Lord Lyons (Vol. 1&2). Thomas Wodehouse Legh Newton
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Название: Lord Lyons (Vol. 1&2)

Автор: Thomas Wodehouse Legh Newton

Издательство: Bookwire

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СКАЧАТЬ other difficulties in the way of making your communication to the Southern Consuls, is that of getting it safely to them. All regular communication with the South is cut off. I suppose the Government here would give either M. Mercier or me a Pass for a special Messenger if we asked for one—but it may be desirable to afford as little evidence as possible of our being connected with the communication. The Southern Government will no doubt do all in their power to give importance and publicity to the communication. This Government will very probably withdraw the Exequaturs of the Consuls who make it. The withdrawal would not be altogether free from inconvenience to us, as it would interfere with the Consuls' holding intercourse with the Blockading Squadrons, which it is sometimes of importance that they should be able to do.

      I think the English and French Governments will find it necessary to make the Cabinet of Washington clearly understand that they must and will hold unofficial communication with the Southern Government on matters concerning the interests of their subjects. The announcement should if possible be made collectively, and in such a form as to preclude the Cabinet's pretending to find a difference between the conduct of France and England. The Government of the U.S. can perform none of the duties of a Government towards Foreigners in the Seceded States; and it is a preposterous pretension to insist upon excluding Foreign Governments from intercourse with the authorities however illegitimate, to whom their Subjects must in fact look for protection.

      The inactivity of the Troops on both sides would be satisfactory, if one could hope that there was still any chance of the question's being solved without any serious fighting. As it is, one would be glad that something should be done as soon as possible to enable an opinion to be formed on the relative strength and spirit of the Armies. I believe that the real secret is that from want of training in the men, and total lack of waggons, horses and other means of transport, neither Government can move troops in any considerable numbers except by railroad. I can see as yet no signs of the spirit of conquest in the North flagging, or of the South losing courage. The Financial Difficulty will be the great one on both sides. The Southern men are said to serve without pay—but this Government has fixed the pay of the volunteers and militiamen at the same rate as that of the regular army, eleven dollars (about 45 shillings) a month, for a private, in addition to clothes and rations.

      I must do the little I can to influence the Senators and Representatives when they come up next month; but there is only too much reason to fear that fierceness against England will be popular, and that the Legislators will vie with each other in manifesting it. What I think they are most likely to do is to give the President authority to declare war with us, without waiting for the sanction of Congress.

      * * * * *

      Since I wrote what precedes I have been informed privately that in Mr. Dayton's Report of his audience of the Emperor, there is a rather ambiguous phrase put into the Emperor's mouth, respecting His Majesty's desire to contribute to put an end to the dispute between North and South. My informant says that the President and Mr. Seward really interpret the phrase as signifying that the Emperor would be willing to assist the North to subdue the South—and that it is from this supposition that Mr. Seward does not send M. Mercier back the 'Exposition' and enter into the discussion about neutral Rights. Mr. Seward is naturally puzzled by the apparent discrepancy between the Emperor's language and that of His Majesty's Minister here. The men in the State Department who are accustomed to business look, it seems, upon the Emperor's words, even as reported by Mr. Dayton, as no more than a vague assurance of goodwill, pointing to mediation rather than to anything else. I will endeavour to get M. Mercier to set the President and Mr. Seward right as soon as possible, for the delusion is a very dangerous one for England, and a much more dangerous one for the U.S.

      The ill-feeling towards England continued to grow worse as time went on, and apparently was due largely to sentiment. The success of the South in founding a practically independent government was so galling to the North that anything which implied the admission of a self-evident fact, such as the recognition of the Southern States as belligerents, was inexpressibly galling. Fortunately, England and France were acting in unison, and even Mr. Seward's ingenuity was unable to show that there was any difference between the attitude of the two countries. Writing on June 24, Lord Lyons reported that he had discovered that Mr. Seward had prepared a despatch which was all but a direct announcement of war, and that it was only the intervention of the President and of the more reasonable members of the Cabinet which prevented its being sent to the American Minister in London. The great qualities of President Lincoln, by the way, do not appear to have been recognized at this early period, for competent judges pronounced that although well-meaning and conscientious, he gave no proof of possessing any natural talents to compensate for his ignorance of everything but Illinois village politics.

      Towards the end of July the military inactivity, due to causes mentioned earlier, came to an end, and the historic fight of Bull's Run took place on the 21st.

      * * * * *

      Lord Lyons to Lord Russell.

       Washington, July 22, 1861.

      It is too soon to form any speculations on the result of the defeat of yesterday. Neither General Scott nor the Government had calculated on the possibility of anything like it, and as for the people of the North, they talked at all events as if the victory was already theirs. If the North have anything like the spirit to which they lay claim, they will rise with more resolution than ever to avenge the defeat. The test will be the conduct of the Militia Regiments. The three months' term of service of most of them has just expired: some had gone home and the rest were on the point of following—leaving the war to be carried on by the Volunteers and the Regular Army. If the Militia regiments remain and others come up, we may conclude that the warlike spirit of the North is unbroken. If they do not, there may be a chance of peace. For this battle will not facilitate recruiting for the army and the Volunteers—and unless the Capitalists are urged by patriotism or squeezed by mob pressure, the loans will fail and the money to pay the Volunteers will not be forthcoming.

      I am myself inclined to hope that Congress may show some dignity and good sense. The general opinion is that it will be violent and childish—vote men and money on paper by millions—slay its Southern enemies by treason bills—and ruin them by confiscation acts—decree the immediate and unconditional abolition of slavery in the Southern States—the closing of the Ports, and what not.

      Amongst other results of Bull's Run was the production of the following minute by Lord Palmerston. If his judgment on the temper of the North was completely wrong, his other observations might be profitably studied by the numerous persons in this country who hold the view that efficient military forces can be improvised whenever an emergency arises.

      * * * * *

      Minute of Lord Palmerston.

       Aug. 15, 1861.

      The defeat at Bull's Run or rather at Yankee's Run proves two things. First, that to bring together many thousand men and put uniforms upon their backs and muskets in their hands is not to make an army: discipline, experienced officers and confidence in the steadiness of their comrades are necessary to make an army fight and stand: secondly, that the Unionist cause is not in the hearts of the mass of the population of the North. The Americans are not cowards: individually they are as reckless of their own lives as of the lives of others: ..., and it is not easy to believe that if they had felt they were fighting for a great national interest they would have run away as they did from the battle, or that whole regiments would have quietly marched away home just before the fight was to begin. The Truth is, the North are fighting for an Idea chiefly entertained by professional politicians, while the South are fighting for what they consider rightly or wrongly vital interests.

      The defects and weaknesses disclosed by this defeat produced much contemptuous criticism upon the military inefficiency СКАЧАТЬ