Название: Changing European Visions of Disaster and Development
Автор: Vanessa Pupavac
Издательство: Ingram
Жанр: Зарубежная публицистика
Серия: Studies in Social and Global Justice
isbn: 9781538144947
isbn:
Chapter 3, ‘Faustian Work and “The Hope of the Poor”’, considers the Dutch struggles against sea and empire, which so inspired Goethe and other Europeans. The dual struggles caught the imagination of Europeans politically and culturally, including Goethe, whose drama Egmont dramatised the Dutch revolt, and whose poem Faust celebrated hydro-engineering in Faust’s great reclamation project. The sixteenth-century Dutch engineer Andries Vierlingh described his building of sea defences and land reclamation as the ‘The Hope of the Poor’. Dutch hydro-engineering has inspired international thinking on dam building and flood prevention. The first part of the chapter discusses European cultural recognition of Dutch hydro-engineering and how pioneering Dutch engineering was matched by the Dutch political struggle against the Habsburg empire in the early modern period, and their pioneering philosophical and republican ideas. Goethe’s drama Egmont was written in the 1780s at a time when Dutch radicals were seeking national republican renewal against oligarchical rule and a sense of national decline. The second part of the chapter discusses the Zuyder Zee project completed in 1932, hailed as one of the wonders of the modern industrial work. The Zuyder Zee, and related post-war Delta works completed in the wake of the 1953 North Sea floods, represented the culmination of the Dutch Faustian struggle with the sea and modern hopes for disaster eradication, anticipated in Goethe’s ‘incommensurate’ Faust.
Chapter 4, on Faust the Developer, discusses the rise and fall of international development ideals through the iconic post-war development texts, Walt Rostow’s The Stages of Economic Growth and E. F. Schumacher’s Small Is Beautiful. The Stages of Economic Growth proposed full industrial development would enhance people’s lives and freedom, while Small Is Beautiful argued large-scale industrial development was incompatible with an economics where people mattered (Schumacher 1974). The chapter then discusses the philosopher Marshall Berman’s exploration of Faust’s failings as the Developer, and the political theorist Hannah Arendt’s warnings against taking natural disasters or natural processes as the model for politics. Critically the suppression of political freedom distorted national development and led industrialisation to sacrifice many citizens as epitomised in the Soviet Union. Such historical experiences encouraged influential European intellectual strands to reject industrial modernity as creating a disastrous world. Humanity increasingly came to be seen as the cause of disasters, and reining in human activity was considered to be the solution. Abandoning industrialisation in European international development models had important international political implications for economically weaker states and regions. Adopting non-industrial sustainable development strategies implied perpetuating north-south and east-west inequalities between states and within states. The crises of international development, humanitarianism, and statebuilding are leading to migration replacing other strategies as people abandon hope of changing their country and international policy-making is redefining migration as a form of sustainable development.
Chapter 5, ‘Nikola Tesla’s Faustian Dream’, discusses the rise and fall of the industrial development of twentieth-century Yugoslavia and twenty-first-century Croatia, and how their development path parallels the rise and fall of dam building in European and international development. Its starting point is the American inventor Nikola Tesla, who was born in the military frontier of Habsburg empire in what is now Croatia. Goethe inspired Tesla’s engineering and design of one of the first hydroelectric power plants in the world. The industrial development of post-war federal socialist Yugoslavia linked national self-determination and industrial development, including ambitious hydroelectric engineering inspired by Tesla. Its workers’ self-management system managed to avoid some of the worst problems of industrialisation experienced in either the Western or the Soviet blocs, and Yugoslavia became the only European country in the Non-Aligned Movement. NAM ties encouraged Yugoslav engineering work abroad, including Kariba dam in Zambia. However, its democratic weaknesses eroded its capacity to reform in the more adverse international political and economic conditions of the 1980s. Its legitimacy as a state disintegrated, and conflict broke out. Secession of its republics gained international support with the ending of the Cold War settlement. The statehood of the republics was recognised, but their national development has been circumscribed by the lack of industrial development strategies, which reflects a European-wide outlook. European turning away from Faustian industrial development is captured in its transnational environmental advocacy condemning large dam building. The World Commission on Dams in its 2000 report confirmed the shift of international development goals away from big dam building and large-scale hydro-engineering as sea defences for flood prevention or as energy provision. The demise of its old industries and slowdown of new industrial projects in Croatia illustrates Europe’s rejection of Tesla’s Faustian engineering dreams.
Chapter 6, ‘The Metamorphosis of Risk Cosmopolitanism’, discusses political catastrophism and the anti-Faustian ideas underlying European governance which believes that national self-determination and industrial development are no longer tenable. Instead its resilience models converge environmental and liberal thinking on complexity and complex adaptive systems, managing how populations function in insecure changing environments. This convergence is evident in the writings of the sociologist Ulrich Beck and the economist Friedrich Hayek. Beck’s risk cosmopolitanism was shaped by environmental concerns and advocated the precautionary principle being adopted in European decision-making to prevent environmental harm. He was critical of industrial growth strategies and utilitarian economic models. Ideologically his risk cosmopolitanism opposed Hayek’s free market economics. Nevertheless, both were sceptical of collective human agency embodied in the nation state and adopted ecological systems thinking. Thus ecologism may reconcile the neoliberal shift from national industrial strategies, leaving national infrastructure to market forces. Collective retreat is manifest in the move away from large-scale sea defences to eradicate floods to non-structural flood management and the return of reclaimed land to the sea. Resilience governance deserts the Faustian dream of political and material freedom. Instead malicious demons dictate a misanthropic outlook seeking to circumscribe human activity and secure nature against humanity. We are left with what the academic and former aid worker Mark Duffield has termed ‘post-humanitarianism’, a vision where populations find themselves living in the ruins of modern hopes and expected to live with disasters (Duffield 2018).
Chapter 7, ‘Submerging Humanity and Rewilding Tesla’s Homeland’, concerns scientism, and the demise of European humanism, and its influence on ecological rewilding models in Croatia. The twentieth-century Croatian writer Miroslav Krleža saw the experience of Dutch nation building as prefiguring the challenges faced by the Balkan nations in the twentieth century. The modern nation builders of his generation did not share the same antipathy towards modern industrialisation or romantic view of living in pre-modern conditions displayed by many western European intellectuals. These national leaders believed in harnessing nature to humanity’s needs. They were inspired by Tesla’s Faustian dreams of engineering the future. For they loathed their country’s marginal existence. They wanted to escape the condition of being European borderlands and become free peoples and countries. Yet what was the direction of modern politics, science, and development? Goethe’s Faust loomed over the physicists developing atomic science, even before the dropping of the atomic bomb. Tesla sought solutions in science against politics but was wary of the new physics because of its potential to shatter the world. Conversely the Yugoslav political leader-turned-dissident Milovan Djilas supported industrial development and was open to the new physics but opposed scientism or scientific dogmatism as undermining both political freedom and scientific endeavour. Djilas’ concerns over scientism did not lead him to reject modern scientific and industrial development, not least because he came from a family whose historical fate was the insecure subsistence farming and banditry of the European borderlands. Djilas’ concerns over scientism are relevant to European governance, which affirms science in ways elevating nature over humanity. Europe’s rejection of a humanist Faustian spirit is epitomised by its rewilding movement wanting to create new wildernesses free from humans. Rewilding СКАЧАТЬ