Talmud. Various Authors

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Abayi said: From all that was said above it is certain to me that the hand of a man (standing on the street) is not treated as public ground. 2 And I also see that (if a man stands on private ground) his hand is not to be treated as private ground. Would it be correct, then, to regard the hand as unclaimed ground? If so, would the penalty imposed by the rabbis in such a case, namely, that one should not move his hand (containing a movable thing) back (during the Sabbath day), apply in this case or not?

      Come and hear the following Boraitha: If a man has his hand filled with fruit and he extends it outside (of the premises where he stands), one said he is not permitted to draw it back, and another Boraitha says he is allowed to do so. May we not assume that this is their point of dispute: the former holds that the hand is treated as unclaimed ground, and the latter thinks that it is not like unclaimed ground? Nay, it may be that both agree that the hand (as spoken of in our Mishna) is like unclaimed ground, and yet it presents no difficulty. One of the Boraithas treats of a man who had extended his hand unintentionally, and the other one treats of a man who had put forth his hand intentionally. In the former case the rabbis did not fine him, and in the latter case they did. And if you wish, it may be said that they both speak of a case when the act was done unintentionally, and their point of differing is as to the varying premises, whether the hand may be drawn back to the ground where the man stands, or to other (private) ground that adjoins it? As Rabha questioned R. Na'hman: If the hand of a man was filled with fruit, and he extended it outside, may he draw it back to the same ground where he stands? And he answered: He may. (And may he remove his hand) to other (private) ground? Nay. And to the question, "What is the distinction?" he said: If thou wilt measure a whole kur of salt and present me with it, I shall tell thee the answer. (See footnote, Erubin, p. 79.) In the former case his design was not accomplished; in the latter, however, his design was accomplished (and it is prohibited for fear that it should be repeated).

      R. Bibi bar Abayi questioned: If one has put bread into the oven, is he allowed to take it out before (it is baked and) he becomes liable to bring a sin-offering, or not?

Said R. A'ha bar Abayi to Rabhina: What does the questioner mean? Unintentionally and without remembering (that it is Sabbath), then what does the expression "allowed" mean? To whom? He is still not aware of it. On the other hand, if he did it unintentionally and afterward he remembered of the Sabbath, how can he be liable to a sin-offering; did not a Mishna state that the liability to bring such a sacrifice applies only when the failing was begun and accomplished unintentionally? Should it be understood that the act was done intentionally, then it would not involve the liability of a sin-offering, but it would constitute a crime that involved capital punishment. 1

      Said R. Ashi: Say, then, it is a crime that involves capital punishment. R. A'ha, the son of Rabha, taught so plainly. R. Bibi bar Abayi said: If one put bread into the oven, he is allowed to take it out before it may involve a case of capital punishment.

      "The mendicant extended his hand," etc. Why is he culpable? (To complete the act) there must be a transfer from a place that is four ells square and a depositing into a place of the same area, and such was not the case here. Said Rabba: Our Mishna is in accordance with R. Aqiba's opinion, who holds that as soon as the air of a place surrounds a thing it is equal to the thing being deposited in that place. But may it not be that depositing does not require four ells, for the reason stated above, but removing does? Said R. Joseph: The teaching of this paragraph agrees (not with the opinion of R. Aqiba), but with that of Rabbi, as we have learned in the following Boraitha:

      If one threw an object from one street into the other, and there was a private ground between them, Rabbi declared him culpable, and the sages freed him. Hereupon R. Jehudah in the name of Samuel said: Rabbi declared the man guilty of two offences: one for having removed the thing from its place, and one for having deposited it in another place. Hence in both, the four ells in question are not required.

      But with reference to this it was taught that both Rabh and Samuel said that Rabbi's declaration of culpability treated of a case where the private ground (that divided the two streets) was roofed, for the assumption is that a house must be regarded as a solid object that fills out all the space it occupies, but not when it was unroofed?

      Therefore said Rabha: (All these views can be dispensed with, as) the hand of a man (because of its value) is considered as a piece of ground four ells square. And so, also, was declared by Rabin, when he came from Palestine, in the name of R. Johanan.

      R. Abhin in the name of R. Ila'a, quoting R. Johanan, said: If one threw a thing and it rested in the hands of another man, he is culpable.

      Why the repetition--has not R. Johanan declared above, already, that the hand of a man is considered as a space of four ells square? Lest one say that this is only when he intended to put it into his hand (and the intention makes it valuable as the space in question), but not otherwise. Therefore the repetition.

      The same said again in the name of the same authority: If one remains standing in his place when he receives a thing, he is culpable; but if he was moving away from his place when he received it, he is free. And so also we have learned in a Boraitha in the name of the anonymous teachers.

      R. Johanan asked the following question: If one threw a thing and then moved from his place and caught it, is he culpable or not? How is this question to be understood? Said R. Ada bar Ah'bah: The difficulty is concerning the exercise of two forces by one man, and the question was thus: If two forces were exercised by one man (in committing a prohibited act), should both parts of the act be accounted to the same, so that he should be declared culpable, or should each part of the act be considered separately, as if there were two individuals concerned, and then he is free? This question is not decided.

      R. Abhin in the name of R. Johanan said: If one put his hand into the yard of his neighbor, got it full of rain water, and withdrew it, he is guilty. But to make one guilty of the act, it must consist of removing a thing from a place of four ells square, which is not the case here. Said R. Hyya b. R. Huna: It means that he took the water as it was running down a slanting wall, as Rabba taught elsewhere that removing a thing from a slanting wall made the man culpable. But (in speaking of removing an object from a slanting wall) Rabba treated on the question of removing a book, which is a stationary thing. Is it analogous to removing water that can never become stationary?

      Therefore said Rabha: Our case treats when he dipped the water out of a cavity (in the wall) in question. Is not this self-evident?

      Lest one say that water standing upon water is not considered stationary,, he comes to teach us that it is. And this is in accordance with his theory, as follows: Water standing upon water is considered stationary; a nut, however, lying upon the surface of water is not considered so.

      The same said again, in the name of the same authorities: One who was laden with eatables and beverages, entering and going out the whole day, he is not culpable until he rests. Said Abayi: And even then only if he stops for the purpose of resting; but not when he stops merely to adjust his burden on his shoulders. Whence is this deduced? From what the master said: "he stopped within the limit of four ells to rest he is free, but if he stopped to adjust the load on his shoulders he is culpable. Beyond four ells, if he stopped to rest he is culpable, but if he stopped to adjust the burden on his shoulder he is not culpable. What does this imply? It implies that one cannot be culpable unless his intention of removing was before he stopped.

      The rabbis taught: If one takes anything from his store into the market through the alley-way (where the benches of market-men are situated), he is culpable; it makes no difference whether he carries, throws, or pushes it with his arm. Ben Azai, however, said: If he carries it in or out he is not culpable, but if he СКАЧАТЬ