The New Irish Constitution: An Exposition and Some Arguments. Various

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СКАЧАТЬ brings with it. It seems to me that in the reassurance of opponents and hesitating well-wishers, and even in the immunity, for a time, from the pressure and annoyances of this class of patronage, the new Irish Government may well find, in its infancy, satisfaction for the temporary withholding of a part of its prerogatives. It might be an instruction to the Lord-Lieutenant, that, during the transition period, (which need not be long) the wishes of the Irish ministry, in regard to appointments to judicial vacancies, should be ascertained and fully considered before the vacancies are filled.

      But if this view cannot prevail then I suggest that during the transition period the patronage in connexion with the Supreme Court should, at all events, [pg 065] be reserved. It is highly desirable that the apprehensions of the Irish Unionists should be allayed in every practicable way.

      Advantage should, I think, be taken of this opportunity to remove the Irish Chancellorship from the list of political appointments. Whatever strong reasons or justification may exist in England for the Lord Chancellor changing with the Government, there should be none that I can discover in the Ireland of the future, unless it be in connection with the appointment of Justices of the Peace. But fairness in distributing that sort of patronage can surely be secured by other means than a frequently recurring and unnatural change of Chancellors, whereby the Pension List is heavily and unnecessarily burdened.

      In connexion with the Royal Irish Constabulary, I am clear that the control should rest, as now, with the Lord-Lieutenant (that is, with the Imperial Government) until Land Purchase has made further progress, and the new Government has gained experience of administration; but it is only fair that during this period of reservation the Imperial Government should allow Ireland a drawback on the cost of the police force, the present strength of which is excessive if judged from the Irish point of view.

      The situation will, of course, be anomalous inasmuch as there will be an Executive Government responsible to the Irish Parliament yet relieved of the prime responsibility resting on all Governments—the maintenance of law and order. This anomaly cannot be avoided: it inevitably arises from the political conditions of the case. The best way of dealing with the situation will be to maintain existing arrangements which are directed by the Under-Secretary and to preserve the subordination of the Law Officers to the [pg 066] Lord-Lieutenant in all matters relating to the maintenance of order. But while the Minister for Law and Justice should have no control over the police during this transition period, his wishes in regard to any matter will, of course, be carefully considered; his request for the performance by the police of all duties not of a purely police character which they now customarily discharge, will be complied with, and his proposals to reduce the strength of the force, and thereby effect saving in the public expenditure, will no doubt be favourably considered by the Lord-Lieutenant if the state of the country permits.

      I presume the Bill will indicate the kind of police force which in time will take the place of the existing force. I confess I am not prepossessed in favour of the plan embodied in this connexion in the Bill of 1886 or 1893. I think the best plan will be to retain the organization of the Royal Irish Constabulary, and to reduce the present force by short recruitment when the Imperial Government think that can be safely done. I deprecate the creation of a local force under the control of the local authorities.71

      Finally, the question whether the force to be locally employed should be armed, or not armed (as the Bill of 1893 proposed), may be left to be decided at the time by the Imperial Government: but, in any case, it will, I think, be necessary for the Irish Government to maintain a sufficiently strong armed body of police in Dublin and other suitable centres to deal with emergencies.

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      The control over the staff of Resident Magistrates is so intimately bound up with the existing system of police administration that one cannot be safely separated from the other, and this section of Law and Justice should, in my opinion, also be reserved during the transition period. At the same time I think the services of the Resident Magistrates can be more fully utilized in the business of general administration than they are at present.

      There is less reason for retaining the Dublin Metropolitan Police under the Lord-Lieutenant's direct control during the transition period than for retaining the Royal Irish Constabulary; and if the national feeling would be gratified by giving to the Irish Parliament, at once, the control of the Dublin police, I would defer to that feeling. But my personal opinion is that the Irish Parliament in its earliest days would be wise to concentrate upon self-organization, the establishment of control over the departmental system, and the taking stock of the condition of the country in all the various aspects of national life. It will then with greater assurance of success take over from the Imperial Government the responsibility for the maintenance of order.

      I have already referred to the Land Commission. There is a general agreement that the department of land purchase, which depends essentially upon the use of British credit, should remain with the Imperial Government. The only question is: should this department be permanently excluded from Irish control, or only temporarily excluded, the period of exclusion being in the discretion of the Imperial Government? In view of the temporary character of the Land Commission, the possibility that Legislation affecting land may be necessary before the Annuities generally cease, [pg 068] and the certainty that when they do cease, either generally or in any particular area, it will be desirable to remove all limitations on the functions of the Irish Legislature in reference to land, I am disposed to think it, on the whole, better to treat the Land Commission as a “reserved” instead of an “excluded” subject, and thereby make its ultimate transfer to Irish control a matter of executive action on the part of the Imperial Government. But I admit the existence of strong reasons for total exclusion, and I should not question a decision in favour of the latter course.72 Should it be excluded, I would suggest that it shall be open for the Irish Government to bring to the notice of the Lord-Lieutenant any matters in which the administration of the Land Commission seems to be defective.

      In this connexion I desire to call attention to the Congested Districts Board and the power which it at present exercises of purchasing land under the Land Purchase Acts. It is imperatively necessary, if this Board is to be retained in its existing or in any modified shape, that its work of relieving congestion and improving the condition of the peasantry of the West should be brought under the supervision and control of the Irish Legislature. But if the land purchase operations of the Land Commission are to be excluded or reserved from control by the Irish Legislature, it is very difficult to defend the subjection to such control of the land purchase functions of the Congested Districts Board. How can the British Treasury be reasonably asked to become responsible for prices fixed by an Irish body over which it will have no control whatever? Such a situation would be utterly anomalous.

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      The anomaly can be avoided (as suggested in my Minute appended to the Report of the Royal Commission on Congestion, 1908) by relieving the Congested Districts Board of its functions as a purchasing authority and having purchases of land made for it, on its requisition, by the Land Commission.

      Having thus indicated my opinion as to the departments or sections of departments to be temporarily reserved from the control of the Irish Parliament, I come to the question of how that control should be exercised over the departments remaining on the list. In this connexion I invite reference to Clauses 20–22 of the Irish Council Bill. That Bill (Clause 19) contemplated the appointment of committees of council, with paid chairmen, to administer the departments into which public business was to be distributed under the Bill. It was my own expectation, had the Council Bill become law, that the chairmen of these Committees of Council would in course of time have become ministers for the departments concerned; but, in the beginning and until experience had been gained, it seemed desirable to give the embryonic ministers the help, and to impose on them the restraint, of colleagues. Whether the future Irish Legislature will see prudence or wisdom in this course, one can only conjecture; but one may trust that it may. In the following observations, however, and without meaning to imply any СКАЧАТЬ