Finding Jesus in the Storm. John Swinton
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Название: Finding Jesus in the Storm

Автор: John Swinton

Издательство: Ingram

Жанр: Религия: прочее

Серия:

isbn: 9780334059769

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СКАЧАТЬ some problem, though they are really addressing different problems or different aspects, interpretations, or readings of the problem. For when a theory talks about a phenomenon, it inevitably does so in terms of its own representation of it. The phenomenon gets incorporated into the theory in a particular way, structured by a definite set of assumptions and presuppositions about its nature. This makes it very important that we recognize those presuppositions and discover how the theory has represented a particular object of explanation.38

      For current purposes, it is important that we recognize the kinds of presuppositions that lie behind reductive biological explanations of mental health challenges and the dangers of uncritically accepting such explanations.

       “Mental Illness” Is Not like Measles

      The ascription of biological explanations has also been used in an attempt to destigmatize the experiences of people living with mental health challenges. The suggestion that the causes of such challenges are similar to the causes of physical illnesses such as cancer, diabetes, and influenza is intended to reduce the stigma that surrounds mental disorders. The compassion behind this approach is clear, and the sentiment is laudable. The problem is, it doesn’t seem to work.

      In his book How to Become a Schizophrenic, John Modrow, a psychiatrist who lives with schizophrenia, offers a powerful insider’s critique of biological explanations and points out a hidden danger:

      The point is not that biology may not be formative of mental challenges. We do not yet have the evidence to make such a case across the board, but in time it may emerge. The problem is that biological explanations on their own can be highly reductive, closing down aspects of our experiences and forcing us to interpret them in a very narrow and confined way. In the end, such attempts at destigmatizing “the mental” actually end up reinforcing the idea that there is a problem with that aspect of our humanness, rather than addressing the key issue—that there is no need to stigmatize issues of the mind dualistically. A psychological description is no different from a biological one; it simply addresses different aspects of our humanness—shifting the problem from the mind to the body is nothing more than another manifestation of Cartesian dualism. The unhealthy and inauthentic anthropology that underpins this way of thinking remains fully intact. Biological descriptions are simply too thin to do the work of realigning and clarifying that is necessary for the tasks of destigmatizing and healing.

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