Making Arguments: Reason in Context. Edmond H. Weiss

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СКАЧАТЬ the responsibilities presented this far all lead to a final set of responsibilities that cluster under the heading of behavior: namely, how arguers ought to act, the things arguers ought to do as they argue and present cases.

      •Arguers need to ask questions and follow up on the answers they receive. Part of argumentation is the process of silent inquiry. For arguments to extend, develop, and be resolved, all relevant information for judgment must be ascertained and evaluated.

      •Arguers should be able to crystallize their arguments. By the end of a dispute, debate, trial, or deliberation, an advocate should be able to define clearly all the key issues and arguments that he or she wants to have the decision-maker examine in rendering judgment.

      •Arguers must enlarge the scope of argumentation as a controversy progresses. Argument is vital, alive, dynamic, and fluid. The arguers respond by keeping the argument alive, keeping it growing, and feeding it. They offer new evidence, new arguments, new lines of reasoning. They are creative and adaptive to the demands of the unfolding argument.

      •Arguers recognize their role in the debate. They are always mindful of their responsibilities. An arguer asks, “What do I need to be doing now? What do I need to learn so as to advance my side of the case?” On the affirmative side of the case, an advocate needs to ask: “Am I meeting my burden of proof? Have I presented a prima facie case for change, and am I continuing to uphold my burden?” On the negative side the advocate needs to find out if he or she is exploiting the power of presumption, and the inherent flexibility that exists within it.

      •Arguers must improvise and adapt to the situation. Argument can be a bit of a dance, but the steps are not choreographed. At some junctures in an argument, advocates can go in an entirely unplanned direction. So long as parties to one’s position are on board with these adaptations, they can be effective alterations to argumentative strategy with often astonishing results. Indeed, sticking stubbornly to a rigid argumentative road map may severely hamper one’s advocacy.

      •Arguers exhibit intellectual humility. They know when an argument is not succeeding, and when to jettison it. A strong argument can be salvaged by relinquishing a weak one that is along for the ride, but which is not helping the overall cause of the argument. Realistic expectations help an arguer decide what arguments to jettison, and which to strengthen.

      •Arguers don’t seek perfection. Argumentation operates in the area of the contingent, embracing uncertainty at every turn. There is no perfect argument, no slam-dunk case that proves something with mathematical certainty. Argument is about probabilities, likelihoods, and controversial courses of action.

      All these responsibilities demand the ability to listen carefully to what everyone else is saying and, when appropriate, respond or adapt. Although listening is hard to do, especially when one is under pressure and planning what to say next, it is the only way to keep the argument moving forward and expanding. And it is the only way to win.

      Projects and Thought Experiments

      1.What is your most formal experience as an advocate? What were the circumstances and where did the rules of argument and procedure come from? How did it go? Did the formal “technicalities” ever prevent true facts and good ideas from being appreciated?

      2.What aspects of your daily life involves argumentative activity? With whom do you argue regularly and in what settings? How can studying argumentation improve those? If it cannot help, why not?

      3.Have you ever observed a trial? Were you surprised by the way arguments were presented and refuted? Was the outcome just? If not, why not?

      4.Do you argue with yourself? Why do you think people do this?

      5.The philosopher Schopenhauer said that people can “do what they will, but they cannot will what they will.” Are free will and independent decision-making an illusion? If not, why not?

      Chapter 3: Judging Arguments

      Types of Judges

      The judgment of an argument cannot be separated from its creation. When we create arguments, we inevitably anticipate and adapt to the eventual judging of those arguments. Arguers argue with the judge in mind. Making an argument means not just outlining, diagramming, writing, planning, and evidencing it. It also means preparing it and laying it out for someone’s consideration. In argumentation, the judge is the essential component that connects every strategy, device, and tactic of advocacy. For the arguer, it ought to be who is judging that determines how arguments are assembled. For the advocate, not paying attention to the centrality of judgment can be fatal.

      Judging an argument usually follows various models, philosophies, or paradigms. That is, a judge tends to have a predisposition to look at argument in a particular way. Such judging philosophies are neither monolithic nor pure. Rather, they are archetypes—models of reasoning—that individuals identify with and embrace. And these models of judging are so potent that they can even overcome important philosophical or political disagreements. For example, conservative and liberal judges have been known to reach the same conclusions at a debate—presumably because their models of judgment (jurisprudence) were similar.

      The following list is useful for advocates in considering how to frame and present their arguments before particular judges, or in specific arenas:

      Tabula Rasa—literally, the judge is a “blank slate.” This concept of the judge suggests examination of an argument without presuppositions. That is, the judge is a competent and intelligent person who, in effect, knows nothing about, and has no prejudice toward, the issues in play. Within the tabula rasa paradigm, the impulse to vote for or support an argument merely because it confirms the judge’s opinions is, purportedly, completely suppressed. One’s beliefs on, say, whether marijuana should be legalized are set aside while hearing the arguments.

      This judge, though not an expert on the issue under discussion, is an expert on how to render a judgment. So, whatever knowledge he or she brings to the debate is set outside the evaluative process. What the judge knows, as well as what he or she understands that the advocates do not, does not enter the controversy. Although the tabula rasa judge could easily suggest how one or another advocate could prevail in the dispute, he or she steps back and lets the advocates sink or swim on their own.

      Every philosophy of judging carries with it some of the tabula rasa core. The perceived fairness and objectivity of the judge weighs in all judging criteria. The extent to which the judge is detached from the content-issues, while still using expertise to evaluate the arguments, is a desideratum, a primary requirement, in the resolution of all controversies.

      The Policymaker—in this view, the judge is deciding on a course of action. He or she is weighing alternatives, and may even “enter” the controversy as a schooled expert on what it is and how to evaluate it. The policy maker is concerned less with burdens of proof and more with effective action. Does the controversy yield an improvement for society? Will it have measurable effects and outcomes? And how will these outcomes compare to rival or alternative actions? Policymaker judges tend to make their own inquiries, ask questions, examine evidence, and lay out justifications themselves for acting (or not acting). In this case, the interventions of the judge may sometimes make the weaker argument into the stronger.

      The Critic—this judge views the controversy as an aesthetic conflict. In this view, advocacy is primarily an artistic enterprise, and the advocates must СКАЧАТЬ