From Disarmament to Rearmament. Sheldon A. Goldberg

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СКАЧАТЬ had “been able to spring up and persist in spite of the denials and in spite of all that is being done to the contrary.” Schuman concluded with a pledge, apparently given to him by Adenauer: “The Federal Government asserts its firm determination to maintain the demilitarization of the federal territory and to endeavor, by all means in its power, to prevent the reconstitution of armed forces of any nature whatsoever. To this effect the Federal Government will cooperate fully with the High commission and in the activity of the Military Security Board.”⁷⁸

      The US position was further muddled by Secretary of Defense Johnson and JCS Chairman Bradley, who, upon arriving in France for a NATO Defense Ministers meeting and despite initially emphasizing that the US had no intention of ever rearming Germany and that there was no hedging or dodging about the American position on that point, subsequently stated that German rearmament was not favored “at this time.”⁷⁹

      In November, Acheson went to Europe himself and met with Adenauer, then the new West German chancellor. During his discussions with Adenauer on 13 November, Acheson told him that from his talks in Paris, he felt that French public opinion was ready for cooperation with West Germany and that France’s premier, Robert Schuman, had the full backing of his cabinet regarding policy on Germany. As the discussion moved to the legal problems of ending the state of war with Germany, Adenauer stated that “[the German government] had no interest in the rearmament of the German nation. . . . It was just too dangerous to provide Germany with arms at this stage.”⁸⁰

      Several days later, Acheson was asked whether Adenauer had addressed the establishment of a small German army of five divisions as reported in the NewYork Times. The president was asked the same question at a press conference the following day. Both Acheson and President Truman emphatically denied that report, calling it one of several rumors on this issue.⁸¹

      Some members of Congress, however, appear to have felt differently. While in Berlin in late November, a four-man congressional study mission of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, led by Representative Joseph Pfeiffer (D-NY) and including representatives Jacob K. Javits (R-NY), Thomas S. Gordon (D-IL), and Clement J. Zablocki (D-WI), stated that they would recommend including West Germany in the Western Union. The group also advised against the early withdrawal of occupation forces, and Pfeiffer said that he was in favor of eventual German rearmament but within the context of a United States of Europe. Of the four representatives, only Javits stated his opposition to German rearmament “under any circumstances.” On their return, Javits said the mission’s report would “condemn rearmament whether of German soldiers to be used under German or Allied command.”⁸²

      In this atmosphere of ambiguity, speculation continued, and on 1 December, the French ambassador Henri Bonnet met with Acheson to state that the “persistent rumors” of German rearmament were upsetting public opinion in Europe and particularly in France. They were, he continued, interfering with the main task of integrating Germany into the European scene, as rearmament was not part of that integration. Acheson replied that the State Department would continue to do everything it could to stop the rumors. Several days later, the State Department transmitted a cable to certain American diplomatic officers telling them to respond to any possible queries regarding the November foreign ministers meeting in Paris that there were “no rpt no agreements, discussions or conversations of any kind re: authorization Ger armed forces or any modification existing disarmament and demilitarization agreements and regs pertaining to Ger.”⁸³

      Two days later, on 3 December, Adenauer gave an interview to John P. Leacacos of the Cleveland Plain Dealer that, according to Adenauer’s autobiography, was garbled when it appeared in the United States and caused “great excitement in the world press.”⁸⁴ In the interview, Adenauer reiterated his opposition to rearmament and stated that the presence of the occupying powers put the FRG under the protection of NATO: “Since the western powers have disarmed Germany, it is their duty by morals and under international law to care for the security of Germany.”⁸⁵ When asked about a German contribution to the defense of Western Europe, Adenauer responded first that the government would not allow the recruitment of Germans into other military services as that would be the same as “buying a people to have mercenaries.”⁸⁶ He then opened Pandora’s box when he told Leacacos that “Germany should contribute to the defense of Europe in a European Army under command of higher European headquarters at which time it will not only be urgent but necessary for the United States military aid program to be extended to Germany.”⁸⁷

      More interesting is what Adenauer said off the record. According to Leacacos, Adenauer then said that the Germans were the only people who could stop the Russians. “However,” Adenauer continued, “with the passage of time, the trained soldiers from general to private are forgetting their military skills. Therefore, if the Allies wait too long before they begin training a German army, it may be too late to be of immediate use to defend Germany against Russia.”⁸⁸

      On 8 December, Adenauer had a discussion with the three high commissioners in which he stated that his recent statements regarding German rearmament were made to allay fears in Germany that were caused by a number of issues. The recent NATO meeting in Paris, he said, had given no information on how Germany might be defended in the case of Russian aggression. Press rumors indicated that two alternatives had been discussed: a European defense on the Rhine and a defense on the Elbe. In addition, Adenauer said that he had evidence that an army was being created in East Germany and that it was no longer possible to believe that these troops were mere police formations.⁸⁹

      The Allies, Adenauer said, were duty bound to maintain the security of the Federal Republic. He believed that any defense on the Rhine was a hollow phrase, as Germany was living under a serious permanent threat, and that unless the Soviet Union was stopped where it was, Western Europe would be finished. Adenauer then asked that the western Allies make a declaration to the effect that West German territory would be defended against an attack and that his views be reported to their governments, which was agreed. It was further agreed that all should refrain from public statements on this issue; it was a matter for “no comment.”⁹⁰

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