Название: The Life of John Marshall, Volume 3: Conflict and construction, 1800-1815
Автор: Beveridge Albert Jeremiah
Издательство: Public Domain
Жанр: Биографии и Мемуары
isbn:
isbn:
Among the latter were William Marbury, Dennis Ramsay, Robert Townsend Hooe, and William Harper. These four men applied to the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus compelling Madison to deliver their commissions. The other thirteen did not join in the suit, apparently considering the office of justice of the peace too insignificant to be worth the expense of litigation. Indeed, these offices were deemed so trifling that one of Adams's appointees to whom Madison delivered a commission resigned, and five others refused to qualify.326
When the application of Marbury and his associates came before Marshall he assumed jurisdiction, and in December, 1801, issued the usual rule to Madison ordering him to show cause at the next term of the Supreme Court why the writ of mandamus should not be awarded against him. Soon afterward, as we have seen, Congress abolished the June session of the Supreme Court;327 thus, when the court again convened in February, 1803, the case of Marbury vs. Madison was still pending.
Marshall resolved to make use of this unimportant litigation to assert, at the critical hour when such a pronouncement was essential, the power of the Supreme Court to declare invalid acts of Congress that violate the Constitution.
Considering the fact that Marshall was an experienced politician, was intimately familiar with the political methods of Jefferson and the Republican leaders, and was advised of their purposes, he could not have failed to realize the probable consequences to himself of the bold course he now determined to take. As the crawling months of 1802 wore on, no signs appeared that the Republican programme for overthrowing the independence of the Judiciary would be relinquished or modified. On the contrary, the coming of the new year (1803) found the second phase of the Republican assault determined upon.
At the beginning of the session of 1803 the House impeached John Pickering, Judge of the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. In Pennsylvania, the recently elected Republican House had impeached Judge Alexander Addison, and his conviction by a partisan vote was assured. Already the Republican determination to remove Samuel Chase from the Supreme Bench was frankly avowed.328
Moreover, the Republicans openly threatened to oust Marshall and his Federalist associates in case the court decided Marbury vs. Madison as the Republicans expected it would. They did not anticipate that Marshall would declare unconstitutional that section of the old Federalist Judiciary Act of 1789 under which the suit had been brought. Indeed, nobody imagined that the court would do that.
Everybody apparently, except Marshall and the Associate Justices, thought that the case would be decided in Marbury's favor and that Madison would be ordered to deliver the withheld commissions. It was upon this supposition that the Republican threats of impeachment were made. The Republicans considered Marbury's suit as a Federalist partisan maneuver and believed that the court's decision and Marshall's opinion would be inspired by motives of Federalist partisanship.329
There was a particular and powerful reason for Marshall to fear impeachment and removal from office; for, should he be deposed, it was certain that Jefferson would appoint Spencer Roane of Virginia to be Chief Justice of the United States. It was well known that Jefferson had intended to appoint Roane upon the death of Chief Justice Ellsworth.330 But Ellsworth had resigned in time to permit Adams to appoint Marshall as his successor and thus thwart Jefferson's purpose. If now Marshall were removed, Roane would be given his place.
Should he be succeeded by Roane, Marshall knew that the great principles of Nationalism, to the carrying-out of which his life was devoted, would never be asserted by the National Judiciary. On the contrary, the Supreme Court would become an engine for the destruction of every theory of government which Marshall held dear; for a bolder, abler, and more persistent antagonist of those principles than Spencer Roane did not exist.331 Had he become Chief Justice those cases in which Marshall delivered opinions that vitalized the Constitution would have been decided in direct opposition to Marshall's views.332
But despite the peril, Marshall resolved to act. Better to meet the issue now, come what might, than to evade it. If he succeeded, orderly government would be assured, the National Judiciary lifted to its high and true place, and one element of National disintegration suppressed, perhaps destroyed. If he failed, the country would be in no worse case than that to which it was rapidly tending.
No words in the Constitution gave the Judiciary the power to annul legislation. The subject had been discussed in the Convention, but the brief and scattering debate had arisen upon the proposition to make the President and Justices of the Supreme Court members of a Council of Revision with power to negative acts of Congress. No direct resolution was ever offered to the effect that the Judiciary should be given power to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional. In the discussion of the proposed Council of Revision there were sharp differences of opinion on the collateral question of the right and wisdom of judicial control of legislative acts.333 But, in the end, nothing was done and the whole subject was dropped.
