From Disarmament to Rearmament. Sheldon A. Goldberg

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СКАЧАТЬ Treaty. The point was further made that the sooner Germany was disarmed, the sooner the work of reconstruction could begin. The authors believed it would take two years after the war ended to complete the total disarmament of Germany and the destruction of its armaments industries.

      To ensure that the post–World War I scenario would not be repeated, the British proposed that eleven divisions of land forces, seven regiments of armored cars plus the necessary nondivisional units—a total of 310,000 personnel—supervise the first two years of the posthostilities period. To back this force up, twenty-eight air force squadrons, to include light and fighter-bombers as well as reconnaissance aircraft, would be needed.⁵ The assumptions made in the report show the level of distrust the British had for Germany, as well as British fears that a resurgent Germany would somehow find a way to circumvent the disarmament regime that would be imposed upon it.

      The British also believed that once the Allies entered Germany they would find a significant amount of civil disorder as well as large numbers of German troops who would need to be disarmed, hence the need for the large number of ground forces. The report also indicates that the presence of a large Allied air force as well as occasional mass formation flights would have a considerable effect on German morale by reminding the Germans that they had been defeated.⁶

      It was not until 1944, however, that the broader concepts of occupation began to be reflected in Allied planning. With the establishment of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) under General Dwight D. Eisenhower in January 1944, the disarmament and demilitarization issue became the responsibility of the deputy chief of staff for operations (G-3), Major General Harold R. Bull (US), and, following the cessation of hostilities, the deputy chief of staff for civil affairs (G-5, Civil Affairs Division), Lieutenant General A. E. Grasset (UK).⁷ What little direction SHAEF could get came from the US War Department, the British War Office, and the joint European Advisory Commission (EAC) established by the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in October 1943.⁸ It was, however, in the posthostilities subcommittee under Colonel Grazebrook, now part of SHAEF’s Operations Division (G-3), that many of the most important demilitarization staff studies and memoranda were developed.

      Among the various agencies responsible for formulating presurrender and postwar policy for Germany, those in Washington were slowest to recognize the need for postwar planning and most severely plagued by serious divisions and fundamental differences in outlook. The Working Security Committee (WSC), composed of war, navy, and state department representatives, was created in December 1943, but agreement on the function of the committee was never really reached. In addition, the perspectives of the state and war departments regarding the tasks to be performed by Allied military forces during the occupation were greatly at odds with one another and began long before the war in Europe ended. In fact, until 1948, the State Department maintained liaison with the War Department on German issues through an “Occupied Areas” office, as it did not have a German division.⁹

      As an example, when the EAC held its first meeting in January 1944, three months after it was formed, Ambassador John G. Winant, the US representative, had yet to receive any guidance from Washington concerning the main task of the meeting (i.e., preparing surrender terms for Germany). Furthermore, according to Winant’s biographer, the ambassador received only one policy directive with authoritative clearances between March and October 1944. During this period, Winant sent his political advisor, George F. Kennan, to Washington to seek guidance, to no avail, and in July 1944, Winant’s military advisor, Brigadier General Cornelius W. Wickersham, also personally appealed to the WSC for policy guidance with little apparent success. Washington’s failure to provide guidance was also felt by Eisenhower, who, following the entry of US combat forces into Germany in September 1944, urgently requested guidance from Washington regarding the control and occupation of Germany.¹⁰ The infighting within the WSC precluded any effective communication or coordination until early March 1944.¹¹

      It appears that the multiplicity of agencies, both military and civilian, in the United States and Great Britain made the posthostilities planning process thorough and extremely broad in its coverage, but also overly bureaucratic, cumbersome and, to some degree, duplicative. From the end of the war in Europe until the USSR walked out of the Allied Control Council (ACC) in 1948, the disarmament and demilitarization process was increasingly encumbered by political obstacles that left many tasks unresolved. Thus, as will be seen, it was left to SHAEF to formulate the plans that would permit Eisenhower to carry out the tasks required to disarm German soldiers, disband and demobilize Germany’s armed forces, dispose of German war matériel, and begin the process of demilitarizing Germany.

       Initial Thoughts on Disarming Germany

      In late November 1943, using the initial posthostilities plan Operation Rankin Case C,¹² COSSAC drafted an initial study that provided suggestions for the composition of the disarmament detachments that would supervise the process to be effected by the German High Command (Oberkommando des Heeres, or OKH). This was, of course, predicated on the belief that German troops remained subject to the discipline of the OKH. The proposed disarmament detachments were to be small and consist only of the personnel needed to communicate the orders of the Allied High Command and supervise their observance. A follow-up study highlighted several areas of concern, such as the guarding of dumps and the responsibility for disarming the German Air Force (Luftwaffe) and Navy (Kriegsmarine). It was also brought up that as the naval ports and facilities were on land, creating points of contact with land forces, they should not be the unilateral responsibility of the Admiralty.¹³

      On 23 December 1943, the first full draft of COSSAC’s disarmament study was forwarded to general staff officers (GSOs 1) for review. Its objective outlined the steps to be taken by the supreme commander to enforce disarmament of the German Army in his area of responsibility (AOR) between the time of the envisioned armistice and the transfer of responsibility to a disarmament commission. The scope of this paper covered German forces outside Germany, German forces in transit over the frontiers of Germany, and German forces in Germany. Contrary to the initial study, it stated that naval disarmament was an Admiralty responsibility and thus would not be considered in the paper.¹⁴

      The draft disarmament study also indicated that the posthostilities subcommittee was drafting a paper on the composition and functions of a European disarmament commission for consideration by the COSSAC and, upon approval by the British government, submission to the EAC. That said, the study postulated that the supreme commander, Allied Forces (SCAF) would be responsible for the complete disarmament of the German armed forces until the transfer of responsibility to the disarmament commission took place—a period expected to be approximately two months. It absolved the SCAF of any responsibility for the disbanding of the German armed forces or the dismantling and destruction of German fortifications and similar works.

      Among the several main considerations in this paper was the admonition that disarmament was to be immediate and that no German should be allowed to enter Germany bearing arms. Citing the circumstances that followed World War I, the paper stated that “after the last war it was possible for the Germans to pretend that the German Army had never been beaten in the field because it returned to Germany still bearing its arms. This is another mistake which must not be repeated.”¹⁵ It also reminded its readers that the German Army had been able to hinder the effectiveness of the Military Control Commission after the last war, which was why total disarmament needed to be carried out immediately after the armistice, without exceptions. By 1 January 1944, the second draft of this study had grown in size and detail, adding sections for action by the air commander in chief as well as ground and air force commanders.

      An unofficial assessment of this disarmament issue by the land forces subcommittee estimated that the British alone would need to provide 270 officers and 1,300 other ranks to man the necessary disarmament detachments, both fixed and mobile. Aside from the security of dumps, depots, and stores of war matériel, two key concerns were that it would prove difficult for Allied forces to enter Germany fast enough to ensure the rapid СКАЧАТЬ