Evolution's Rainbow. Joan Roughgarden
Чтение книги онлайн.

Читать онлайн книгу Evolution's Rainbow - Joan Roughgarden страница 7

Название: Evolution's Rainbow

Автор: Joan Roughgarden

Издательство: Ingram

Жанр: Биология

Серия:

isbn: 9780520957978

isbn:

СКАЧАТЬ are nearly monochromatic.17

      Furthermore, even the limited rainbow of a clonal species is continually endangered. The colors that shine brightly are always crowding out the colors that don’t, causing diversity to contract over time. Recall the jewelry and the savings account. If diamonds are valuable for a long time, their value grows and comes to overshadow the savings account. If profits are automatically reinvested in the most immediately successful venture, the portfolio gradually loses its diversity. Then when the demand for jewelry drops—say because a new find of diamonds floods the market—the portfolio takes a big hit. This progression is similar to that of the clonal reproducer, which courts danger by concentrating on only a few investments. Instead, one should redistribute some earnings each year across the investments. If jewelry has a good year, sell some and put the proceeds in the savings account. If interest is high one year, then withdraw some funds and buy jewelry. Shuffling money across investments in this way maintains the portfolio’s diversity, and a bad year for one investment doesn’t cause disastrous losses in the portfolio. Wall Street investors call this shuffling “rebalancing a portfolio.” This is the strategy of the sexual reproducer. Every generation when sexually reproducing animals mate, they mix genes with one another and resynthesize the colors in short supply. Thus, according to the diversity-affirming theory, sex serves to maintain the biological rainbow, which conserves the species.18

      THE DIVERSITY-REPRESSING THEORY

      According to the diversity-repressing theory for the benefit of sex, sex protects the genetic quality of the species. The diversity-repressing theory envisions that asexual species accumulate harmful mutations over time and gradually become less functional, as though asexual lizards gradually lost the ability to run fast or digest some food. Sex supposedly counteracts this danger by allowing family lines that have picked up harmful mutations to recombine, producing offspring free of bad mutations. According to this theory, some offspring will possess both families’ mutations and will die even more quickly, but other offspring will have none of the mutations, and will prosper on behalf of the species. According to this theory, without sex each and every family line inexorably accumulates mutations, leading eventually to species extinction.

      ENDING THE DEBATE

      Although both the diversity-affirming and diversity-repressing views have a long history, the time has come for closure. The time has come to reject the diversity-repressing view as both theoretically impossible and empirically vacuous. The scenario envisioned by the diversity-repressing theory can’t exist. In an asexual species, when a bad gene arises, the line where the mutation originated is lost to natural selection, whereas the lines without the mutation prosper. The entire stock never deteriorates, because natural selection doesn’t look the other way while a bad gene spreads. Instead, natural selection eliminates a bad gene when it first appears, preserving the overall functionality of the species. No evidence whatsoever shows asexual species becoming extinct because of a progressive accumulation of disabilities and loss of functionality. A bad gene never gets going in an asexual species, and sex’s supposed pruning of the gene pool is unnecessary and mythical.

      On the other hand, the environment does change from year to year, and individuals who don’t do well one year may shine when conditions change, and vice versa. Butterflies whose enzymes work at cold temperatures thrive in dark, damp years, while butterflies whose enzymes function best at hot temperatures do better in sunny drought years. All butterflies are perfectly good butterflies, even if the abilities of some don’t match the opportunities currently supplied by the environment.

      I don’t see any grounds for dignifying the diversity-repressing view for the benefit of sex as a viable alternative to the diversity-affirming view. To be agreeable, one might say both theories are valid. But this compromise isn’t true. Conceding, even slightly, that one function of sex is to prune diversity puts forth a view that hasn’t earned its place scientifically. Accepting a diversity-repressing view of sex simply to be polite admits through the back door a philosophical stance that may later be used to justify discrimination.

      Therefore, I accept as a working premise that a species’ biological rainbow is good—good because diversity allows a species to survive and prosper in continually changing conditions. I further accept that the purpose of sex is to maintain the rainbow’s diversity, resynthesizing that diversity each generation in order to continually rebalance the genetic portfolio of the species. I reject the alternative theory that sex exists to prune the gene pool of bad diversity.

      Darwinists have to take a consistent stand on the value of diversity. They can’t maintain on the one hand that most variation is good because it’s needed for natural selection and on the other hand also maintain that females must continually shop for males with the best genes as though most genes could be ranked from good to bad. Instead, I argue that almost all diversity is good and that female choice is more for the best match than for the best male.

      How then should we assess the rainbows in our own species? We should be grateful that we do reproduce sexually, although we probably take this gift for granted. I feel too that we should conserve and embrace our rainbows. Affirming diversity is hard, very hard. We must come to accept ourselves and love our neighbors, regardless of color in the rainbow.

      Overall, sex is essentially cooperative—a natural covenant to share genetic wealth. Sexual reproduction is not a battle.

      2

      Sex versus Gender

      To most people, “sex” automatically implies “male” or “female.” Not to a biologist. As we saw in the last chapter, sex means mixing genes when reproducing. Sexual reproduction is producing offspring by mixing genes from two parents, whereas asexual reproduction is producing offspring by one parent only, as in cloning. The definition of sexual reproduction makes no mention of “male” and “female.” So what do “male” and “female” have to do with sex? The answer, one might suppose, is that when sexual reproduction does occur, one parent is male and the other female. But how do we know which one is the male? What makes a male, male, and a female, female? Indeed, are there only two sexes? Could there be a third sex? How do we define male and female anyway?

      “Gender” also automatically implies “male” and “female” to most people. Therefore, if we define male and female biologically, do we wind up defining gender as well? Similarly, for adjectives like “masculine” and “feminine,” can we define these biologically? Moreover, among humans, is a “man” automatically male and a “woman” necessarily female? One might think, yes, of course, but on reflection these key words admit lots of wiggle room. This chapter develops some definitions for all these words, definitions that will come in handy later on.

      When speaking about humans, I find it’s helpful to distinguish between social categories and biological categories. “Men” and “women” are social categories. We have the freedom to decide who counts as a man and who counts as a woman. The criteria change from time to time. In some circles, a “real man” can’t eat quiche. In other circles, people seize on physical traits to define manhood: height, voice, Y chromosome, or penis. Yet these traits don’t always go together: some men are short, others are tenors, some don’t have a Y chromosome, and others don’t have a penis. Still, we may choose to consider all such people as men anyway for purposes like deciding which jobs they can apply for, which clubs they can join, which sports they may play, and whom they may marry.

      For biological categories we don’t have the same freedom. “Male” and “female” are biological categories, and the criteria for classifying an organism as male or female have to work with worms to whales, with red seaweed to redwood trees. When it comes to humans, the biological criteria for male and female don’t coincide 100 percent with present-day social criteria for man and woman. Indeed, using biological categories as though they were social categories is a mistake called “essentialism.” Essentialism amounts to passing the buck. СКАЧАТЬ