The Life of John Marshall, Volume 3: Conflict and construction, 1800-1815. Beveridge Albert Jeremiah
Чтение книги онлайн.

Читать онлайн книгу The Life of John Marshall, Volume 3: Conflict and construction, 1800-1815 - Beveridge Albert Jeremiah страница 19

СКАЧАТЬ skilful conduct depends, in this our capricious world, so much on accident. Had Mr. Adams been reelected President of the United States, or had his successor been [a Federalist] … a very different reception … would have been given to the same measure.

      "The payment of a specific sum would then have been pronounced, by those who now take merit to themselves for it, a humiliating national degradation, an abandonment of national interest, a free will offering of millions to Britain for her grace & favor, by those who sought to engage in a war with France, rather than repay, in part, by a small loan to that republic, the immense debt of gratitude we owe her."

      So speaks with bitter sarcasm the new Chief Justice, and pessimistically continues: "Such is, & such I fear will ever be human justice!" He tells King that the Federalist "disposition to coalesce" with the Republicans, which seemed to be developing during the first few months after Jefferson's inauguration, had disappeared; "but," he adds, "the minority [Federalist Party] is only recovering its strength & firmness. It acquires nothing." Then, with the characteristic misgivings of a Federalist, he prophesies: "Our political tempests will long, very long, exist, after those who are now toss'd about by them shall be at rest."309

      For more than five years310 Marshall had foreseen the complicated and dangerous situation in which the country now found itself; and for more than a year311 he had, in his ample, leisurely, simple manner of thinking, been framing the constructive answer which he was at last forced to give to the grave question: Who shall say with final authority what is and what is not law throughout the Republic? In his opinion in the case of Marbury vs. Madison, to which this chapter is devoted, we shall see how John Marshall answered this vital question.

      The philosophy of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions had now become the ruling doctrine of the Republican Party. The writer of the creed of State Rights sat in the Executive chair, while in House and Senate Virginia and her daughter Kentucky ruled the Republican majority. The two States that had declared the right and power of any member of the Union to pronounce a National law unconstitutional, and that had actually asserted a National statute to be null and void, had become the dominant force in the National Government.

      The Federalist majority in the legislatures of ten States,312 it is true, had passed resolutions denouncing that anti-National theory, and had vigorously asserted that the National Judiciary alone had the power to invalidate acts of Congress.313 But in none of these States had the Republican minority concurred. In all of them the Republicans had vigorously fought the Federalist denial of the right and power of the States to nullify National laws, and had especially resisted the Federalist assertion that this power was in the National Judiciary.

      In the New York Legislature, forty-three Republicans voted solidly against the Federalist reply to Virginia and Kentucky, while the Federalists were able to muster but fifty votes in its favor. In Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Maryland, the Republican opposition was determined and outspoken.

      The thirty-three Republicans of the Vermont Legislature cited, in their protest, the position which Marshall had taken on the Sedition Law in his campaign for Congress:314 "We have ever been of an opinion, with that much and deservedly respected statesman, Mr. Marshall, (whose abilities and integrity have been doubted by no party, and whose spirited and patriotic defence of his country's rights, has been universally admired)315 that 'it was calculated to create unnecessarily, discontents and jealousies, at a time, when our very existence as a nation may depend on our union.'"316

      In Southern States, where the Federalists were dominant when Kentucky and Virginia adopted their famous Resolutions, the Republicans were, nevertheless, so strong that the Federalist majority in the Legislatures of those States dared not attempt to deny formally the new Republican gospel.317

      So stood the formal record; but, since it had been written, the Jeffersonian propaganda had drawn scores of thousands of voters into the Republican ranks. The whole South had now decisively repudiated Federalism. Maryland had been captured; Pennsylvania had become as emphatically Republican as Virginia herself; New York had joined her forces to the Republican legions. The Federalists still held New England and the States of Delaware and New Jersey, but even there the incessant Republican assaults, delivered with ever-increasing strength, were weakening the Federalist power. Nothing was plainer than that, if the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions had been submitted to the Legislatures of the various States in 1801-1803, most of them would have enthusiastically endorsed them.

      Thus the one subject most discussed, from the campaign of 1800 to the time when Marshall delivered his opinion in Marbury vs. Madison, was the all-important question as to what power, if any, could annul acts of Congress.318 During these years popular opinion became ever stronger that the Judiciary could not do so, that Congress had a free hand so far as courts were concerned, and that the individual States might ignore National laws whenever those States deemed them to be infractions of the Constitution. As we have seen, the Republican vote in Senate and House, by which the Judiciary Act of 1801 was repealed, was also a vote against the theory of the supervisory power of the National Judiciary over National legislation.

