New England Dogmatics. Maltby Geltson

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СКАЧАТЬ The problem, as we have suggested before, is that Christ cannot perform both works. He cannot suffer as a penal substitute and a non-penal substitute. So, the question for us then is whether Edwards’ commitments to the rectoral demands of divine justice are at odds with his commitment to the role of retributive justice issued by penal substitution. Our answer is yes, they are at odds, and they are in no less than two important ways.

      First, because Edwards construes sin as both a private offense against God for which humanity is liable to pay a debt of honor and as a private offense against God for which humanity is liable to pay a debt of punishment (which as we have seen previously is itself something of a contradiction, that is, if we understand a debt of punishment to be a public or societal offense)—both acts of which cannot be done simultaneously by a penal and non-penal substitute. In other words, Christ cannot absorb divine wrath for sin as a penal substitute, when he is at the same time (collectively) deferring or delaying that wrath until the consummation by making reparations on behalf of all humanity. The second way they are at odds, is because Edwards construes the nature of Christ’s substitutionary work in what we might call “personal” and then “meritorious” terms. By personal substitution, we mean the substitutionary work he performs by “standing in,” as it were, for individual persons upon whom are the retributive demands of God justice. By meritorious substitution, we mean the substitutionary work he performs by accumulating the reparative merit of honor that offsets the infinite demerit of sin. For, because God is infinitely holy, sins against God accrue an infinite demerit, as it were, that requires some infinite merit to offset.69 It seems to that, at least with respect to the mechanism of the atonement, these are not complimentary accounts of substitution so much as competing ones. For, no honor is restored to God by his meeting out retribution against the Son—paying a debt of punishment does not necessarily pay a debt of honor. In these two ways at least, there is a tension in Edwards’ account of Christ’s atoning work. Against this detailed backdrop, let us consider some Edwards Jr’s thinking on the matter.

      Of the variety of theological writings that offer some additionally detailed insight into the development of his father’s legacy regarding the atonement, there are two works in particular that shed some light on Edwards Jr’s thoughts about the work of Christ. The first is his “Thoughts on the Atonement,”echoes of which appear in the second piece called “Remarks on the Improvements Made in Theology by His Father, President Edwards.” In both cases, the younger Edwards makes a number curious statements that point in the direction of his ascent to something along the lines a penal substitution model atonement. What is interesting—what makes this evidence so curious—is that Edwards Jr has never been attributed with articulating anything but a so-called penal non-substitution model of atonement, where (roughly) the work Christ accomplishes is claimed to be that of a penal example—repairing the dishonor done to the moral law by humanity’s transgression(s) against it. The following two statements, each one represent a sort of core sample of ideas in which are resident both Dr. Edwards’ clear out-working of the penal non-substitution model and the presence of substitutionary language in keeping with his father. Dr Edwards writes,

      By atonement, I mean something done or suffered, which, to the purpose of supporting the honor and dignity of the divine law and government, shall be equivalent to the punishment of the sinner according to law. Therefore, the atonement made by Christ implies his substitution in the stead of the sinner, who is to be saved by him; or that he suffered that in the sinner’s stead, which as effectually tended to discourage, or prevent transgression, and excite to obedience, as the punishment of the transgressor himself, according to the letter of the law would have done.70

      In another place he maintains,

      The atonement is the substitute for the punishment threatened in the law; and was designed to answer the same ends of supporting the authority of the law, the dignity of the divine moral government, and the consistency of the divine conduct in legislation and execution. By the atonement it appears that God is determined that his law shall be supported; that it shall not be despised or transgressed with impunity; and that it is an evil and a bitter thing to sin against God. The very idea of an atonement or satisfaction for sin, is something which, to the purposes of supporting the authority of the divine law, the dignity and consistency of the divine government, is equivalent to the punishment of the sinner, according to the literal threatening of the law.71

      Clearly, from these statements, the idea of substitutionary atonement is part of the way Edwards Jr thinks about Christ’s work. Whether we can call this a full-blow doctrine of penal substitution remains to be seen. At most, we are left wondering just what Edwards Jr actually believes about the atonement, and specifically, how a substitutionary work plays into a non-substitutionary model of Christ’s work. It seems to us there are (at least) three possible answers. Consider that both the good Doctor was simply unconscious of the impact of the commitment they was making by trotting out such a claim—a case of category confusion. Given the relative precision of Edwards Jr’s account, this seems highly unlikely. If so, then perhaps he actually saw a theological way forward—a way that make the New England model of penal non-substitution unique to the rest of the moral government tradition—that we have yet to discover—a way that Christ can be both a substitute and a non-substitute that avoids what is an obvious logical contradiction. The most likely possibility, it seems to us, has to do with his construal of the nature of substitution. Notice that Dr. Edwards says nothing about Christ being a substitute for individuals. Notice also his emphasis on Christ’s substitutionary work as having a direct impact on the demands of the moral law, which, as we saw in the case of President Edwards is a public or societal matter—humanities offence is against the moral law, not God, strictly speaking. By implication, it looks like the solution (atonement) to the problem (transgression of the moral law) effects all humanity. How can this be? The answer may be that he augmented individual substitutionary atonement to some account of universal substitutionary atonement, in keeping with Crisp’s relatively recent suggestion that we ought to understand two things: First, the New England theologians were interested in doctrinal development and ought to be seen in this light (rather than some sort of doctrinal decline and fall, as has been the earlier trend). Second, their developments as it relates to the atonement tended toward expressions of some sort of hypothetical universalism, according to which Christ’s work extends in some sense to all persons—like we see here from Dr. Edwards. What then about the President Edwards? How do we make sense of the anomalous appearance of both substitutionary language, moral government language, and the oddities of his account of rectoral and retributive justice? Perhaps looking further down the historical road to Gelston will enable us to look back at Doctor and President Edwards with some greater clarity.

      II.4. Gelston on Atonement

      To this point we have challenged the idea that says that the moral government or penal non-substitution model of atonement was the atonement model of choice amongst the New England theologians from Dr. Edwards onward. Interestingly, our findings reveal that not only should we think of President Edwards’ account of the atonement as “thicker” than has hitherto been thought, but that we should also think of Dr. Edwards’ model of atonement as “thicker” than his most recent interpreter has made out. In what remains of this introduction, we aim to show that there is some data suggesting that Gelston himself inherited this otherwise odd, amalgamated tradition of holding to some aspect of both a penal and non-penal substitution model of atonement. To get at Gelston’s thinking about these matters, we have isolated the following list of atonement-specific questions and answers from his Systematic Collection:

      Question 152 [201]. Why was a satisfaction or atonement necessary to the dispensation of pardon?

      Question 153 [202]. Why was a satisfaction or atonement so great as that of Christ necessary to the dispensation of pardon?

      Question 154 [203]. In what consisted the essence of the atonement of Christ? In his obedience, or his sufferings, or in both?

      Question 155 [204]. In what sense did he satisfy divine justice by his sacrifice?

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