Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856 (4 of 16 vol.). United States. Congress

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СКАЧАТЬ are in the estimation of members on this floor, the merchants abroad do not estimate them as insurmountable. Their anxiety to risk their property, in defiance of them, is full evidence of this. The great danger to mercantile ingenuity is internal envy – the corrosion of weakness or prejudice. Its external hazard is ever infinitely smaller. That practical intelligence which this class of men possesses, beyond any other in the community, excited by self-interest – the strongest of human passions – is too elastic to be confined by the limits of exterior human powers, however great or uncommon. Build a Chinese wall, and the wit of your merchants, if permitted freely to operate, will break through it or overleap it, or undercreep it.

      –"mille adde catenas

      Effugiet tamen, hæc sceleratus vincula Proteus."

      The second branch of the alternatives under consideration is equally deceptive – "War with both nations." Can this ever be an alternative? Did you ever read in history, can you conceive in fancy, a war of two nations, each of whom is at war with the other, without a union with one against the other immediately resulting? It cannot exist in nature. The very idea is absurd. It never can be an alternative, whether we shall find two nations each hostile to the other. But it may be, and if we are to fight at all, it is a very serious question, which of the two we are to select as an adversary. As to the third branch of these celebrated alternatives, "a continuance and enforcement of the present system of commerce," I need not spend time to show that this does not include all the alternatives which exist under this head – since the committee immediately admit, that there does exist another alternative, "partial repeal," about which they proceed to reason.

      The report proceeds. "The first" (abject and degrading submission) "cannot require any discussion." Certainly not. Submission of that quality which the committee assume, and with the epithets of which they choose to invest it, can never require discussion at any time. But, whether trading under these orders and decrees be such submission, whether we are not competent to resist them in part, if not in whole, without a total abandonment of the exercise of all our maritime rights, the comparative effects of the edicts of each upon our commerce and the means we possess to influence or control either, are all fair and proper subjects of discussion; some of which the committee have wholly neglected and none of which have they examined, as the House had a right to expect.

      The committee proceed "to dissipate the illusion" that there is any "middle course," and to reassert the position before examined, that "there is no other alternative than war with both nations, or a continuance of the present system." This position they undertake to support by two assertions. First, that "war with one of the belligerents only, would be submission to the edicts and will of the other." Second, that "repeal in whole or in part of the embargo, must necessarily be war or submission."

      As to the first assertion, it is a miserable fallacy, confounding coincidence of interest with subjection of will; things in their nature palpably distinct. A man may do what another wills, nay, what he commands, and not act in submission to his will, or in obedience to his command. Our interest or duty may coincide with the line of conduct another presumes to prescribe. Shall we vindicate our independence at the expense of our social or moral obligations? I exemplify my idea in this way. Two bullies beset your door, from which there are but two avenues. One of them forbids you to go by the left, the other forbids you to go by the right avenue. Each is willing that you should pass by the way which he permits. In such case, what will you do? Will you keep house forever, rather than make choice of the path through which you will resume your external rights? You cannot go both ways at once, you must make your election. Yet, in making such election, you must necessarily coincide with the wishes and act according to the commands of one of the bullies. Yet who, before this committee, ever thought an election of one of two inevitable courses, made under such circumstances, "abject and degrading submission" to the will of either of the assailants? The second assertion, that "repeal in whole or in part of the embargo must necessarily be war or submission," the committee proceed to maintain by several subsidiary assertions. First – "a general repeal without arming would be submission to both nations." So far from this being true, the reverse is the fact; it would be submission to neither. Great Britain does not say, "you shall trade with me." France does not say, "you shall trade with me." If this was the language of their edicts, there might be some color for the assertion of the committee, that if we trade with either we submit. The edicts of each declare you shall not trade with my adversary. Our servile knee-crooking embargo says, "you shall, therefore, not trade." Can any submission be more palpable, more "abject, more disgraceful?" A general repeal without arming, would be only an exercise of our natural rights, under the protection of our mercantile ingenuity, and not under that of physical power. Whether our merchants shall arm or not, is a question of political expediency and of relative force. It may be very true that we can fight our way to neither country, and yet it may be also very true, that we may carry on a very important commerce with both. The strength of the national arm may not be equal to contend with either, and yet the wit of our merchants may be over-match for the edicts of all. The question of arming or not arming, has reference only to the mode in which we shall best enjoy our rights, and not at all to the quality of the act of trading during these edicts. To exercise commerce is our absolute right. If we arm, we may possibly extend the field beyond that which mere ingenuity would open to us. Whether the extension thus acquired be worthy of the risk and expense, is a fair question. But, decide it either way, how is trading as far as we have ability, made less abject than not trading at all?

      I come to the second subsidiary assertion. "A general repeal and arming of merchant vessels, would be war with both, and war of the worst kind, suffering the enemies to plunder us, without retaliation upon them."

      I have before exposed the absurdity of a war with two belligerents, each hostile to the other. It cannot be true, therefore, that "a general repeal and arming our merchant vessels," would be such a war. Neither if war resulted, would it be "war of the worst kind." In my humble apprehension, a war, in which our enemies are permitted to plunder us, and our merchants not permitted to defend their property, is somewhat worse than a war like this; in which, with arms in their hands, our brave seamen might sometimes prove too strong for their piratical assailants. By the whole amount of property which we might be able to preserve by these means, would such a war be better than that in which we are now engaged. For the committee assure us, that the aggressions to which we are subject, "are to all intents and purposes a maritime war, waged with both nations against the United States."

      The last assertion of the committee, in this most masterly page is, that "a partial repeal must from the situation of Europe, necessarily be actual submission to one of the aggressors, and war with the other." In the name of common sense, how can this be true? The trade to Sweden, to Spain, to China, is not now affected by the orders or decrees of either belligerent. How is it submission, then, to these orders for us to trade to Gottenburg, when neither France nor Britain command, nor prohibit it? Of what consequence is it to us what way the Gottenburg merchant disposes of our products, after he has paid us our price? I am not about to deny that a trade to Gottenburg would defeat the purpose of coercing Great Britain, through the want of our supplies, but I reason on the report upon its avowed principles. If gentlemen adhere to their system, as a means of coercion, let the Administration avow it as such, and support the system, by arguments, such as their friends use every day on this floor. Let them avow, as those friends do, that this is our mode of hostility against Great Britain. That it is better than "ball and gunpowder." Let them show that the means are adequate to the end; let them exhibit to us, beyond the term of all this suffering, a happy salvation, and a glorious victory, and the people may then submit to it, even without murmur. But while the Administration support their system only as a municipal regulation, as a means of safety and preservation, those who canvass their principle are not called upon to contest with them on ground, which not only they do not take, but which, officially, they disavow. As partial repeal would not be submission to either, so, also, it would not be war with either. A trade to Sweden would not be war with Great Britain; that nation is her ally, and she permits it. Nor with France, though Sweden is her enemy, she does not prohibit it. Ah! but say the committee, "a measure which would supply exclusively one of the belligerents, would be war with the other." This is the State secret; this СКАЧАТЬ