Fateful Triangle. Tanvi Madan

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СКАЧАТЬ predicted further delays, “probably … due to irritation caused by Mr. Nehru’s refusal to go along with the United States and its policy toward Communist China.”²²⁹ A former chairman of the Republican National Committee asserted that India’s “cooperation with aggressors” weakened the case for aid.²³⁰

      With support from a bipartisan coalition, however, Truman went ahead with a request to Congress that February. His message made anticommunist, humanitarian, and democracy promotion cases for aiding India. Many members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee agreed that it was important to aid India.²³¹ In the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to spur action, Acheson and Senator H. Alexander Smith (R-NJ) noted Chinese and Soviet offers of grain to India on a barter or sale basis.²³² The bill, however, stalled in Congress for months as members debated whether to give India aid and whether to demand raw materials in return since Delhi was not going to support US foreign policy.²³³ The debate also gave members a forum to criticize India’s China policy repeatedly and vociferously.

      The India bashing in Congress and the media resulting from Delhi’s China policy, and the linkage between Indian foreign policy and American food assistance, adversely affected Indian views of the US.²³⁴ As Nehru had noted, “We are a sensitive people and we react strongly to being cursed at and run down.… Our general reaction, whenever any pressure is sought to be applied upon us by any country, is to resent it and may be to go against it.”²³⁵ Anti-India rhetoric in the US generated louder self-sufficiency rhetoric in India. Nehru insisted publicly that conditional aid would not be welcome. His reproach, in turn, sparked further criticism on Capitol Hill, finally leading the prime minister to state that India would prefer a loan rather than a grant.²³⁶ In June, months after India had requested aid, Truman signed a food assistance bill. Thus the US eventually helped fill Indian stomachs, but in the process did little to win the battle for Indian hearts and minds.²³⁷

      India as a Channel to China: Only Hurting Itself? (1951–1952)

      Feeling burned by the American attitude and recognizing the adverse impact on the aid debate in Congress, Delhi had limited its intermediary role in the Korean War in spring 1951. Bajpai told Pandit, “Both China and the USA are determined to fight it out, and any third party that tries to come between the two is likely only to hurt itself.” There was criticism in parliament of such a role as well. Jivatram Bhagwandas (J. B.) Kripalani, whom Nehru had backed to be president of the Indian National Congress, said that thanks to India’s positions, “[India had] no friend left in the world.”²³⁸ Furthermore, the experience was frustrating. China and the US mistrusted each other’s intentions. Each side told Indian officials they doubted the other’s peaceful intentions and, therefore, insisted that the other provide reassurance first.²³⁹

      Nonetheless, in summer 1951, Indian officials did become involved in efforts in Beijing and Delhi—quietly coordinating with British and Swiss representatives—to secure the release of American prisoners being held in China.²⁴⁰ India was reprising a role it had played in 1949 when it had tried to secure the release of American consul Angus Ward.²⁴¹ Differing US and Indian perceptions of China were again evident. In the early stages of talks on the prisoners, Panikkar felt Chinese premier Zhou Enlai’s responses were positive. Washington, however, took more seriously the views of British officials, who did not share the Indian ambassador’s optimism.²⁴² There were also differences on tactics. American officials thought that Indian public representations on behalf of the US would convey to Beijing the widespread disapproval of its attitude toward foreign nationals. Indian officials, on the other hand, believed that explicit association with the US or others would reduce Indian influence in Beijing.²⁴³

      Frustration with Washington deepened when India became involved as an intermediary on the Korean issue again, even as China and the US undertook armistice talks after summer 1951 in Kaesong and then Panmunjom. After China backtracked in July 1952 on its in-principle acceptance of an India-UK prisoner repatriation formula that could have led to a settlement, an exasperated Nehru said that both sides “express their desire for settlement, but neither is prepared to give in … and wants the other to do so.” He was unhappy that Beijing had not been “straight” with India. But he found the American military approach—and continued bombing in the midst of peace efforts that only made Beijing more intransigent—to be “outrageous.” On balance, he blamed American policy in the Far East, which had “come in the way of a peace effort.”²⁴⁴

      India was not, however, only frustrated with the US. Panikkar, for example, became so annoyed with the lack of Chinese action on American prisoners that he dropped his opposition to public pleas.²⁴⁵ Like their US counterparts, Bajpai and other Indian officials also questioned whether China was feeding India wrong or exaggerated information to pressure the US into negotiations on Chinese terms.²⁴⁶ Furthermore, China kept vacillating about its preferred policy options. After Beijing’s July 1952 U-turn, Nehru expressed “extreme displeasure and embarrassment” internally.²⁴⁷ He lamented, “The situation at the China end is more difficult than we have imagined.”²⁴⁸ Nehru insisted that any future Chinese proposals should be conveyed in writing rather than just verbally.²⁴⁹ He was again disappointed when Beijing rejected another Indian proposal in November 1952. Moreover, China criticized India’s attempts to be the “voice of Asia” and dismissed it as a tool of the US. Nehru wondered if these rejections stemmed from Moscow’s influence or a belief that India had leaned too much toward the UN/US side.²⁵⁰

      Despite concerns, Delhi believed its mediatory role and neutrality made it somewhat useful—and therefore important—to Beijing. As long as this was the case, Bajpai noted that China would not trouble India. Rather, it had given India assurances regarding the Sino-Indian border, with Zhou indicating that China “had no intention [of] making claims to or raising questions about boundary” and asserting that China wanted “cultivation [of] friendship” with India and Burma.²⁵¹ Acheson, too, observed that China was not taking military action against Burma since it would upset India at a time when it was important for Beijing to stay on Delhi’s good side.²⁵² But in summer 1952, when China had reneged on commitments to India on Korea, Nehru’s concern about broader implications was evident—against Panikkar’s advice, he thought India should explicitly raise the boundary issue with China.²⁵³ Even beyond China, Krishna Menon believed that India’s role as intermediary increased its global influence and importance.²⁵⁴

      American officials had mixed feelings about the Indian role. Henderson, for example, believed India could be an “ameliorating influence” on Beijing.”²⁵⁵ Bowles, his successor, believed that even if US messages via India were not passed on to—or heeded by—China, using the India channel would help convince Delhi that, unlike Beijing, Washington was doing its part to seek peace.²⁵⁶ Dean Rusk, assistant secretary of state for Far East Asian affairs, found Indian contacts with Chinese officials useful for conveying warnings of potential US retaliation if China escalated.²⁵⁷ For Acheson, as long as the US had multiple channels, India’s good relations with China and its standing with other Asian countries made the continued use of this channel worthwhile.²⁵⁸

      However, there were also serious doubts about India as a conduit.²⁵⁹ There were questions about India’s reliability and its officials’ judgment as to China’s intentions. The US Army chief believed Beijing was manipulating India.²⁶⁰ In addition, there was unease that Panikkar was proposing ideas or interpretations to Chinese officials that the US had not approved, while suggesting to Beijing that the proposals had resulted from close contact with Washington.²⁶¹ There were also doubts about whether roving Indian envoys like Krishna Menon were even keeping Delhi in the loop on US views. Furthermore, there was concern that US officials did not know what Delhi was actually saying to Panikkar and what he was conveying to Chinese officials.²⁶²

      Other officials worried that India would compromise principles СКАЧАТЬ