Lord Lyons (Vol. 1&2). Thomas Wodehouse Legh Newton

Чтение книги онлайн.

СКАЧАТЬ was directed to leave Washington with all the members of his staff and the archives, and to repair forthwith to London.

      Accompanying the despatches was a private letter from Lord Russell to Lord Lyons.

      * * * * *

      Pembroke Lodge, Dec. 1, 1861.

      The despatches which were agreed to at the Cabinet yesterday and which I have signed this morning impose upon you a disagreeable task.

      My wish would be that at your first interview with Mr. Seward you should not take my despatch with you, but should prepare him for it, and ask him to settle with the President and his Cabinet what course they would propose.

      The next time you should bring my despatch and read it to him fully.

      If he asks you what will be the consequence of his refusing compliance I think you should say that you wish to leave him and the President quite free to take their own course, and that you desire to abstain from anything like menace. I think the disposition of the Cabinet is to accept the liberation of the captive commissioners and to be rather easy about the apology: that is to say if the Commissioners are delivered to you and allowed to embark in a packet for England, and an apology or explanation is sent through Mr. Adams that might be taken as a substantial compliance. But if the Commissioners are not liberated, no apology will suffice.

      M. Thouvenel promises to send off a despatch on Thursday next giving our cause moral support, so that you may as well keep the despatch itself a day or two before you produce it, provided you ask at once for an interview with Seward.

      The feeling here is very quiet but very decided. There is no party about it: all are unanimous.

      The best thing would be if Seward could be turned out, and a rational man put in his place. I hear it said that the Americans will not fight, but we must not count upon that.

      I have every reliance that you will discharge your task in the temper of firmness and calmness which befits a British representative.

      Mr. Hammond, the permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, whose judgment was in after years shown to be far from infallible, expressed the opinion that Messrs. Mason and Slidell would be immediately executed, so that there might be an answer ready whenever their release was demanded. A warship was ordered to proceed from Halifax to New York to receive the members of the Legation in case an unfavourable reply should be received from the American Government.

      On December 7, Lord Russell wrote again privately to Lord Lyons.

      * * * * *

      Foreign Office, Dec. 7, 1861.

      I have been going over in my mind the possible evasive answers of Mr. Seward, falling short of substantial compliance with our demands, in order to give you some contingent instructions.

      But the result is that I fear I should embarrass you more by such a course, than by leaving you to the exercise of your own excellent judgment.

      What we want is a plain Yes, or a plain No to our very simple demands, and we want that plain Yes or No within seven days of the communication of the despatch.

      The devices for avoiding the plain course are endless, and the ingenuity of American lawyers will seek perhaps to entangle you in endless arguments on Vattel, Wheaton and Scott.

      Here are two plain answers. If the Trent had been brought into Boston harbour, the Prize Court must have condemned the captors to pay costs for illegal detention. This, at least, is our opinion.

      But Captain Wilkes superseded the authority of the Courts instituted and recognized by the Law of Nations. Seeing that there was no chance that any Court of Justice, or any law could justify the capture of the four Americans, Captain Wilkes has set aside all Courts of Justice and all law, and has taken into his own hands, by virtue of his cannons and cutlasses, the solution of a question which demanded if raised at all, a regular, a solemn and a legal decision.

      These are the grounds therefore upon which our demands are based and upon which they should be urged.

      P.S.—I have just received your letter of the 22nd. If you receive the Confederate prisoners under the protection of the British flag, we shall be satisfied. But if that is not to be obtained, you will only have to obey your instructions and withdraw.

      Mr. Hammond, a very unfortunate prophet, predicted that 'the Americans will never give way. The humiliation will be too great, and after all their boastings against Europe, they will scarcely be satisfied to yield to the common reprobation with which the act has been received. We hear, too, that the President himself is most determined against concession, having rejected peremptorily General McClellan's conciliatory advice.' It must be admitted, however, that if Mr. Hammond was wrong, plenty of other people shared his views on both sides of the Atlantic.

      Lord Russell's despatch having arrived at Washington late at night on December 18, Lord Lyons called upon Mr. Seward on the 19th, and acquainted him with its general tenour. Mr. Seward received the communication seriously and with dignity, nor did he manifest any dissatisfaction. At the conclusion of the interview, he asked to be given the following day for consideration, and also for communication with the President. He thought that on the 21st he would be able to express an opinion upon the communication, and in the meanwhile expressed his gratification at the friendly and conciliatory manner in which it had been made by the British Representative.

      * * * * *

      Lord Lyons to Lord Russell.

       Washington, Dec. 19, 1861.

      Before I left Mr. Seward he said that there was one question which he would put to me 'informally,' but which it was most important that I should answer. Was any time fixed by my instructions within which the U.S. Government must reply? I told him that I did not like to answer the question; that what of all things I wished to avoid was the slightest appearance of a menace. He said I need not fear that; he only wished me to tell him privately and confidentially. I said that on that understanding, I would tell him that the term was seven days. He then said that much time would be lost if I did not let him have a copy of your despatch 'unofficially and informally'; that so much depended upon the wording of it, that it was impossible to come to a decision without reading it. I told him that the only difficulty I had about giving it to him at once officially was that the seven days would at once begin to run. He said that was very true, but I might let him have it on the understanding that no one but himself and the President should know that I had done so. I was very glad to let him have it on these terms. It will give time for the Packet (which is indeed already due) to arrive with M. Thouvenel's Despatch to M. Mercier, and in the meantime give Mr. Seward who is now on the peace side of the Cabinet time to work with the President before the affair comes before the Cabinet itself. I sent the Despatch to him in an envelope marked 'Private and Confidential.' Almost immediately afterwards he came here. He told me he was pleased to find that the Despatch was courteous and friendly, and not dictatorial or menacing. There was however one question more which he must ask me, without an answer to which he could not act, but at the same time he must have the answer only in strict confidence between himself and me. I had told him in confidence that I was to wait seven days for an answer on the subject of the redress we required. Supposing he was within the seven days to send me a refusal, or a proposal to discuss the question? I told him that my instructions were positive and left me no discretion. If the answer was not satisfactory, and particularly if it did not include the immediate surrender of the Prisoners, I could not accept it.

      I was not sorry to tell him this in the way I did. I avoided СКАЧАТЬ