      Should this conclusion go unchallenged? If so, it would have the sanction of acquiescence and soon acquire the strength of custom. What then would become the condition of the country? Congress might pass a law which some States would oppose and which they would refuse to obey, but which other States would favor and of which they would demand the enforcement. What would this entail? At the very least it would provoke a relapse into the chaos of the Confederation and more probably civil war. Or a President might take it upon himself to pronounce null and void a law of Congress, as Jefferson had already done in the matter of the Sedition Law,319 and if House and Senate were of a hostile political party, Congress might insist upon the observance of its legislation; but such a course would seriously damage the whole machinery of the National Government.

      The fundamental question as to what power could definitely pass upon the validity of legislation must be answered without delay. Some of Marshall's associates on the Supreme Bench were becoming old and feeble, and death, or resignation enforced by illness, was likely at any moment to break the Nationalist solidarity of the Supreme Court;320 and the appointing power had fallen into the hands of the man who held the subjugation of the National Judiciary as one of his chief purposes.

      Only second in importance to these reasons for Marshall's determination to meet the issue was the absolute necessity of asserting that there was one department of the Government that could not be influenced by temporary public opinion. The value to a democracy of a steadying force was not then so well understood as it is at present, but the Chief Justice fully appreciated it and determined at all hazards to make the National Judiciary the stabilizing power that it has since become. It should be said, however, that Marshall no longer "idolized democracy," as he declared he did when as a young man he addressed the Virginia Convention of 1788.321 On the contrary, he had come to distrust popular rule as much as did most Federalists.

      A case was then pending before the Supreme Court the decision of which might, by boldness and ingenuity, be made to serve as the occasion for that tribunal's assertion of its right and power to invalidate acts of Congress and also for the laying-down of rules for the guidance of all departments of the Government. This was the case of Marbury vs. Madison.

      Just before his term expired,СКАЧАТЬ



<p>309</p>

Marshall to King, May 5, 1802, King, iv, 116-18.

<p>310</p>

Since the adoption of the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions in 1798. (See vol. ii, chaps. x, xi, xii, of this work.)

<p>311</p>

Since the Republican repeal of the Federalist Judiciary Act was proposed. See supra, 51.

<p>312</p>

Maryland, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, New York, Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island.

<p>313</p>

The Federalist majority in Vermont resolved that: "It belongs not to State Legislatures to decide on the constitutionality of laws made by the general government; this power being exclusively vested in the Judiciary Courts of the Union." (Records of Governor and Council of Vermont, iv, 529.)

The Federalist majority in the Maryland Legislature asserted that "no state government … is competent to declare an act of the federal government unconstitutional, … that jurisdiction … is exclusively vested in the courts of the United States." (Anderson, in Am. Hist. Rev. v, 248.)

The New York Federalists were slow to act, but finally resolved "that the right of deciding on the constitutionality of all laws passed by Congress … appertains to the judiciary department." (Ib. 248-49.)

Connecticut Federalists declared that the Kentucky and Virginia plan was "hostile to the existence of our national Union." (Ib. 247.)

In Delaware the then dominant party decided that the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions were "not a fit subject" for their consideration. (Ib. 246.)

The Pennsylvania Federalist majority resolved that the people "have committed to the supreme judiciary of the nation the high authority of ultimately and conclusively deciding the constitutionality of all legislative acts." (Anderson, in Am. Hist. Rev. v, 245.)

On February 8, 1799, Massachusetts replied to the Virginia Resolutions that: "This legislature are persuaded that the decision of all cases in law or equity, arising under the Constitution of the United States, and the construction of all laws made in pursuance thereof, are exclusively vested by the people in the Judicial Courts of the U. States." (Mass. Senate Journal, 1798-99, xix, 238, MS. volume Mass. State Library.)

Such was the general tenor of the Federalists' pronouncements upon this grave problem. But because the people believed the Sedition Law to be directed against free speech, the Federalist supremacy in many of the States that insisted upon these sound Nationalist principles was soon overthrown.

The resolutions of the Republican minorities in the Legislatures of the Federalist States were emphatic assertions that any State might declare an act of Congress unconstitutional and disregard it, and that the National Judiciary did not have supervisory power over legislation.

<p>314</p>

See vol. ii, 387-89, of this work.

<p>315</p>

Referring to Marshall's conduct in the French Mission. (See vol. ii, chaps. vii, viii, ix, of this work.)

<p>316</p>

Anderson, in Am. Hist. Rev. v, 249.

<p>317</p>

Ib. 235-37.

<p>318</p>

The questions raised by the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions were principal themes of debate in State Legislatures, in the press, in Congressional campaigns, and in the Presidential contest of 1800. The Judiciary debate of 1802 was, in part, a continuance of these popular discussions.

<p>319</p>

See supra, 52.

<p>320</p>

Within a year after Marbury vs. Madison was decided, Albert Moore, one of the Federalist Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, resigned because of ill health and his place was filled by William Johnson, a Republican of South Carolina.

<p>321</p>

See vol. i, 410, of this work.