Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856 (4 of 16 vol.). United States. Congress

Чтение книги онлайн.

СКАЧАТЬ of Great Britain to injure France, formed no excuse for France to attempt to injure Great Britain by violating the commerce of the United States.

      On the 31st of December, 1806, the British Government formally notified the American Government, that Great Britain would consider an acquiescence in the Berlin Decree on the part of neutral nations, as giving to her (Great Britain) the right to retaliate in the same way against France.

      Had the American Government, at this period, manfully and explicitly made known its determination to support our rights at all hazards, I have no belief that our present difficulties would ever have existed.

      In May succeeding, advices were received of French privateers, under this decree, depredating upon American vessels in the West Indies; and during the same month the ship Horizon, in distress, was thrown by the act of God on the French coast, and was seized under the same authority.

      In November, 1807, the British, in conformity with their notice, issued their retaliating order. A prior Order in Council of January, 1807, had been issued, but this only affected vessels trading between different ports of France, or between ports of France and her allies; a trade always obnoxious to suspicion, and one which during war must ever be expected in a great degree to be restricted, and which is also interdicted by a standing law of the French Government, passed in 1778, and confirmed by the present Emperor.

      Then followed in succession, on the part of France, the Milan and Bayonne decrees. The last of which dooms an American vessel to condemnation from the exercise of a right universally acknowledged to belong to belligerents, and one which the neutral has no possibility of preventing, that of being spoken with by an enemy cruiser, which from her superior sailing there was no possibility of avoiding. In point of principle, this is the most outrageous violation of neutral rights ever known, and this, too, took place under the existence of a treaty made within a few years by the same person who issued these very decrees. While with Great Britain we have no treaty, and whose orders are expressly bottomed upon and limited in duration by the French decrees, and issued after having given twelve months' notice of her intention to oppose them in this way, and the Orders in Council are even as yet not co-extensive in principle with the French decrees.

      I have, in taking this brief view, confined myself exclusively to the decrees and orders of the two Governments, without adverting to other causes of complaint on either side. I consider myself as warranted in doing this, from the American Government having explicitly taken this ground, and made known that, on the removal of the decrees and orders, it would, on our part, remove the embargo, and restore the accustomed intercourse between the two countries.

      From this consideration of the subject, it irresistibly follows, that France was the first aggressor on us, in issuing her decrees – that in point of principle, they are much more outrageous violations of right than the British Orders in Council – that the latter originate from, and co-exist only with the former, and that France should of consequence be the first object of our vengeance.

      The effects of a war with one or the other nation, would be as distinctly perceptible. With France it would make no difference to us. For as long as she continues her decrees, commerce with her could not be prosecuted – no man would be mad enough while her coast is lined, and the ocean covered with British cruisers, to send his vessel to France, where she would meet with certain condemnation for being even seen and spoken with by a British frigate. With France, therefore, the actual difference arising from passing this bill, and declaring a non-intercourse, would be next to nothing.

      With Great Britain the effects would be reversed. No one now doubts her ability or disposition to carry her orders into effect, nor her preparation to extend the theatre of war. If we commenced war upon France, as she would be the common enemy of both nations, there is no doubt in my mind that our differences with Great Britain would be favorably settled, that the commerce of the world, excepting as it respects France and her allies, would be again open to us, and that a trade, which has hitherto employed nearly seventy millions of our capital, might be again accessible to the industry and enterprise of our citizens.

      Reverse this picture, admitting that you have a war with Great Britain, what will be its consequences? If your citizens are united, you can capture Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick; when you have effected this, what remains next to be done? You have reached the ne plus ultra of your ability. Thenceforward your ports are hermetically sealed. Privateering, from the convoy system adopted by Great Britain, could not be successfully prosecuted; no food for enterprise remains, and thus you would remain, five, ten, or fifteen years, as the case might be, until the wisdom and good sense of the nation predominated over its passion, when an accommodation would be made with Great Britain, following her example with regard to her West India conquests, restoring the captured provinces, enriched by American population and industry, and giving us perhaps a treaty still less favorable than the much execrated instrument of 1794, which, bad as it was said to be, has proved a cornucopia of wealth to our country, if it produced nothing less than a thirteen years' peace, and which, to my view, is vastly preferable to its abortive successor of the year eighteen hundred and six.

      The question was now taken on the passage of the bill, and determined in the affirmative – yeas 21, nays 12, as follows:

      Yeas. – Messrs. Anderson, Condit, Franklin, Gaillard, Giles, Gregg, Howland, Kitchel, Leib, Mathewson, Meigs, Milledge, Mitchill, Moore, Pope, Robinson, Smith of Maryland, Smith of New York, Smith of Tennessee, Thruston, and Tiffin.

      Nays. – Messrs. Bayard, Crawford, Gilman, Goodrich, Hillhouse, Lloyd, Parker, Pickering, Reed, Sumter, Turner, and White.

      So it was resolved that this bill pass, and that the title thereof be, "An act to interdict the commercial intercourse between the United States and Great Britain and France, and their dependencies, and for other purposes."

      Friday, February 24

Additional Duties

      The bill, entitled "An act for imposing additional duties upon all goods, wares, and merchandise, imported from any foreign port or place," was read the third time as amended.

      Mr. Lloyd moved to postpone the further consideration of this bill until the first Monday in June next; and addressed the chair as follows:

      Mr. President: After the observations which I have before made, sir, on this bill, and the detailed consideration which was given to it yesterday, I should not again rise, were the subject not a commercial, and an exceedingly important one; nor is it now my intention to make more than a few remarks, and these the Senate will probably think entitled to more than usual respect, when I inform them they will principally be, neither my own, nor wholly accordant with my opinions.

      This bill can only be advocated upon the ground that a war is about to ensue, and that, to prepare the public Treasury to sustain the prosecution of such war, this proposed duty is necessary. My purpose is to cite some authorities to show that neither the one nor the other is either expected or necessary; and the authorities I shall adduce to prove this, are those to which the Senate is accustomed to pay the highest respect.

      [Here Mr. Lloyd quoted from Mr. Gallatin's Treasury reports, to show that he deemed loans preferable to taxes if war ensued, and that there was revenue enough until the next winter.]

      Now, sir, it is clear, from the showing even of this honorable gentleman whose calculations are received with so much respect here, that whether there is peace, war, or embargo, our resources are yet abundant to carry us on, at least until the next winter; and as we are to meet again in three months, it follows that the present undigested project must be worse than useless.

      To all this mass of evidence and authority against both the necessity and policy of laying this duty, I have only to add a few observations to show that it will, in its operation, be both unequal and unjust.

      It СКАЧАТЬ