The Great World War 1914–1945: 1. Lightning Strikes Twice. John Bourne

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СКАЧАТЬ is suggested by the fact that most of the men listed as unfit for flying duties in the period 1 April to 31 December 1940 did not fall into the three categories of unfitness for flying caused by ‘real’ factors, but rather had their records endorsed ‘LMF’ (Lack of Moral Fibre), the term for cowardice.⁷² Accusations of LMF were levelled on a regular basis during the first half of the war. Aircrews who returned early from operations, claiming mechanical failure or similar in their aircraft, were liable to be labelled LMF until their reports were corroborated by groundcrew inspection of the aircraft.⁷³ The accusation of cowardice was made usually within the confines of the squadron or the station, but it could come from higher levels. For instance, it was reported at the end of 1941 that a Squadron Leader from a Blenheim unit ordered a formation to return to base without dropping its bombs after they failed to find a target, mainly as a result of low cloud.⁷⁴ On return to base, he was asked why he had not dropped his bombs on Heligoland, to which he replied that at such a low altitude he did not think it advisable to do so owing to the wastage of aircraft likely to occur. The Air Marshal conducting the interview used the words, ‘Yellow, were you?’, and put an end to the questioning. Shortly after this incident, the Squadron Leader was ordered to send out his squadron to attack Heligoland, from which operation only two aircraft returned.⁷⁵ This particular incident was brought to the attention of the Chief of Air Staff Portal by the Minister of Aircraft Production, Moore-Brabazon, in December 1940. Unfortunately, no reply can be found, and it is not clear from what remains of Portal’s private correspondence as to what his views were on the subject of LMF. What can be said is that there was no perceptible change in attitude towards the subject of cowardice until 1943, and this was due to the more rigorous investigation into the problem of flying stress, for which much of the credit must go to the Air Member for Personnel appointed in August 1942, Air Marshal Bertine Sutton, who stated that he deplored the term ‘Lack of Morale Fibre’.⁷⁶

      A study of combat stress in the operational commands was begun in 1942, under Air Vice-Marshal Sir Charles Symonds, who was a consultant in neuro-psychiatry, and a Wing Commander Denis Williams. They submitted their first report in December of that year, and their main finding was that aircrew stress was caused by the combination of fear and fatigue.⁷⁷ Many causes of fatigue are fairly obvious: the length of sortie, the extremely low temperatures, having to concentrate throughout on instruments or the night sky, the effects of low oxygen, etc. However, there were the less tangible causes of aircrew fatigue, such as the strain caused by concern for wives or other relatives, and dependants, should they be killed or incapacitated.

      Meanwhile, fear was seen to have many elements. The fear of death or injury manifested itself in numerous ways, depending on the individual, but there were common tell-tale signs.⁷⁸ Many former aircrew recounted the atmosphere in messes before operations, how many men were unable to eat and how vomiting became a daily occurrence. Many referred to the congestion in ablution blocks, as men visited the toilet for the umpteenth time before an operation. Many referred to the distinctive ‘smell of fear’ that pervaded dispersal areas and transports to the aircraft. Then there was the fear of letting down the other crew members, or letting down a commanding officer. Many, including Miles Tripp, feared being labelled LMF. After an attack of nerves during a mission over Cologne, he was anxious to go on another as soon as possible, reasoning that it was like falling off a horse or having a car accident, when one had to get back in the saddle or back into the driving seat as soon as possible.⁷⁹

      For some aircrew, fear and general stress were manageable until one particular event caused them to snap, if momentarily, like Miles Tripp. A number of former aircrew commented that they had coped with fear and stress over many months of operations, but how they were thrown off balance by the death of a friend in the squadron, the sight of an empty bunk bed next to them, or seeing mutilated bodies. One former navigator recalled having seen a bomber make an emergency landing at his base, and how groundcrews had to use high-pressure hoses to clean out the rear gun turret after the gunner was shot to pieces by an enemy fighter.⁸⁰

      Methods of coping with fear and general stress varied. Some men became superstitious and could be seen going through pre-flight rituals. Those of a religious persuasion carried rosaries or crosses. Heavy drinking and absorption in mess social life were also common, as was living for the day. Most aircrew abandoned long-term planning and concentrated on day-to-day existence.⁸¹ But there were also mechanisms commanding officers could employ to boost morale and alleviate stress, and Symonds and Williams made a number of recommendations.⁸² First, it was emphasised that it was very important for a commanding officer to explain the purpose of missions and where they fitted into the overall campaign, as far as OPSEC would allow. Second, it was vitally important for the results of missions to be articulated to the crews, especially the success stories, and recognition of hard-won success by a telegram from Command or Group HQ level was considered essential. However, it was felt that the most valuable praise was that from the immediate commanding officer at squadron or station level. The award of medals or other decorations was also seen as a significant factor in the maintenance of good morale.

      Keeping the crews at the sharp end apprised of their contribution to the whole effort does appear to have been one of the keys to maintaining Bomber Command’s morale as a whole at a reasonable level. Whatever criticisms we may level at Arthur Harris for his lack of strategic vision and dogmatism over the merits of area versus precision bombing, he was very popular with the aircrews because he believed in speaking frankly about Bomber Command’s successes and failures, and his enthusiasm and determination filtered right down to grass-roots level. Even when Bomber Command was facing crippling losses during 1943 and 1944 during the Battles of Berlin and the Ruhr, when a heavy bomber crew faced less than a 44 per cent chance of surviving a first tour of operations, Harris remained a popular C-in-C. One former Right Sergeant said of him: ‘We had all the confidence in the world in his strategy. We felt that we and we alone in Bomber Command were winning the war.’⁸³ It required a unique type of leadership to convince aircrews to keep on putting themselves in harm’s way, with little chance of survival. Harris had that ability, and his leadership style is worthy of a much larger study.⁸⁴ Harris, for his part, had tremendous admiration for the bomber crews under his command. He said:

      ‘There are no words with which I can do justice to the aircrew who fought under my command. There is no parallel in warfare to such courage and determination in the face of danger over so prolonged a period, of danger which at times was so great that scarcely one man in three could expect to survive his tour of thirty operations… It was, moreover, a clear and highly conscious courage, by which the risk was taken with calm forethought, for their aircrew were all highly skilled men, much above the average in education, who had to understand every aspect and detail of their task. It was, furthermore, the courage of the small hours, of men virtually alone, for at his battle station the airman is virtually alone. It was the courage of men with long-drawn apprehensions of daily “going over the top”.’⁸⁵

      It is interesting that Harris chose to use a First World War image, and it was entirely fitting, given the enormous casualty rate in Bomber Command (49,585 killed in combat, with another 8,117 lost in non-operational flying), which paralleled 1914–18’s battlefield losses.⁸⁶ Bomber Command’s own record demonstrated that to serve as aircrew was anything but a safe option. Further, it imposed unnatural strains on individuals, and demanded levels of technical proficiency largely unparalleled in the other services. As is often the case, many of the fundamental principles of strategic bombing were identified, at least by the RNAS, in the First World War, but were subsequently forgotten, so that a second generation of airmen had painfully to relearn the lessons. For this reason, and the fact that we are dealing with human endeavour, there were many parallels between the First and Second World War experiences.

      Notes on contributors

      Dr Christina J.M. Goulter,

      Christina J.M. Goulter was educated at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand, and King’s College, London, where she took СКАЧАТЬ