Such was the record of the Constitutional Convention when, by his opinion in Marbury vs. Madison, Marshall made the principle of judicial supremacy over legislation as much a part of our fundamental law as if the Constitution contained these specific words: the Supreme Court shall have the power to declare invalid any act of Congress which, in the opinion of the court, is unconstitutional.
In establishing this principle Marshall was to contribute nothing new to the thought upon the subject. All the arguments on both sides of the question had been made over and over again since the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions had startled the land, and had been freshly stated in the Judiciary debate in the preceding Congress. Members of the Federalist majority in most of the State Legislatures had expressed, in highly colored partisan rhetoric, every sound reason for the theory that the National Judiciary should be the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution. Both Federalist and Republican newspapers had printed scores of essays for and against that doctrine.
In the Virginia Convention of 1788 Marshall had announced as a fundamental principle that if Congress should pass an unconstitutional law the courts would declare it void,334 and in his reply to the address of the majority of the Virginia Legislature335 he had elaborately, though with much caution and some mistiness, set forth his views.336 Chief Justice Jay and his associates had complained that the Judiciary Act of 1789 was unconstitutional, but they had not had the courage to announce that opinion from the Bench.337 Justices Iredell and Paterson, sitting as circuit judges, had claimed for the National Judiciary the exclusive right to determine the constitutionality of laws. Chief Justice Jay in charging a grand jury, and Associate Justice Wilson in a carefully prepared law lecture, had announced the same conclusion.
Various State judges of the Federalist faith, among them Dana of Massachusetts and Addison of Pennsylvania, had spoken to like effect. At the trial of Callender338 СКАЧАТЬ
323
324
325
326
327
See
328
See
329
This belief is strikingly shown by the comment of the Republican press. For example, just before Marshall delivered his opinion, a correspondent of the
"The efforts of
"Politics are more improper and dangerous in a Court of Justice, if possible, than in the pulpit. Political charges, prosecutions, and similar modes of official influence, ought never to have been resorted to by any party. The fountains of justice should be unpolluted by party passions and prejudices.
"The
"The Court must be defeated and retreat from the attack; or march on, till they incur an impeachment and removal from office. But our
"The will of the nation, deliberately and constitutionally expressed, must and will prevail, the predictions and exertions of
Marshall's opinion was delivered February 24. It took two weeks of fast traveling to go from Washington to Boston. Ordinary mail required a few days longer. The article in the
330
Dodd, in
331
As President of the Court of Appeals of Virginia he later challenged Marshall and brought about the first serious conflict between the courts of a State and the supreme tribunal of the Nation; and as a pamphleteer he assailed Marshall and his principles of Nationalism with unsparing rigor. (See vol. iv, chaps. iii, and vi, of this work.)
332
For example, in Fletcher
333
It seems probable, however, that it was generally understood by the leading men of the Convention that the Judiciary was to exercise the power of invalidating unconstitutional acts of Congress. (See Corwin:
In the Constitutional Convention, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts asserted that the judicial function of expounding statutes "involved a power of deciding on their Constitutionality." (
On the other hand, Franklin declared that "it would be improper to put it in the power of any Man to negative a Law passed by the Legislature because it would give him the controul of the Legislature." (
Madison felt "that no Man would be so daring as to place a veto on a Law that had passed with the assent of the Legislature." (
George Mason of Virginia said that the Judiciary "could declare an unconstitutional law void… He wished the further use to be made of the Judges of giving aid in preventing every improper law." (
Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania – afterwards of New York – dreaded "legislative usurpations" and felt that "encroachments of the popular branch … ought to be guarded agst." (
Gunning Bedford, Jr., of Delaware was against any "check on the Legislative" with two branches. (
James Wilson of Pennsylvania insisted that power in the Judiciary to declare laws unconstitutional "did not go far enough" – the judges should also have "Revisionary power" to pass on bills in the process of enactment. (
Luther Martin of Maryland had no doubt that the Judiciary had "a negative" on unconstitutional laws. (
John Francis Mercer of Maryland "disapproved of the Doctrine that the Judges as expositors of the Constitution should have authority to declare a law void." (
John Dickinson of Delaware "thought no such power ought to exist," but was "at a loss what expedient to substitute." (
Charles Pinckney of South Carolina "opposed the interference of the Judges in the Legislative business." (
The above is a condensed
334
See vol. i, 452, of this work.
335
The Virginia Resolutions.
336
Address of the Minority, Jan. 22, 1799,
337
Jay to Iredell, Sept. 15, 1790, enclosing statement to President Washington,
338
See