Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856 (4 of 16 vol.). United States. Congress

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СКАЧАТЬ and property of the inhabitants of Louisiana was secured to them. What then is the inference from this state of the case? That the United States got possession illegally, in defiance of judicial authority. I am sorry to see that the judicial authority has been set at defiance, and the Presidential mandate carried into effect at the point of the bayonet, right or wrong. This was the case. Those who were put in possession were ousted by military force. Let me not be understood as throwing odium on the Executive; far from it. I believe the Executive acted conscientiously, but upon an ex parte statement. The President was never told that the case had been judicially investigated. Those facts were taken for granted, on the other hand, which did not exist, and those which formed the foundation of the true merits of the case, were withheld.

      Mr. Poydras spoke at some length in reply to Mr. Sheffey, and in defence of the title of the United States. The batture had many years ago been considered as public property, and no one who examined the circumstances of the case could for a moment doubt it. He said that it had never been claimed as private property until after it came into the possession of the United States. He hoped the rights of the public and of the people of New Orleans would not be trampled upon to grant the petitioner his prayer.

      Mr. Macon said that he was himself in favor of giving the right of the United States to the property to the people or corporation of New Orleans, and letting them and the individual contest it. There was nothing new, however, in the reference of a subject to the Head of a Department, whose opinion would have no more weight than reason, and so far only ought it to have weight. Mr. M. said he had no more desire to interfere with the judiciary than either of the gentlemen who had spoken. If provision was made for trying this case, must it not be extended to all others? In order to do justice, it must be done to all. Had not a special court been refused in relation to a property of much greater value than this? Before Congress made a special court for a certain case, they ought to look at the consequences. It was departing from the general system of the nation to appoint a court for a special case. Perhaps there was something in this case which differed from other cases: but he doubted whether it would warrant the appointment of a special court. Mr. M. said he saw no other way of treating this subject but by letting it go before the courts already organized. If the right was in the petitioner, be the consequences what it might, the city of New Orleans had no right to take it away from him.

      Mr. Troup observed that this case was probably one which would fall under the old maxim, nullum tempus occurrit regi or reipublicæ. It appeared to him that there was a constitutional difficulty in this case, which did not appear to have suggested itself to the mind of any gentleman. First, has the United States a claim, either real or disputed, to this territory? Whether disputed or otherwise, provided the claim be asserted on its part, the question is, has the Congress of the United States a power to decide the validity of that claim? And if it has, is it proper so to decide it? What is the subject-matter in dispute? Public property; and what species? Landed. Then the question results, has Congress a right, in order to determine its title, to refer it to any tribunal whatever? I contend not; the right to public property was originally in the people of this country; they could never be divested of their great public right to the landed property of the nation, but by their express consent. They did give that right to the Congress of the United States, in declaring that it should have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations concerning public territory. Would it have had that power, if this right had not been expressly delegated? I know that, under the old Articles of Confederation, Congress did undertake to legislate as to property; but it was always questionable whether they had a right to do so – and this was not the only point on which Congress did exercise powers which were brought into question. The right to determine claims to public property is not only guarantied exclusively to Congress by the constitution, but the practice has been invariably pursuant to it; it was so in 1807. The Government not only asserted its right in the first instance, but asserted its power to enforce the right at the point of the bayonet. If the public have always been in possession of a certain property, the man who enters on it without their consent is a trespasser on that property. Upon this view of the subject, there is a constitutional difficulty on which the House should decide, before it entertains a motion for delegating a power to decide this question to any tribunal or commission whatever.

      Mr. Boyd said, admitting all the gentleman had said to be true, his observations did not apply to this case. He had spoken of the right to public property. The question now was, whether this was public property or not; if it were certainly public property, on which ground the gentleman rested his argument, there could be no question on the subject. It was asked only before they decided between the individual and the United States on the right to land, not confessedly public property, but claimed as such, that fair investigation should be had. Mr. B. disclaimed the power of deciding judicially upon the subject; it was a right which he had never thought of this House claiming. A delay of justice was a denial of it. The individual petitioning had been in possession of the property; it had been taken from him by force, and he now asked a trial of his title before a competent court – and this opportunity, Mr. B. said, he ought to have as speedily as possible.

      Mr. Randolph said he should vote against that report. He said it was no part of his intention to deliver any opinion on the merits of the claim, although he had devoted not a little of his time to the study of that question, for two reasons: first, that it would be a prejudicated opinion, inasmuch as that was not the question which the House were called upon to decide, even if it were competent to decide it. I am extremely sorry, said he that the law of 1807 has been brought into view of this House by my friends from North Carolina and Georgia, and for this reason: that that law has no bearing at all on the present question. Its object was wholly different from that to which it has been misapplied. What, sir, was the object of that law? To defend against a conspiracy, I may properly term it – against the lawless violence of confederated associations, a vast property. How has it been applied? Not to a great public property, but to a speck of land, to which, as I understand it, a single individual, or at most three or four, put in a claim. Such an application as that of the law in question was never intended by the Legislature; and, if applied to such a property as the batture, and to the case of a single individual, may be applied to the property of every man in society. What is the doctrine of my friend from Georgia? That the public are always supposed to be in possession of the national domain. True, sir, and it is also true that those who enter upon it and endeavor to appropriate it to themselves, are trespassers, and as such, may be resisted by force. But that is not the case in the present question – very far from it – for the public never had been in possession of the property in question.

      Without attempting to enter into the merits of the real title to the land in question, let us take it on the ground of the right of the citizen. A citizen comes before this House, and complains that he is dispossessed of his common right by arbitrary power. If, after a cause has been heard by a court, and a citizen put in possession of a property, by a decree of that court, he is dispossessed of it by military violence, where, if not before this House, is he to prefer his claim for redress? There is no court before which he can go, because the court which is the last resort in this case has already unavailingly given its decision. There is no court of appeal, no superior tribunal, and if there were, and a decree of the Supreme Court obtained in his favor on the appeal, what is any decree to avail against armed men – against muskets and bayonets? But this is not the only reason why I am sorry that the act of 1807 has been brought in to apply to this case. It is because, if this House can be once prevailed upon to consider this case as analogous to the Yazoo case, many most injurious consequences must follow therefrom. The first is, that that odious and supremely infamous claim will be put upon a ground which it is by no means entitled to occupy; and I entreat my friend from Georgia, and those whose minds are unalterably made up on the Yazoo question, not to give their enemies such a prize as they must have on us, if we agree to confound the Yazoo claim with that before the House. There is no sort of analogy between them. On the other hand, sir, supposing the right to be in the United States, I beg gentlemen not to create so forcible an interest against the rights of the United States as will infallibly be embodied against it if we confound the two. I have no idea of giving the Yazoo men such a handle. Again, let us suppose, if we can suppose it, that the right is in the petitioner; may it not, supposing a great majority СКАЧАТЬ