Captured Peace. Christine J. Wade

Чтение книги онлайн.

СКАЧАТЬ civilian massacres. The report also documented the FMLN’s execution of mayors from 1985 to 1988 and other extrajudicial killings, including the murders of U.S. marines in the Zona Rosa in 1985. Most of the report, however, focused on the abuses and violence committed with impunity by state agencies and their affiliates. Among the report’s findings in individual cases, the commission concluded that Roberto D’Aubuisson ordered the assassination of Archbishop Romero; that the murder of the American churchwomen was planned before their arrival at the airport and that high-ranking officials impeded the investigation; and that Col. René Emilio Ponce gave the order to kill Father Ignacio Ellacuría and “to leave no witnesses,” which was followed by a widespread cover-up. In its investigation of civilian massacres, such as those at El Mozote, Río Sumpul, and El Calabozo, the commission determined that the armed forces had engaged in a systematic policy of targeting civilians:

      Everything points to the fact that these deaths formed part of a pattern of conduct, a deliberate strategy of eliminating or terrifying the peasant population in areas where the guerrillas were active, the purpose being to deprive the guerrilla forces of this source of supplies and information and of the possibility of hiding or concealing themselves among that population.

      It is impossible to blame this pattern of conduct on local commanders and to claim that senior commanders did not know anything about it. As we have described, massacres of the peasant population were reported repeatedly. There is no evidence that any effort was made to investigate them. The authorities dismissed these reports as enemy propaganda. Were it not for the childrens skeletons at El Mozote, some people would still be disputing that such massacres took place.

      [. . .]

      No action was taken to avoid incidents such as this. On the contrary, the deliberate, systematic and indiscriminate violence against the peasant population in areas of military operations went on for years.⁹⁰

      The Cristiani administration initially attempted to prevent the findings of the commission from being publicized but was unsuccessful in its attempts to persuade the FMLN to support that position.⁹¹ Unlike many truth commissions, the Salvadoran report named individual actors allegedly responsible for human rights violations. Although the Cristiani government initially supported identifying those guilty of committing abuses, its position changed once it became clear that high-ranking officials would be implicated.⁹² Threats of coups and retaliations, which had occurred during negotiations, soon resurfaced. Cristiani asked that the publication of the report be delayed until after the 1994 elections. The commissioners held firm in their decision, arguing that telling the “complete truth” meant naming names.⁹³ As a result, more than forty individuals were named. Defense Minister René Emilio Ponce, himself named in the report in connection with the Jesuit murders, and other members of the high command called the report, “unfair, incomplete, illegal, unethical, biased and insolent.”⁹⁴ Other members of the military high command directed their anger toward Cristiani, who, they suggested, had been “irresponsible” in having agreed to the commission.⁹⁵

      There were numerous other criticisms of the report. First, at the behest of the FMLN, there were no Salvadorans on the commission. The organization argued that the high levels of polarization and distrust between the government and FMLN would make it difficult to find mutually acceptable, neutral Salvadoran investigators and that using Salvadorans to take testimony would reduce the number of victims and witnesses willing to provide testimony.⁹⁶ Indeed, many Salvadorans feared retribution if they were to testify about government abuses. But as Ana Guardado and others have noted, this decision not only prevented Salvadoran citizens from becoming full participants in the process but also meant that there was no government ownership of the report.⁹⁷ Not only did the Cristiani administration refuse to accept the findings of the commission, but no effort was made to distribute the report, as had become common practice in other cases.⁹⁸ Instead, Cristiani urged Salvadorans to forget the past. As described below, the refusal to acknowledge the report’s findings or assign responsibility for acts of violence seriously impeded reconciliation by perpetuating two very distinct narratives of the war.

      Second, the context in which the commission conducted its work constrained not only the collection of testimony but limited the prospects for meaningful reform. The truth commission was the result of the negotiations between the Salvadoran government and the FMLN, which is somewhat unusual in the establishment of truth commissions.⁹⁹ One of the chief purposes of truth commissions, as opposed to trials, is to focus on the victims rather than the perpetrators. However, as observed by Popkin, “neither the UN nor the parties to the conflict made any systematic effort to consult with Salvadoran civil society, victims and their relatives, or even Salvadoran human rights groups. Nor did the parties recognize that the right to truth and justice could not be foreclosed by their negotiations.”¹⁰⁰ This undermined the victim-centered approach supposedly afforded by truth commissions.

      Third, the commission’s work was carried out in the midst of the transition rather than following the transition, as El Salvador’s elections weren’t scheduled until March 1994. Thus, ARENA’s incumbency meant that the “old regime” and the “new regime” were one and the same.¹⁰¹ For obvious reasons, truth commission investigations and the release of their reports generally occur after regime change or transitional elections, as was the case in Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, Peru, and South Africa. Those responsible for the abuses in El Salvador were still in power. As such, it should be of little surprise that the Cristiani administration did not endorse the commission’s findings.

      Fourth, there was general dissatisfaction with the investigation of cases related to the FMLN. The Lawyers’ Committee on Human Rights referred to it as being one of the “weakest” sections of the report.¹⁰² The vast majority of the cases in the report were those attributed to the armed forces and state security agencies, which was a reflection of both the commission’s mandate and the disproportionate number of abuses committed by the state.¹⁰³ However, the commission erroneously assumed that documentation of FMLN abuses could be provided by the Salvadoran and U.S. governments and conducted little investigation in this regard.¹⁰⁴ For example, there was no investigation of summary executions within FMLN ranks, which many considered to be one of the chief offenses by the FMLN. As such, the report offered little new information about FMLN abuses. Additionally, those abuses that were included in the report, most of which the FMLN had already acknowledged, were attributed to a single group within the FMLN, the People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP).¹⁰⁵ The government and its supporters used this lack of an adequate investigation into FMLN abuses to delegitimize the report.

      Finally, the commissioners considered it beyond the scope of the mandate to investigate the role that the United States played in the conflict. This was particularly disconcerting since several of the cases of abuse presented in the report were committed by U.S.-trained units, such as the Atlacatl Battalion. Former U.S. ambassador to El Salvador Robert White was particularly critical of the omission: “The whole backdrop to the report that is missing is the U.S. role in not only tolerating violence in El Salvador but also encouraging it.”¹⁰⁶

       The Commission’s Recommendations

      The recommendations made by the commission involved punitive measures, institutional reforms, and societal reparations to promote reconciliation. While the truth commission had no prosecutorial powers, the parties had agreed that its recommendations would be binding. Many of the commission’s recommendations reaffirmed changes agreed to in the peace accords, but most were never implemented. In the absence of the judicial capacity to punish those responsible for the violations in the report, the commission made a number of punitive recommendations. First, the commission recommended the dismissal of military officers and civil servants named in report. Second, the commission recommended that all those named in the report, including members of the FMLN, be disqualified from holding public office for at least ten years and be barred permanently from serving in any capacity related to public security or national defense. Finally, the commission СКАЧАТЬ