Captured Peace. Christine J. Wade

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      Source: Adapted from Tommie Sue Montgomery, Peacemaking and Democratization in the Western Hemisphere (Miami: North-South Center Press, 2000), 144.

      Throughout its work, the mission repeatedly commented on issues where it believed that the parties were not living up to the agreements established in the accords. ONUSAL’s documentation of communications with the parties, as well as its own reports, is extensive. A careful review of the communications reveals the difficulties faced by the mission with regard to the implementation process. While there were certainly some significant issues that related directly to the FMLN, most of the documented difficulties reveal the recalcitrance of governing elites. This was particularly notable in the areas of police and judicial reform.

       Human Rights

      Although the deployment of the ONUSAL human rights division was originally scheduled to occur after the ceasefire, both parties requested that the mission begin its work ahead of schedule. The secretary general’s office sent a small delegation to determine if the work could be conducted in the absence of a ceasefire. The division began operations in July 1991, well before any necessary reforms related to strengthening human rights had been implemented. Although the mission expanded over time, the division’s chief responsibility was to investigate and report human rights violations occurring after July 26, 1991. Violations committed before that date were entrusted to the Truth Commission. Requests for division assistance often exceeded its mandate.³² Shortly after arriving, the division expressed some concern that “vast numbers of Salvadorians right across the political spectrum believe that the Mission will be able to prevent, or at least punish, human rights violations,” although it did not have the powers to do so.³³ Reports from the division generally emphasized two challenges: the difficulty of adequately monitoring violations during conflict and failure of the judiciary to investigate or follow up on alleged violations.³⁴

      The deployment of the human rights division gave the UN an entrée into El Salvador while negotiations continued. It also complicated the division’s work. There was a fundamental tension between ONUSAL’s human rights division, which was charged with monitoring and reporting abuses committed by the parties, and the UN secretary general’s office, which wanted to ensure that negotiations progressed. Should reports of violations be suppressed if they advanced the larger goal of attaining a resolution to the conflict? Would suppressing reports damage the integrity of the mission and undermine respect for human rights in the long term? On the ground, there was some sense among division staff that human rights were subservient to other aspects of the negotiations, particularly political and military concerns.³⁵ After the ceasefire, ONUSAL’s mandate expanded to include demilitarization and demobilization, civilian policing, and elections. While this helped reduce the number of human rights violations, it also shifted emphasis to other matters. As one division official relayed to the Lawyers’ Committee, “once the other divisions arrived, it was more difficult. It was clear that human rights were no longer a priority for anyone. The government had never been interested, but now not even the UN or the FMLN were interested.”³⁶

      The National Counsel for the Defense of Human Rights (PDDH) was established in 1991. Its main function was to receive and investigate complaints of human rights abuses. While the institution had the power to make recommendations, it had no enforcement capabilities. The first national counsel, Carlos Fonseca Molina, was appointed in February 1992. Due to Fonseca’s own lack of experience in human rights advocacy and the general disinterest of the Cristiani administration, the institution got off to a slow start.³⁷ Relations with the human rights division and human rights organizations were strained, and it was not until 1994 that the national counsel and ONUSAL began working together to strengthen the institution. The appointment of Victoria Marina Velásquez de Avilés to the PDDH in 1995 helped to transform the institution.³⁸ Velásquez de Avilés became an outspoken defender of human rights and denounced abuses by state institutions, particularly the PNC. Public confidence in the PDDH rose considerably during her tenure, in large part due to her leadership.³⁹ She was rewarded for her efforts with a 10 percent budget cut in 1997, which reduced the capabilities of the institution at a critical time.⁴⁰

       Security and Policing

      The second phase of implementation was the restructuring and reduction of the armed forces, abolition of security forces, and the creation of a new civilian police force, and the demobilization of the FMLN. Within one year of the signing of the accords, the armed forces had effectively been reduced by one-half, from 63,175 to 31,000.⁴¹ Because the reduction was completed a full year ahead of schedule, some have speculated that the original number of troops had been inflated.⁴² The demobilization of the Rapid-Deployment Infantry Battalions (BIRIs) was delayed by three months, but the process was completed on March 31, 1993.⁴³ The change in the armed forces was not only notable for the reduction in forces but also for the general willingness with which the military accepted its new role in Salvadoran society. Not all aspects of demilitarization went so smoothly. The UN appointed three Salvadoran civilians to the Ad Hoc Commission, a mechanism agreed to in the accords to review military records and purge human rights offenders. It was the first time that any military in Latin America had allowed an external review of its forces.⁴⁴ Beginning in May 1992 the commission reviewed military-personnel files and documentation from human rights organizations, and met with members of the U.S. Defense Department and congressional and human rights groups in the United States.⁴⁵ Due to the three-month time constraint, the commission was able to interview only approximately 230 officers—a mere 10 percent of all officers in the armed forces. In September 1992, the commission delivered its confidential report to President Cristiani and UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, which called for the removal of 102 officers, including Defense Minister René Emilio Ponce. Protests from the military high command led to stalling tactics by Cristiani. Despite the agreement that named officers were to be removed with sixty days, only twenty-three had been formally dismissed by January 1993.⁴⁶ It required significant pressure from abroad and the release of the Truth Commission’s report to force the removal of remaining officers.⁴⁷

      The dissolution of internal security forces accompanied the reduction of the armed forces. The National Guard and the Treasury Police were scheduled to be dismantled by March 1992. Instead, they were renamed and incorporated directly into the armed forces.⁴⁸ СКАЧАТЬ