New England Dogmatics. Maltby Geltson

Чтение книги онлайн.

СКАЧАТЬ to provide an atonement for sinners?

      Question 158 [207]. Did Christ redeemed all men alike, elect and non-elect?

      Question 171. [233]. Did Christ suffer and die in the stead as well as for the benefit of his people?

      Question 172. [234]. Could he have made atonement without suffering in stead of his people?

      Question 173 [235]. Did Christ pay the debt for the elect, so that they can claim salvation on the foot of justice?

      Question 174 [236]. Where the sufferings of Christ to the purpose of supporting the divine law equivalent to the endless torments of the sinner?

      Question 175 [238]. Do the sufferings and obedience of Christ proved to the divine law to be a just law?

      Let us take each question and answer in turn, offer some brief commentary, after which we will conclude with a series of implications from our findings along with some suggestions for further research. Gelston asks, in Question 152, “Why was a satisfaction or atonement necessary to the dispensation of pardon?” His response is as follows:

      Answer 152. In order to the dispensation of pardon and atonement, satisfaction is necessary because without this the law and the moral government of God must fall into contempt. If a law be made, and the penalty be not executed when broken, it is of no more consequence than if no penalty had been annexed. Indeed, the law is of no mere importance than mere advice in the view of all rational beings. It would be more contemptible than advice. For, it pretends to something which is not supported. Not only the law, but the character of the lawgiver must fall equally into contempt. This is the case in human governments, and this would be the case in the divine. If the honor of the law be not supported by a proper execution of its threatenings, the moral government of God would be subject to constant disorder and confusion. In this case, the rebellious may go on with impunity and with increasing wickedness. Nor would there be anything to deter others from the like. In this way, infinite mischief may be produced and be forever experienced without any diminution or relief.

      Either, therefore, the full penalty of the law must be executed or some atonement must be made which, in support of the divine law and government, will answer the like purposes with an infliction of the punishment. No pardon of consequences can be obtained without an atonement or satisfaction which is equivalent to the full demands of the law.

      There are several points worth highlighting here. Clearly Gelston is committed, like his mentor, Dr. Edwards, to the idea of the necessity of atonement. Notice also that Gelston frames the problem of the moral law’s demands in the context of divine honor. It interesting that he links these demands so intimately with the demands of the lawgiver. “If the honor of the law be not supported by a proper execution of its threatenings, the moral government of God would be subject to constant disorder and confusion.” This is quite a telling statement. For, either a payment must be rendered or atonement—a suitably equivalent payment—supporting the divine law and government be made. That said, it not altogether clear from Gelston’s answer what mechanism is explicitly at work in atoning for human sin. His use of the term “equivalent”—reminiscent of penal non-substitution—might be a clue. That he says, “Either, therefore, the full penalty of the law must be executed or some atonement must be made” is confirming of the same. However, notice the subtle distinction of the either-or clauses at play here. Gelston seems to be affirming that Christ’s atoning work assumes that Christ never actually paid the penalty of the law. In other words, his “suitably equivalent” payment is a sacrifice of a non-penal substitution, which is yet something new altogether. That said, his thinking of sin as an offense against the moral and God pulls in a different direction.

      In question 153, Gelston considers “why was a satisfaction or atonement so great as that of Christ necessary to the dispensation of pardon?” His answer is as follows,

      (Answer 153) The evil of sin is infinite, and in its nature and consequences tends to produce infinite mischief in the moral government of God. No atonement, therefore, could wipe off this evil, but that which is also infinite. The sinner would make no atonement by repentance and reformation, for they are already do. He cannot suffer a punishment of the temporary kind which will be adequate to the crime; for it would be but finite. Nor could any creature, however great, atone: because what ever he should suffer would still be finite. It is allowed, however, that a creature more excellent than man might have made an atonement proportionally greater. But to render an atonement completely adequate, the person must be infinite in dignity and excellence, or suffer and infinite evil fully equal to the sins of those for whom he makes atonement. Hence, it was that an atonement so great as that of Christ was necessary.

      Gelston makes the case for explicit support of the doctrine of the necessity for atonement, something made much of in Crisp’s analysis of Edwards Jr. He writes, “The evil of sin is infinite, and in its nature and consequences tends to produce infinite mischief in the moral government of God. No atonement, therefore, could wipe off this evil, but that which is also infinite. The sinner would make no atonement by repentance and reformation, for they are already do.” Gelston goes on to make clear that a divine person is necessary to make atonement. Gelston’s emphasis on the necessity of the atonement represents a token of the Anselmian tradition (which echoes the non-penal substitution found in the final part of his response in the previous question), and yet still does not commit Gelston to either a view of penal substitution or non-substitution.72

      In question 155, Gelston pushes further toward this distinction when he asks, “In what sense did he satisfy divine justice by his sacrifice?” What he says about how the atonement is answerable to divine justice and for whom it is answerable will reveal a great deal about Gelston’s theological commitment. He argues,

      (Answer 155) Christ so completely answered the demands of the law as that, the believer may be saved from the curse of it, and yet the honor of the law and the dignity and authority of the divine government be fully supported. The penalty of the law, however, may still be executed to the full extent upon the finally impenitent. Justice therefore, has received no satisfaction with respect to them. And indeed, the believer, were it not for the constitution and promises of God might, notwithstanding all Christ has done and suffered, experience the full punishment due to his sins. The believer, therefore, would not demand a release from punishment, as a debtor might demand a release from his debt when a third person had paid for him the full demand of his creditor. Justice, therefore, is not satisfied with respect to the believer as it is with respect to the debtor. God was under no obligation from justice to accept the atonement which Christ has made: and if he actually does except of it, it must be from sovereign mercy and free grace.

      There are several important observations that might be made here. First, notice that Gelston appears to think Christ’s work solves a problem related to the law that entails a solution to problem of offenses against God himself; something we will see again in his answer to question 175. Second, notice that the solution to the problem is not collective, that is, not for all humanity. “Did Christ redeem all men alike, elect and non-elect?” His answer is quite telling, pushing directly against Crisp’s suggestion that hypothetical universalism was a doctrine that developed amongst the New England theologians. While it may have developed so for Bellamy, but perhaps not for Gelston. He argues that “[t]he believer, therefore, would not demand a release from punishment, as a debtor might demand a release from his debt when a third person had paid for him the full demand of his creditor. Justice, therefore, is not satisfied with respect to the believer as it is with respect to the debtor.” In other words, the work Christ was somehow in Gelston’s mind accomplished only for the elect. With his repeated reference to “believers,” this suggests a substitutionary act on the part of Christ, which again hints in the direction of his subscription to something like a doctrine of penal substitution.

      Next, in Question 156, Gelston considers whether God was “under an obligation of justice to provide an atonement for sinners?” СКАЧАТЬ