The Naval War of 1812. Theodore Roosevelt

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СКАЧАТЬ throw the same broadside weight of metal, one from long guns, the other from carronades, at short range they are equal; at long, one has it all her own way. Her captain thus certainly has a great superiority of force, and if he does not take advantage of it it is owing to his adversary's skill or his own mismanagement. As a mere approximation, it may be assumed, in comparing the broadsides of two vessels or squadrons, that long guns count for at least twice as much as carronades of the same calibre. Thus on Lake Champlain Captain Downie possessed an immense advantage in his long guns, which Commodore Macdonough's exceedingly good arrangements nullified. Sometimes part of the advantage may be willingly foregone, so as to acquire some other. Had the Constitution kept at long bowls with the Cyane and Levant she could have probably captured one without any loss to herself, while the other would have escaped; she preferred to run down close so as to insure the capture of both, knowing that even at close quarters long guns are somewhat better than short ones (not to mention her other advantages in thick scantling, speed, etc.). The British carronades often upset in action; this was either owing to their having been insufficiently secured, and to this remaining undiscovered because the men were not exercised at the guns, or else it was because the unpractised sailors would greatly overcharge them. Our better-trained sailors on the ocean rarely committed these blunders, but the less-skilled crews on the lakes did so as often as their antagonists.

      But while the Americans thus, as a rule, had heavier and better-fitted guns, they labored under one or two disadvantages. Our foundries were generally not as good as those of the British, and our guns, in consequence, more likely to burst; it was an accident of this nature which saved the British Belvidera; and the General Pike, under Commodore Chauncy, and the new American frigate Guerrière suffered in the same way; while often the muzzles of the guns would crack. A more universal disadvantage was in the short weight of our shot. When Captain Blakely sunk the Avon he officially reported that her four shot which came aboard weighed just 32 pounds apiece, a pound and three quarters more than his heaviest; this would make his average shot about 2 1/2 pounds less, or rather over 7 per cent. Exactly similar statements were made by the officers of the Constitution in her three engagements. Thus when she fought the Java, she threw at a broadside, as already stated, 704 pounds; the Java mounted 28 long 18's, 18 32-pound carronades, 2 long 12's, and one shifting 24-pound carronade, a broadside of 576 pounds. Yet by the actual weighing of all the different shot on both sides it was found that the difference in broadside force was only about 77 pounds, or the Constitution's shot were about 7 per cent, short weight. The long 24's of the United States each threw a shot but 4 1/4 pounds heavier than the long 18's of the Macedonian; here again the difference was about 7 per cent. The same difference existed in favor of the Penguin and Epervier compared with the Wasp and Hornet. Mr. Fenimore Cooper 47 weighed a great number of shot some time after the war. The later castings, even weighed nearly 5 per cent, less than the British shot, and some of the older ones, about 9 per cent. The average is safe to take at 7 per cent. less, and I shall throughout make this allowance for ocean cruisers. The deficit was sometimes owing to windage, but more often the shot was of full size but defective in density. The effect of this can be gathered from the following quotation from the work of a British artillerist: "The greater the density of shot of like calibres, projected with equal velocity and elevation, the greater the range, accuracy, and penetration." 48 This defectiveness in density might be a serious injury in a contest at a long distance, but would make but little difference at close quarters (although it may have been partly owing to their short weight that so many of the Chesapeake's shot failed to penetrate the Shannon's hull). Thus in the actions with the Macedonian and Java the American frigates showed excellent practice when the contest was carried on within fair distance, while their first broadsides at long range went very wild; but in the case of the Guerrière, the Constitution reserved her fire for close quarters, and was probably not at all affected by the short weight of her shot.

      As to the officers and crew of a 44-gun frigate, the following was the regular complement established by law: 49

      1 captain,

       4 lieutenants,

       2 lieutenants of marines,

       2 sailing-masters,

       2 master's mates,

       7 midshipmen,

       1 purser,

       1 surgeon,

       2 surgeon's mates,

       1 clerk,

       1 carpenter,

       2 carpenter's mates,

       1 boatswain,

       2 boatswain's mates,

       1 yeoman of gun-room,

       1 gunner,

       11 quarter gunners,

       1 coxswain,

       1 sailmaker,

       1 cooper,

       1 steward,

       1 armorer,

       1 master of arms,

       1 cook,

       1 chaplain.

       __

       50

      120 able seamen,

       150 ordinary seamen,

       30 boys,

       50 marines. _

       400 in all.

      An 18-gun ship had 32 officers and petty officers, 30 able seamen, 46 ordinary seamen, 12 boys, and 20 marines—140 in all. Sometimes ships put to sea without their full complements (as in the case of the first Wasp), but more often with supernumeraries aboard. The weapons for close quarters were pikes, cutlasses, and a few axes; while the marines and some of the topmen had muskets, and occasionally rifles.

      In comparing the forces of the contestants I have always given the number of men in crew; but this in most cases was unnecessary. When there were plenty of men to handle the guns, trim the sails, make repairs, act as marines, etc., any additional number simply served to increase the slaughter on board. The Guerrière undoubtedly suffered from being short-handed, but neither the Macedonian nor Java would have been benefited by the presence of a hundred additional men. Barclay possessed about as many men as Perry, but this did not give him an equality of force. The Penguin and Frolic would have been taken just as surely had the Hornet and Wasp had a dozen men less apiece than they did. The principal case where numbers would help would be in a hand-to-hand fight. Thus the Chesapeake having fifty more men than the Shannon ought to have been successful; but she was not, because the superiority of her crew in numbers was more than counterbalanced by the superiority of the Shannon's crew in other respects. The result of the battle of Lake Champlain, which was fought at anchor, with the fleets too far apart for musketry to reach, was not in the slightest degree affected by the number of men on either side, as both combatants had amply enough to manage the guns and perform every other service.

      In all these conflicts the courage of both parties is taken for granted: it was not so much a factor in gaining the victory, as one which if lacking was fatal to all chances of success. In the engagements between regular cruisers, not a single one was gained by superiority in courage. The crews of both the Argus and Epervier certainly flinched; but had they fought never so bravely they were too unskilful to win. The Chesapeake's crew could hardly be said СКАЧАТЬ