The Great World War 1914–1945: 1. Lightning Strikes Twice. John Bourne

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СКАЧАТЬ possible, for distinctive landmarks to be noted and memorised before the flight. There was a heavy reliance upon old RNAS stocks of navigation literature or aids to navigation. For instance, just prior to the IBF’s creation a Major wrote to RAF HQ requesting 12 RNAS Course and Distance Indicators and six copies of the RNAS book Aerial Work. These, it was said, would assist squadrons in cloud flying training and operations.²⁹ Similarly, virtually all the bombsights and bombing manuals were drawn from Admiralty sources.³⁰

      The legacy of the RFC’s lack of interest and investment in research and development was apparent, not only in the last months of the First World War, but also during the inter-war years. During the 1920s budgetary constraint, and associated inter-service rivalry, compelled Trenchard, as Chief of Air Staff, to make increasingly grandiose claims for air power. By the end of that decade British strategic bombing doctrine claimed that not only would the bomber always get through, but that finding and destroying a target was a straightforward business. With this doctrine underpinning the inter-war RAF, there was little incentive to pursue research and development into aids to navigation and bomb-aiming, but nor was there a sufficiently strong research and development tradition remaining within the new service to act as any sort of counter-balance to the effects of air power dogma. As the 1930s unfolded, the race to achieve numerical parity with German air power meant that the focus was on expanding the RAF’s aircraft establishment, rather than developing supporting technologies or increasing the number of personnel who would have to fly these aircraft.³¹

      The RAF’s expansion between 1934 and 1939 aimed at increasing the frontline aircraft establishment at home from 547 to at least 1,780.³² Eight different expansion schemes were proposed during this time, each with slightly different emphases, but all with a main focus on bomber production. Far less attention was paid to the question of how to man this force. On the eve of expansion, in November 1933, the RAF employed just over 33,000 officers and men. It was not a size of force that would be able to service or operate the anticipated increase in aircraft numbers. Numerous measures were introduced to meet this challenge, but the development of the training organisation lagged far behind the material expansion of the RAF, and this was to have serious consequences in the first half of the war.

      To begin with, recruits were attracted to the RAF by short service commissions, lasting four or five years on the active list, with renewable periods of service. These recruits were trained at civilian flying schools, which received a fee from the Air Ministry. Then, in 1936, a Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve was formed with the object of providing ab initio training for pilots. Finally, University Air Squadrons were established, and these persuaded many undergraduates to take up flying and to acquire the technical knowledge that would be so much in demand once war started.³³

      These various measures succeeded in producing a seven-fold increase in the number of pilots trained each year. However, not until the late 1930s was it appreciated that other aircrew trades would also require expansion. As late as 1936 it was felt that one observers’ school would be sufficient to train all the observers required by the new size of force, but, more seriously, it was also believed that other aircrew trades could be trained on the squadrons.³⁴ This was in spite of the fact that the expansion programme envisaged the introduction of aircraft capable of much longer ranges and of greater technical complexity, demanding much higher standards of piloting and navigation. Specialised navigation courses were not introduced until 1937, but even then civilian flying schools were to provide most of the navigational training. The product coming out of these civilian schools proved inferior to the service-trained individual, and the problem was exacerbated by the fact that the RAF engaged in no long-range navigation exercises before the war broke out.³⁵ Further, there was no separate navigator function until 1941, as it was considered sufficient to have two pilots in the longer-range aircraft.

      Until 1938, almost all of the other aircrew trades (wireless operators, air gunners, etc) were on part-time flying duties only and were trained on a part-time basis. The system was economical during peacetime, but once war broke out the RAF found that it could not provide full crews. Direct entry into these trades was disappointing, as no one wanted to be anything other than a pilot. Again, specialised training was slow in inception. A Central Gunnery School was not created until October 1939, and not until 1942 were the gunnery and wireless operator functions separated out.³⁶

      One of the greatest obstacles to aircrew training during the late 1930s was a reluctance to divert not only qualified personnel into instructor roles but also potential front-line aircraft into training units. The emphasis on the RAF’s quantitative strength in the front line meant that the it had little in the way of reserves, either to sustain losses during wartime or to provide a sufficient training foundation. So, for example, although the number of initial flying training schools had been increased from five to nine in 1936, these schools failed to meet their targeted output to the extent of 1,200 pilots by 1939, and this shortfall was not made up until the latter part of 1941.³⁷

      In the short term, the output from the various training schools was increased by the expedient of shortening course lengths, but it soon became apparent that aircrews were substantially below standard. Like the Royal Flying Corps, in particular, front-line squadrons during 1939–40 were having to bring new aircrew up to operational standard. The quantity and quality problem was not solved until the first products of the Empire Air Training Scheme arrived on operational squadrons in any numbers (towards the end of 1941). By the terms of the Ottawa Agreement, ratified in December 1939, Canada agreed to train Canadians, Australians and New Zealanders in 13 Elementary Flying Training Schools, 16 Advanced Flying Training Schools, 10 Air Observer Schools, 10 Bombing and Gunnery Schools and two Air Navigation Schools. In addition, Australia and New Zealand provided an additional 29 elementary flying schools.³⁸

      This was the depth of training organisation needed to support the RAF’s operations in Europe, the Middle East and the Far East, but even when this was fully functional, deficiencies in the training of aircrew personnel were still apparent. One of the greatest problems was preparing bomber aircrews adequately for the type of missions they would face once they reached their operational squadrons. It was one thing for individual crew members to reach a standard of proficiency in a training type of aircraft; it was quite another to reach a point where an aircrew, as a unit, felt comfortable in the type of aircraft they would take into battle. So, the problem facing Bomber Command was twofold: first, ‘converting’ crews from their training aircraft to the types they would fly in combat, and, second, crew-building.³⁹

      Shortly after the war broke out, the AOC-in-C of Bomber Command, Air Chief Marshal Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt, took the bold step of rolling up 13 of the 33 operational bomber squadrons to form the basis of what would become known as Operational Training Units.⁴⁰ At these OTUs the products of the various training schools would come together, and the process of crew-building was described by one former bomb-aimer, Miles Tripp, in this way:

      ‘On the first day, men were sent to a large hangar and told it was up to them to form crews among themselves; those who were too sensitive, diffident or withdrawn to respond to these conditions would eventually be crewed up with others of similar temperament. This arbitrary collision of strangers was basically a marriage market and yet the choice of a good flying partner was far more important than a good wife. You couldn’t divorce your crew, and you could die if one of them wasn’t up to his job at a critical moment.’⁴¹

      Once crews had formed, the following weeks were spent on cross-country, night-flying and navigational exercises, and practice bombing, and it was hoped that any serious weaknesses among the new crew would manifest themselves at this point, rather than on operations. Miles Tripp found that his bomb-aiming skills were not up to standard when he reached his OTU, and he was held back for additional instruction.⁴² But he also found out that the gunner in his crew had poor eyesight – only luck and bluff had secured his place at the OTU – and his navigator had failed on one of the cross-country exercises. These types of deficiency could be identified at this stage of final training, but there СКАЧАТЬ