Russia. Crimea. History. Nikolay Starikov

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СКАЧАТЬ to privatization in Moscow. Shock therapy and price rising from January 1, 1992 was the background, used by Russian Supreme Soviet of that time when it supported Crimeans. However, a conflict was about to brew inside Russia, which led to bloody events in Moscow in October 1993. In this situation, Russian President Boris Yeltsin often worked on the principle that the enemy of my enemy was my friend. Therefore, when the Russian members of parliament supported the Crimea and in doing so became enemies of “the young Ukrainian state”, Yeltsin did not support them. Yeltsin’s Russia was weak in all aspects; “reformers” of Gaidar’s team were destroying economy and army, quickly bringing the country to the threshold of combat capability. That was how the Russian Federation, so rapidly losing its sovereignty in the early 1990s, actually betrayed the Crimea. All the citizens of the Crimea got a stamp in the passports with the Ukrainian “trident” in summer 1992. This was despite the fact that even in 1954 at the time of handing the Crimean ASSR over to the jurisdiction of the Ukranian SSR, there was not a single legislative action concerning any change in nationality of the residents. They remained to be citizens of the USSR and RSFSR all that time![147]

      In the early 1990-s, the entire Crimea was in a difficult situation, with Sevastopol residents who felt the “cutting” from Russia in the keenest way. However, the city of Russian military glory did not give up. On August 23, 1994 according to the results of public opinion poll, Sevastopol City Council appealed to Presidents Yeltsin and Kuchma and Heads of the Parliaments with a proposal to give a Russian status to Sevastopol and asked to make final decision on the problem of Black Sea Fleet[148]. No answer was received from Moscow. Two years later, residents of Sevastopol involved the heavy artillery to settle the problem. Moscow Mayor Yury Luzh kov initiated a statement from the Federation Council of Russia “On the status of Sevastopol” on December 5, 1996. The senators expressed regret in the document that during negotiations the Ukrainian party did not wish to discuss the issue of Russian status of Sevastopol. Luzhkov reported his message in a clear, but diplomatic manner: our fleet could not leave the Crimea, as it would lead to weakening of Russia’s geopolitical position and dominance of other state fleets in the Black Sea[149]. While the patriotic forces in Russia tried to convince Boris Yeltsin that it was necessary to deal with Ukraine in a more drastic way, a real legislative war broke out within the Ukrainian state. Kiev was trying to restrain the Crimea. The Supreme Council of Ukraine changed the legal status of the peninsula unilaterally by the Law dated March 17, 1995 “On the Autonomous Republic of Crimea”. In accordance with it the Crimea became “administrative-territorial autonomy” but not state formation. So, the position of the president of the republic was abolished[150]. The new Constitution of Ukraine of 1996, in which the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (Article 134) was declared as its inalienable part was adopted. The Crimea fell between two stools: legislative and executive power in Ukraine. Ukrainian leaders notified Russia of the fact, and Russian senators had nothing to do but react to this very unfriendly policy. Nevertheless, the final word rested with president Yeltsin. In fact, the Crimea, and its future were entirely dependent on the decision of the Russian President and his will. And a signal was given – the signal to obey and accept the new status quo. Intergovernmental agreements were signed in Kiev on May 28, 1997, according to which Sevastopol as the main base of the Black Sea Fleet ceased to exist. Russia agreed to lease the territory from Ukraine. Renunciation of Russia by Yeltsin resulted in signing of “Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between the Russian Federation and Ukraine” on May 31, 1997. The idea to close eyes on the behaviour of Ukraine for the sake of “fraternal friendship” proved to be fiction. This agreement did not mean much, since pro-American “orange”, who took over the office in 2004, set the course for “integration with the EU” and NATO membership. Unilateral renunciation never leads to anything good in politics. Gorbachev is a striking example. The West paid nothing for his services. All promises were broken; the world has not become safer. Yeltsin’s policy towards Ukraine did not lead to anything good either. By the way, the real integration instead of fair words did not begin with Boris Yeltsin. The Customs Union, the Eurasian Union, starting its operation on January 1, 2015, – all these projects are of later time. The only truly integration process of the Yeltsin’s era was the establishment of the Union State of Russia and Belorussia, but it fully began to run later…

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      Примечания

      1

      Also a builder according to his education and first professional experience, but such persons should rather be referred as professional demolishers.

      2

      The details of such a strange diplomacy – when winners pay money to a defeated party – see N. V. Starikov. Geopolitics. How it is done. – SPb, 2013 (in Russian).

      3

      A. Gamov. Leonid Kravchuk, ex-President of Ukraine: Yeltsin solicited to get Crimea back to Russia… http://www.kp.ru/daily/26207/3093145/ (in Russian).

      4

      Russian authorities understood this very well, therefore after the victory of the first Maidan, emerged a number of youth organizations (for example, “Nashi” – “Ours”). Their main purpose was to occupy squares and streets just in time – in order to prevent deployment of an “orange” scenario.

      5

      Just recall Russia after the events on “Bolotnaya square” – it is quite a demonstrative example how the “orange” elite “got hurt”. They were deprived of mandates, removed from mass media, was sentenced to probation. No preventive steps of the same kind with respect to the local elite were made in Ukraine. As a result, an accomplice and a colleague of Yanukovich – Petr Poroshenko, the former foreign minister and former minister of economics and trade, – became one of the main sponsors of the Maidan. And later he became the President.

      6

      After arrests of the main leaders of the turmoil at Bolotnaya square in Moscow on 6 May 2012, further unrests would never reach such scale. It was not done in Ukraine.

      7

      In Ukraine, Yanukovich – instead of “switching on a fool” – has believed to the promises of the West, he started “fair” negotiations, he fulfilled all his obligations, and after that was immediately deceived and had a narrow escape from being murdered.

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