Fateful Triangle. Tanvi Madan

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СКАЧАТЬ recognition was in the offing.⁹⁷ The prime minister subscribed to scholar-diplomat Panikkar’s view that recognition would put India in a “better position to protect [its] interests” vis-à-vis China than isolating it.⁹⁸ He wanted to discuss Indian interests in Tibet, which Chinese premier Zhou Enlai had told Panikkar would be safeguarded, and the India-Tibet boundary with Chinese officials.⁹⁹ Moreover, he believed that indefinite delay or conditional recognition would likely push China and the Soviet Union together and strengthen the hands of those in Beijing pushing for such a communist alliance.¹⁰⁰ Bajpai outlined another reason to Henderson: India’s role in Asia would be adversely affected if other Asian countries recognized China and Delhi did not.¹⁰¹

      Patel would later tell the American ambassador that Nehru’s decision was also hurried along by indications that Britain and the US were just waiting for a good time to recognize China. Nehru wanted to pre-empt them so that Beijing would see him as a leader rather than a follower.¹⁰² The deputy prime minister had conversely suggested to Nehru that there was little benefit to being in the lead, and it would be better if India were “somewhat late in the company of others.”¹⁰³ But even he thought that recognition was inevitable.¹⁰⁴

      American officials in Britain, China, India, and the US tried to delay Indian recognition.¹⁰⁵ London persuaded Delhi to delay by two weeks, but on December 10, K. P. S. Menon informed Henderson that Delhi was likely to recognize the communist regime toward the end of the month. On December 19, mentioning the British intention to recognize, he confirmed that India would recognize Mao’s government on December 30.¹⁰⁶ On that day, India made a public announcement that it would be willing to recognize the communist Chinese government.

      Even at that point, Delhi and Washington were not on entirely different pages when it came to China. Like Indian officials, Acheson believed that the communists controlled the mainland and that Mao was not a “true satellite” of the Soviets. Meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in late December, he questioned whether the effort to delay the fall of Taiwan was worth it. He said the US should instead focus on strengthening China’s neighbors by building their stability and prosperity, and on supporting nationalist movements in the region—a strategy with which Nehru would have concurred.¹⁰⁷

      But there was no concurrence on recognition. Acheson told his British and French counterparts that recognition would serve no purpose and would only worry American partners in Asia. Many US allies leaned toward recognition, but the administration agreed with members of Congress that the US should not recognize Mao’s regime. Chinese mistreatment of US nationals, including diplomats,¹⁰⁸ reinforced this view.¹⁰⁹ From Delhi, Henderson, while noting that the Indian leadership would vociferously criticize the US for not recognizing China, asserted that the US should not do so. He believed it would adversely affect American credibility because countries in the region would see it as a sign of weakness.¹¹⁰

      China hawks in the US gave the administration little credit for not recognizing the Chinese communist regime. Senator Knowland moreover criticized it for not doing enough to stop or at least delay Indian recognition.¹¹¹ China bloc criticism only increased when Truman and Acheson stated publicly in early January 1950 that the US would neither defend Taiwan militarily nor significantly increase aid to Jiang’s regime. In a speech on Asia, the secretary of state also laid out a “defensive perimeter” that omitted Taiwan and Korea.

      That speech also contained themes about the problems and solutions in Asia that Indian officials would have found familiar. It identified “revulsion” against poverty and foreign domination as the primary factors driving Asians. Furthermore, Acheson emphasized vulnerability to communist subversion as a key threat and the need to look beyond military means as a solution.¹¹²

      In testimony on Capitol Hill, Acheson also stressed that there was “no easy or early solution” to the China situation—and definitely not a military one. The “real center” of American interest in Asia, he emphasized, must lie in the “crescent of countries” around China, with Japan and India at its crucial ends. He acknowledged, however, that these two “major anchors” were facing significant problems at that stage.¹¹³

      Both within and outside Congress, there was criticism that the administration did not then seem to have a plan to strengthen countries like India. The administration had not outlined how it was going to contain communism in Asia—nothing “bold,” like a “Marshall Plan for Asia,” was on the table. Senator Styles Bridges (R-NH) said the situation begged the question of whether Americans were “men in Europe and mice in Asia.”¹¹⁴

      There was also criticism of India. Nehru had conveyed the hope via K. P. S. Menon that the US “would not take amiss” India’s early recognition.¹¹⁵ But this was wishful thinking. Recognition reinforced the growing sense in Washington that India might not be the hoped-for solution to the China conundrum. Before Indian recognition, a map of Asia in the New York Times outlining the spread and threat of communism had highlighted India as a “non-communist strong point,” with a label that read “West counts on Nehru for support in long run.”¹¹⁶ A month later, postrecognition, in a similar map that statement had become a question: “Will India supply effective anti-communist leadership?”¹¹⁷ Commentators lamented that India “h[eld] the key” to any defense of Asia and yet its attitude was “dangerous.”¹¹⁸

      Other episodes in early 1950 only exacerbated the negative feelings toward India in the US. Nehru publicly criticized the American attitude toward China as unnecessarily confrontational.¹¹⁹ At the UN Security Council, where it was then a nonpermanent member, India took the position that the communist regime should hold the Chinese seat.¹²⁰ It also declined to recognize the Paris and Washington-backed Bao Dai regime in Vietnam (the communists were backing Ho Chi Minh). These developments particularly grated because Delhi’s voice was considered influential with other Asian states. They left the New York Times commenting that Nehru’s views on developments in Asia were “less than wise.”¹²¹

      Indian policymakers were aware of the consequences of the shift in mood in the US toward India because of Delhi’s China policy. Bajpai tried to assure American officials that India was not appeasing China.¹²² Privately, he and Pandit, who had moved from Moscow to Washington, discussed the need “to correct the misrepresentation to which India is being subjected.”¹²³ Pandit told Nehru this was critical because India wanted “a charge account” from the US (i.e., aid).¹²⁴

      But Acheson was blunt; aid could only be “forthcoming when there is Indian receptivity and our own ability, and constructive purpose to be served.”¹²⁵ With the administration’s ability limited and motivation lacking because of India’s unwillingness to play a role in its Asia policy, there was little appetite for aiding India. Pandit conveyed her concern to Bajpai that this American attitude toward assistance and its Asia policy, in turn, were the reasons for growing criticism of the US in India.¹²⁶

      The bigger China-related stumbling block in US-India relations, however, was yet to come. After all, other American friends and even allies such as Britain had also recognized communist China. It was US-India interactions over the Korean War, which intensified the Cold War, that drove home the disconnect between US and Indian perceptions of China, as well as their preferred method of dealing with that country.

      The Korean War: Seeing Each Other as Spoilers (1950)

      Initially, the Korean War increased India’s importance in the US. This was partly a result of the strategic reconsideration evident in NSC-68. The document represented a more comprehensive view of US strategy, blurring the line between vital and peripheral interests. Drafted in the first half of 1950, it asserted that “a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere.” This turned Lovett’s assertion СКАЧАТЬ