US Supreme Court cases in the court’s opinion was motivated by liberal ideology? Conservative ideology?

      7.What is the difference between an umpire and a judge? How about referees?

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